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ABSTRACT
MONEY, OUTPUT AND REAL WAGES IN A NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK
WITH HETEROGENEOUS LABOR AND MONOPSONISTIC FIRMS
by
Robert J. Martel
University of New Hampshire, December, 1998
Representative agent models do not match up well with
three stylized facts of the business cycle: a money-output
connection, countercyclical markups, and acyclical real wages.
This thesis investigates whether a New Keynesian model which
departs from the representative agent assumptions and models
heterogeneity and imperfect competition in the labor market is
more consistent with these stylized facts.
One possible explanation of countercyclical markups and
acyclical real wages is that labor markets are monopsonistic
and

monopsony

recessions,
supply

be

power

is weaker

during

expansions

than

in

This would require that the elasticity of labor
procyclical.

This

is

not

possible

if

worker

preferences are homothetic.
An aggregate

labor supply

labor is constructed.

function for heterogeneous

Labor is indivisible, and workers are

heterogeneous with respect to their nonlabor income endowments
and preferences for risk. Nonlabor income is assumed to be
distributed Lognormally.

Workers'

optimizing choices in a

take-it-or-leave it job market are determined by a reservation
xiv
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wage function which relates reservation wages to nonlabor
income.

Aggregate labor supply is a composite function of

the Lognormal distribution of nonlabor income and the reserva
tion wage function.
The parameters of the aggregate labor supply function are
affected by changes in the aggregate price
interest rate.

An increase in the money supply increases

aggregate labor supply.
risk

level and the

aversion,

an

If workers have increasing relative

increase

in

money

also

increases

the

elasticity of labor supply. The magnitude of this increase
depends

upon the magnitudes

of the

interest- and wealth-

elasticities of the aggregate money demand function.
If

firms

aggregate

are

labor

monopsonistic,

supply

function

respect to monetary policy,
lical.
real

the
will

elasticity
be

of

procyclical

the
with

and markups will be countercyc

A calibrated version of the model indicates that the

wage would

be weakly countercyclical,

acyclical,

or

weakly procyclical, depending on the short-term elasticities
of the price

level and the interest rate with respect to

changes in M2.

The model implies a wealth-effects trans

mission

channel

from monetary

supply,

employment

and

output,

policy

to

restoring

aggregate
a

traditional

Keynesian theme of a monetary theory of production.

xv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

labor

CHAPTER I
REAL WAGES, MARKUPS, AMD THE MONEY-OUTPUT CONNECTION
1.1

Introduction

Macroeconomic models can be classified according to how
well their predictions match up with two well-established
stylized facts of the business cycle:[Fischer,

(1)

(1988)]

changes in the nominal money stock are positively
correlated with changes in real output;

(2)

the aggregate real wage is acyclical or weakly
procyclical.

Each stylized fact has had its own history of debate and
has been the subject of an extensive body of empirical and
theoretical research.

While most economists would probably

agree that these two statements have been descriptive of most
U. S. business cycles, when it comes to providing theoretical
explanations the contemporary literature breaks down into two
competing schools of thought: the New Keynesian (NK) and the
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theories1.

In the U. S. the published debates have been largely confined to these two
mainstream schools of thought. This is not to discount, by their exclusion here,
the theoretical contributions of other schools of thought such as the PostKeynesian, Non-Walrasian and Post-Walrasian, which have had greater acceptance
abroad.

1
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2

In this chapter I examine representative models of both
schools and show that neither school has had much success in
explaining

both

stylized

facts

in

a

principal conclusion of this chapter

single

model.

is that,

The

within the

conventional paradigms of macroeconomic theory, it has been
difficult to construct a model in which changes in money and
output are positively correlated and the aggregate real wage
is acyclical or weakly procyclical.

These two stylized facts represent nontrivial character
istics of national economies. The first one offers a rational
ization of the Keynesian Phillips curve and leads to the
inference

that

monetary policy.

cyclical

fluctuations

are

influenced

by

However, it is also consistent with the RBC

view that money is neutral but responds to changes in real
output. The second stylized fact implies that labor produc
tivity and labor's share of national income are procyclical,
which is hard to reconcile with the Keynesian assumption of a
stable short-run

aggregate production

function with

fixed

capital and decreasing returns to labor. (Sargent and Wallace,
1974; Canzoneri, 1977; Hall, 1991))

The RBC explanation is

that the aggregate production function is unstable and subject
to cyclical shocks to labor productivity.

Thus, the two main

schools

offer

of

thought

in

macroeconomics

contrasting

explanations of how cyclical shocks are propagated in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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aggregate labor market.
chapter that neither

It will be demonstrated

school

gets

it quite

in this

right,

i.

e.,

neither explanation is consistent with both stylized facts.

This inconsistency appears to involve the core arguments
of the New Keynesian-RBC debate, and begs an explanation.

The

source of the difficulty may reside in a common premise of the
two schools rather than their differences.

What is common to

both RBC and New Keynesian models,

and to macroeconomics

generally,

the

is

the method

by

which

atomistic

choice-

theoretic behavior specified for individual agents is attrib
uted one-for-one to their corresponding aggregates
assumption

of

a

representative

agent.

One

of

—

the

the

main

arguments of this chapter, and of this entire thesis, is that
the discrepancy between macro models and the stylized facts
about real wage behavior and the non-neutrality of money is
due to the restrictive assumptions inherent

in the repre

sentative agent method of aggregation, which preclude certain
relationships at the macro level.

It is well known that representative agent aggregation
is valid for consumers if and only if their preferences are
quasi-homothetic [Lewbel 1989, Kirman 1992, Martel 1996], and
for

firms

if and only

if their

identical and linearly homogeneous

production
[Sargent

functions
(1987)].

are

These

assumptions restrict the marginal responses of all agents on

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4
the same side of a market to be identical and independent of
scale, i. e., to be homogeneous.

Heterogeneity of marginal

responses is excluded by assumption.

This exclusion may be

problematic when applied to the aggregate labor market, since
there

is

ample

evidence

in the

literature

that

labor

is

heterogeneous and that heterogeneity often matters for labor
market outcomes2. [Ehrenberg (1971), Coleman (1984), Kydland
(1984), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Keane, Moffitt and Runkle
(1986).]

The evidence is more than circumstantial.

The

review of the extant literature in this chapter suggests that
heterogeneity in the labor market may be an important factor
in the real-wage anomaly.

It is a contention of this chapter that part of the
difficulty in constructing macro models that match up with
these two stylized facts is that the behavior that is observed
empirically is precluded theoretically by the representative
method of aggregation.

This proposition is the focal point

for the overall research agenda of this thesis, which is to
demonstrate that, by moving away from a representative agent
framework and employing a more general method of aggregation,
it is possible to fit both stylized facts concerning money and
real wages within an otherwise '* Keynesian” setup.

There also was the Cantabrigian debate over the homogeneity of capital and
the existence of an aggregate production function, which will not be resurrected
here. Solow (1957>, Ackley (1961), Kuh (1966) and Fisher (1969) also expressed
about the existence of a meaningful aggregate production function.
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5
In this chapter I present evidence in favor of this main
proposition, discuss some of the methodological issues and
problems that need to be addressed in the research, and pose
some questions and working hypotheses which will be explored
in the thesis. The chapters which follow will explore ways of
modeling aggregate behavior in the labor market when those
restrictive

assumptions

modeled explicitly.

are relaxed

and

A concluding section

heterogeneity

is

provides a guide to

the contents of Chapters II through V.

1.2

The Real Wage Anomaly

One of the more intriguing puzzles in macroeconomics is
why movements in the aggregate real wage are small relative to
fluctuations in employment and output over the business cycle.
Figure

1-1

shows

the historical

relationship

between the

aggregate real wage and output (both variables detrended and
in logs) .

The real wage appears to have been procyclical

during the 1970's, but outside of that time period it is not
possible to discern a persistent relationship from the graph.
Table 1-1 shows estimated elasticities of the aggregate real
wage with respect to output and employment for the period
1949-1993.

Only two of the elasticities are significantly

different from zero, and those have low values3 .

3The elasticities in Table 1-1 are the results of replications by- Abraham
and Haltiwanger (1995) of several previous studies.
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Figure 1-1. Aggregate Real Wage Vs. Industrial Output, 1949-1994
(From Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995)
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Figure 1-2. M2 Annual Growth Rate Vs. the Business Cycle
(Federal Reserve Board)
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TABLE 1-1
CYCLICAL ELASTICITY OF THE AGGREGATE REAL WAGE
Quarterly BLS Data, Hodrick-Prescott Detrended
Cyclical
Indicator

Real Wage
Measure

IPI

AHE/PPI
AHE/PPI

Employment

1949-69

Elasticity
1970-93

1949-93

-.141
(.091)

+.186*
(.090)

.007
(.076)

-.222
(.154)

.020
(.152)

-.098
(.110)

HEI/PPI

IPI

-.185*
(.087)

.080
(.043)

-.024
(.082)

HEI/PPI

Employment

-.296
(.152)

.001
(.070)

-.147
(.115)

From Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Table 3. Estimation by OLS on
logarithmic data. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Statistically significant at 5%; others are not significant.
AHE: Average Hourly Earnings. PPI: Producers' Price Index.
IPI: Industrial Production Index. HEI: Hourly Earnings Index.
Data for HEI are 1949-1988.

TABLE 1-2
CYCLICAL ELASTICITIES OF DISAGGREGATED REAL WAGES
Based on PSID Annual Data
Investioators

Data
Period

Individual
Elasticities

Stockman (1983)

1967-80

-1.31

Coleman (1984)

1968-79

-1.53

Aggregate
Elasticitv
-.96(ns)

Bias
---

-1.07

Mather (1987)
Solon & Barsky
(1989)

1967-84

-1.26

-.78

+ .48

Solon, Barsky
& Parker(1994)

1967-87

-1.16

-.57

+ .59

From Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Table 5. Cyclical variable is the
unemployment rate. GDP deflator used by all investigators.
(ns) * not significant; all others are significant at 5% or lower.
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One can infer from Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1 that there is
no set pattern to the behavior of the aggregate real wage; its
elasticity

was

weakly

procyclical

in

the

1970's,

weakly

countercyclical at other times, seldom significantly different
from zero, and when estimated over two or more decades the
elasticities essentially cancel out.

From the data in Table

1-1, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the aggregate real
wage is acyclical with respect to employment4.

There is some evidence that real wages in the U. S. are
more procyclical at lower levels of aggregation (Bils, 1985).
Several investigators have found real wages estimated from
individual wage data to be procyclical.
summarized in Table 1-2.

These findings are

The BLS measures of aggregate wages

are not adjusted for changes in composition of the workforce,
and thus have a composition bias.

The bias is countercyclical

because low-wage workers are disproportionally represented in
layoffs during recessions and in hires during expansions; thus
their wages and hours are weighted accordingly in computing
the

economy-wide average

wage.

Solon,

Barsky

and

Parker

(1994) estimated a composition bias of +0.59 in the elasticity
of the real wage with respect to unemployment during the

4The choice of a cyclical indicator depends on what hypothesis one is is
interested in testing. Since the real product wage is determined in the labor
market, the natural indicator would seem to be employment or the unemployment
rate. In Table 1-1 the difference between the elasticities with respect to the
IPI and employment during 1970-93 can be attributed to the fact that industrial
output was more cyclical than total employment during that period. Other problems
of measurement are discussed in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995).
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1967-87 period5. (Table 1-2, row 5).

This finding suggests that real wages were more procyc
lical during that period (and presumably the entire 1949-1993
period) them would be inferred from the data in Table 1-1. It
should

be

noted

that,

however

measured,

real

wages

were

unusually procyclical during the 1970's, which was a period of
stagflation with historically high inflation and supply-side
productivity shocks.

The direction and magnitude of composi

tion bias in other time periods is unknown.

The preponderance of the evidence is that the aggregate
real wage is neither countercyclical nor strongly procyclical
(i.e. elasticity approaching +1) . Depending on the time period
examined,

the source of fluctuations,

methods employed,

and the statistical

observed aggregate real wages are either

acyclical or weakly procyclical6.

The issue of composition

bias serves as a reminder that the national labor "market" is
quite heterogeneous,
skills,

with distributions

of human capital,

productivity and tastes for work which may engender

5tTsing Okun's 3:1 rule to convert changes in the unemployment rate to
changes in GDP, the estimated adjustment for composition bias in Table 1-1 would
be 3{.59)» +.177 for the IPI elasticity in the period 1970-93, resulting in an
adjusted procyclical elasticity of (.186 + .177) = +.363., which is moderately
procyclical. This adjustment is not applicable to other time periods or cyclical
measures in Table 1-1 due to lack of comparability.
6Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) provide a contemporary review and analysis
of the extensive empirical literature on real wage behavior. They conclude that
after adjusting for composition bias the aggregate real wage is procyclical, but
they do not commit to magnitudes or time periods.
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non-homogeneous marginal responses leading to fallacies of
composition.

One of the major arguments of this chapter and

thesis is that modeling such heterogeneous responses of the
labor market is an important avenue to a theoretical explan
ation of the money-output connection and acyclical real wages.

1.2

A

Countercyclical Markups

prof it-maximizing

monopolistic

firm

will

set

its

product price above marginal cost, which creates a markup:
,.(»•) . f - c 7 [?(*•)] ..
1
P*
r\(Pm)

(X. 1)

Here P* is the monopolist's optimum price, q(P*) the corres
ponding optimum quantity to produce and sell,

C'(q(P*)

is

marginal cost, and r|(P*) is the elasticity of product demand,
the inverse of which is Abba Lerner's index of monopoly power.
There

is

ample

evidence

that

many

U.

S.

industries

are

imperfectly competitive and, more significantly, that price
markups in those industries are countercyclical (Bils, 1987,
1989; Hall, 1988; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991). Equation 1.1
shows that

if

a firm's markup is countercyclical then

monopoly power is also countercyclical (i.e. is
expansions

and stronger in recessions) .

elasticity

of

industry demand,

q(P*) ,in

its

weaker in

Equivalently, the
an

imperfectly

competitive industry, must be procyclical.
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Figure 1-3

(a) and

(b) show the cyclical behavior of

markups over aggregate marginal cost in U. S. manufacturing
industries, as calculated by Bils (Panel (a)) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (Panel (b)).

The divergence of markups from the

level of employment is evident in the 1973-75 and 1981-83
recessions and in the expansion of the mid-1980's.

Bils

estimated the elasticity of markups with respect to aggregate
production employment to be -0.333, highly significant,

and

persistent in sign across two-digit industries.

As with the real-wage anomaly, the hypothesis that demand
elasticities are procyclical is problematic for the repre
sentative

agent

method

almost universally
schedule

is

schedules.

an

of

aggregation,

in macroeconomics.

aggregation

of

which
An

individual

is

employed

industry demand
consumer

demand

The representative agent method of aggregation

requires the underlying assumption of identical, homothetic
consumer preferences, which in turn implies that the elastici
ty of consumer demand is invariant with respect to changes in
scale (income or wealth).

In this case, the representative

consumer's demand curve shifts iso-elastically with a constant
markup

in response

to

changes

in aggregate

income.

The

evidence of strongly countercyclical markups contradicts a
representative agent model, and suggests that it may be
productive to depart somewhat from the representative agent
assumptions and model heterogeneity in the economy.
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The real wage and markup anomalies cure closely related.
Keynes (1939), in responding to evidence offered by Dunlop
(1938) that real wages in England were not countercyclical as
implied by the General Theory, offered an explanation in terms
of offsetting countercyclical markups in imperfectly competi
tive

industries,

(1938).

an

idea

which he

attributed

to

Kalecki

However, it is evident from the previous discussion

that Keynes' explanation is also inconsistent with represen
tative agent aggregation.

An explanation of acyclical or

procyclical real wage behavior in terms of cyclical elastici
ties of supply or demand is problematic within a represen
tative consumer framework.

New

Keynesian

models

rationalize

sticky

prices

by

assuming that imperfectly competitive firms have weak incent
ives to change prices when there is a change in demand. The
weak incentive may be attributed to menu costs (Mankiw, 1985)
or non-optimizing behavior (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) .

Most

of these models, including the two just cited, assume constant
marginal cost.

The effect of a change in demand on the

markup will depend on the firm's price-setting behavior in
relation to its marginal cost.
and menu

costs

are

small,

If marginal cost is constant

a profit-maximizing

firm

will

maintain its price and the markup in Equation 1.1 will be
constant, contrary to what is generally observed.
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On the other hand, if marginal cost is increasing and the
firm maintains its price, the markup will be countercyclical,
which is observed but is also inconsistent with representative
agent

aggregation

over

consumers.

It

appears

that

the

implications of the New Keynesian imperfect competition models
need to be reconciled with the empirical evidence on markups.
Again, it may be fruitful to move away from the representative
agent framework in order to accomplish this.

1.4 The Monev-Output Connection

One of the more important stylized facts of macroeconom
ics is that lagged changes in real GDP over the business cycle
are positively correlated with changes in the nominal money
supply.

The empirical evidence in support of this proposition

is quite strong7.

Figure 1-2 shows that every post-1950

recession in the U. S. has been preceded by a significant
decline in the rate of growth of M2,

followed by a sharp

reversal of that trend during recessions and an increase in
the growth rate during

subsequent expansions.

recession was an exception.)

(The 1990-91

Although visually impressive,

such a graph is hardly proof that a positive correlation
exists over time.

7

The empirical evidence on the money-output connection is discussed
greater detail in Chapter II.
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The
(1963)

landmark study of money by Friedman

concluded

economic activity.
bivariate

and

that

changes

in money

and

cause

Schwarz

changes

in

More recent econometric studies employing

multivariate

causality

tests

(Sims,

1972;

Mishkin, 1983) also found that changes in money Granger-cause
output®.

The positive correlation is not in question; howev

er, the direction of causality is an issue which separates the
two schools of business-cycle theory —
Business Cycle (RBC) advocates —

Keynesians and Real

who have agreed to disagree

on the issue of the neutrality of money9.

The non-neutrality of money implies the

existence of

significant non-homogenous demand or supply responses some
where in the economy.

In a Keynesian setup these are general

ly assumed to be caused by nominal rigidities in prices or
wages, and much of the New Keynesian research agenda has been
directed at establishing choice-theoretic microfoundations for
such rigidities.

These have generally taken

the

form of

fi

Recent surveys of the empirical evidence on the money-output connection
are Bernanke (1986), Romer and Romer (1989), Blanchard (1990) and B. Friedman
(1995).
Although some studies have not found a causal relationship, most
conclude that the rate of money growth is a causal factor in real output
fluctuations at business-cycle frequencies.
Causation is implied when the
innovation in money is exogenous to changes in output.
Q

A third interpretation of the evidence, associated with the Post-Keynesian
school, is that money is endogenous to the real economy, and that the positive
correlation between money and output is due to the procyclical demand for and
supply of credit. This interpretation places the central bank in a more or less
accommodative rather than a proactive posture. Brunner and Meltzer (1993, pp.
55-58) critique this interpretation and reject it on empirical grounds.
Nevertheless, the credit channel hypothesis is very much alive. (See Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) for a recent review.)
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frictions or "menu” adjustment costs which cause prices or
wages to be sticky.

But the incorporation of sticky prices

or wages in a model of imperfect competition also affects the
cyclical behavior of markups and the real wage in response to
external shocks.

This becomes evident when the markup is

expressed as:
i

(1 .2 )

where I is labor, F£ is its marginal product, W is the money
wage,

P is the product price,

product demand.

and ti is the elasticity of

Equation 1.2 can be rearranged thusly:

(1.3)

With fixed technology and diminishing returns to labor in the
conventional short-run production function, F£ is countercyc
lical. If nominal wages are sticky and prices are flexible,
the real wage will be countercyclical if markups are constant
(including the special case of zero, i.e., perfect competi
tion10) . This

is

the

Traditional

nevertheless is counter factual.

Keynesian

result

which

Keynes's conjecture to Dunlop

was that m(£) might be countercyclical enough to offset the
influence of F£ and cause W/P to be constant or even pro
cyclical.

Thus, if the goods market is imperfectly competi

10Thi8 assumes decreasing returns to labor, i.e.

< 0.
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tive the cyclical behavior of the real wage will depend on the
cyclical behavior of markups and the elasticity of F£.

Conversely, if prices are sticky and wages are flexible,
then, (a) markups will be constant and the real wage will be
countercyclical if marginal cost is constant, or (b) markups
will be countercyclical and the real wage will be strongly
procyclical if marginal cost is increasing and the elasticity
of labor supply is low.

(Romer 1996,

pp.

218-219).

This

outcome is closer to the stylized facts, but the real wage may
be too strongly procyclical.

Also, the assumption that prices

are stickier than wages may not be realistic.

If both wages and prices are sticky, we have the case of
generalized disequilibrium in which the out-of-equilibrium
adjustment path of the real wage in response to demand shocks
is generally ambiguous, although under certain conditions it
could be procyclical (Barro and Grossman, 1976, pp. 95-98.)

Thus, the responses of markups and the aggregate real
wage to an external

shock

also depend

critically

on how

nominal and real rigidities are specified in a model.
behavior of markups and the real wage
Keynesian

models

predetermined

of

by the

imperfect
stickiness

The

implied by the New

competition
assumptions,

are

virtually

and are

entirely consistent with the empirical record.
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1.5

Survey of Representative Macroeconomic Models

This section presents some evidence in support of the
proposition that most macroeconomic models find it difficult
to explain the actual behavior of real wages and the non
neutrality of money.

The various schools of macroeconomic

theory are classified along these two dimensions, and then the
implications of representative models of each class are summ
arized11.

Figure 1-4 classifies the main schools of macroeconomic
theory according to the neutrality of money and the predicted
cyclical behavior of the real wage.

The Classical and Real

Business Cycle models preserve the classical dichotomy between
nominal and real variables,

and therefore make

connection between money and output.

no

causal

Traditional Keynesian

and Post-Keynesian models can explain involuntary unemployment
but predict a countercyclical

real wage.

Christiano

and

Eichenbaum (1992) point out that Keynesian models understate,
and RBC models overstate, the degree of positive correlation
between real wages and employment.

11It would be impossible to be all-inclusive in this survey, and therefore
I have selected models which have been judged to be canonically representative
of their class- based on their citations and inclusion in compendia. It is
possible that counter-examples in the literature have been overlooked.
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Both the Disequilibrium and New Keynesian classes of
models are capable, under certain conditions, of exhibiting
rigid or procyclical real wages. However, their implications
are not quite in accord with the acyclical real wage behavior
shown in Table 1-1.

1.5.1

The specifics are discussed below.

Traditional Kevnesian and Post-Kevnesian Models

Traditional Keynesian models based on The General Theory
are summarized in Table 1-3.
Theory

(1936)

had a causal

countercyclical real wage.

Keynes' model in The General
role

for money but

implied

a

To clarify ideas, it may be useful

to describe in modern terms why this was so.

Keynes accepted the classical theory of a competitive
labor market in which the real wage is equal to the marginal
product of labor.
short

run,

the

With capital and technology fixed in the
marginal

product

of

labor

declines

with

increasing employment, so that:
... with a given organization, equipment and technique, real
wages and the volume of output (and hence of employment) are
uniquely correlated, so that, in general, an increase in
employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in
the rate of real wages.

[Keynes, 1936,Chap. 2,

p. 17]

In the short-period framework of The General Theory Keynes
implicitly ruled out shocks to technology or the productivity
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TABLE 1-3
TRADITIONAL KEYNESIAN MODELS
MONEY-OUTPUT

REHAVTOR OF W/P

Keynes G. T. (1936)

Non-neutral

Countercyclical

Hicks IS/LM

Non-neutral

MODEL

(1937)

Keynes (1939)
Reply to
Dunlop-Tarshis

Non-neutral

Countercyclical
(with Phillips curve
supply side)
Acyclical or Pro
cyclical if markups
are countercyclical

TABLE 1-4
REPRESENTATIVE NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS
MODEL
STICKY W OR P

MONEY-OUTPUT

Baily (1974)
W/P

None
(Real Model)

Rigid
(Optimal Path)

Fischer (1977)
Taylor (1980)
W

Non-neutral
(Staggered
Wage-Setting)

Rigid
(Constant Markup
Assumed)

Mankiw (1985)
P

Non-neutral
(Menu costs in
goods market)

Akerlof &
Yellen (1985)
W
Blanchard &
Kiyotaki (1987)
W, P
Ball & Romer (1990)
W, P

BEHAVIOR OF W/P

Non-neutral
(Near-rationa1
Wage-setting)

Procyclical
Rigid (maximizers)
Countercyclical for
non-maximi zers

Non-neutral
(Menu costs in both
goods & labor markets)
Non-neutral
(Real and nominal
rigidities;
heterogeneous labor,
efficiency wages

Rigid
(W and P are
fixed)
Acyclical
(assumed)
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of labor, implying that firms would always be on their (stat
ionary) labor demand curves.

This situation is shown in Panel

(a) of Figure 1-5.

Keynes posited that nominal wages would be rigid downward, so
that if prices fell in a recession the real wage would be
above the market-clearing level. Employment and output would
be constrained by effective demand, and there would be invol
untary unemployment.

The real wage would move countercyc-

lically along the labor demand curve in response to changes in
effective demand,

e.g. , as between point A and point B in

Figure 1-5(a)12.

Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1938) confronted Keynes with
data purporting to show that real and money wages in England
were positively correlated; under the assumption that money
wages are procyclical, one could infer that the real wage is
also

procyclical,

plied13.

not

countercyclical

as

Keynes

had

im

Interestingly, Keynes' reply included, among other

considerations, the conjecture that the degree of imperfect

12

Not all interpreters of Keynes would agree with this exegesis, e. g.
Davidson (1994), Chap. 11. A more extreme Post-Keynesian view is that neither
the demand for or supply of labor depend upon the real wage, e. g., Applebaum
(1979 >, Eichner (1985). The diversity of Post-Keynesian visions of the labor
market makes it difficult to include them in the scope of this thesis.
13Tarshis (1939) subsequently recanted his conclusions from the data in his
1938 paper, concluding in the end that the data implied a countercyclical real
wage. Coleman (1984) pointed out that Dunlop and Tarshis have often been mis
quoted, and set8 the record straight.
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competition, reflected in markups of price over marginal cost,
varied countercyclically so as to offset the downward influ
ence of the labor demand curve, a deus ex nachina he attribut
ed to Kalecki.

This idea was never incorporated into the

Traditional Keynesian legacy.

The countercyclical real wage

of the General Theory was carried over in the Hicks-Hansen
interpretation of Keynesian economics.

Thus, Trad

itional Keynesian models became subject to the criticism that
they were counter factual with respect to the behavior of the
aggregate real wage,

and

ignored the

supply

side

of

the

economy.

Post-Keynesian models are a different genotype of the
General Theory and to a great extent are not comparable with
any of the other classes.

There are many variations, but most

have in common the non-neutrality of money, imperfect competi
tion in the goods market, and markup pricing that is deter
mined by the anticipated internal financing needs of firms
rather than short-term profit maximization.
1985, 1991), Chick (1983),

(Eichner (1973,

Post-Keynesians appear to lack a

consensus on how the labor market functions,

or whether a

conventional market model is even relevant (Applebaum 1979;
Eichner 1985, Chap. 5; 1991, Chap.
here with

the Traditional

1)

Keynesians,

They are classified
but

are

considered

beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed
further.
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1.5.2

Kevnesian Disequilibrium M q Hp Ig

Disequilibrium interpretations of Keynes [e. g . , Patinkin
(1965. Chap. XIII)), Leijonhufvud (1968, 1981), Clower (1965)
Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976) ] assumed wage-price rigidities
which prevent one or more markets from clearing, rationalizing
both involuntary unemployment and a money-output connection.
The behavior of the real wage in response to aggregate demand
shocks depends on specific assumptions regarding its out-ofequilibrium adjustment path, and in general is ambiguous.
Barro and Grossman (1976, p. 95-99) argued that the out-ofequilibrium adjustment behavior of the real wage is likely to
be less countercyclical than in a market-clearing model, and
can be procyclical.
rium model

Although the Barro-Grossman disequilib

is pas de rigrueur in America,

much of the New

Keynesian research program is devoted to developing choicetheoretic foundations for the wage and price rigidities that
were merely assumed in that model.

1.5.3

New Kevnesian Models

Some representative New Keynesian models are listed in
Table 1-4.

These are partial equilibrium micro models of the

labor or goods market which were developed to provide choicetheoretic microfoundations for nominal and real rigidities
that previously had been assumed.

The implications of these
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models are extrapolated to the macro level by invoking the
representative agent assumption.

The earlier sticky-wage models [Fischer (1977); Taylor
(1980) ] also implied and predicted a countercyclical real
wage.

Baily (1974) presented a highly stylized model of risk-

sharing in an industry in which the optimum strategy for all
firms was to maintain a rigid real wage14. More recent models
have attempted to rationalize sticky prices based on imperfect
competition and menu costs or other externalities in the goods
market.

A money-output connection follows from the presence

of nominal rigidities, but most of these models assume rather
them predict a rigid real wage
(1985).

(e.g.

Akerlof

and

Yellen

Thus, New Keynesian models tend to treat the real

wage as a free parameter, to be specified to fit the circum
stances.

It appears that the assumption of rigid nominal

wages, which engendered criticism of Traditional Keynesian and
Disequilibrium

models,

has

been

supplanted

in

many

New

Keynesian models by the assumption of a rigid real wage.

14Baily'8 model and a related 1975 paper are discussed in Appendix C,
where it is shown that the model provides a rationale for the assumption of
monopsony power in the aggregate labor market. Also, implicit contract models
are not discussed here. According to Rosen (1985):
Contract theory neither resolves nor illuminates questions
of Keynesian unemployment based on nominal wage and price
rigidities, money illusion and non-market clearing. Explan
ations for 'sticky' wages and prices that impede efficient labor
utilization must be sought in other quarters.
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The 1990 paper by Ball and Romer appears to have all of
the necessary ingredients, but instead of deriving implica
tions for the real wage, the authors calibrated their model so
that it would be acyclical, in keeping with the empirical re
cord15. Many New Keynesian models arrive at a rigid real wage
by fixing either W or P and assuming a constant ratio W/P,
which implies that markups are exactly as countercyclical as
the marginal product of labor, a rather special case.
Equation 1.3.)

(See

Thus, for the New Keynesian class of models,

money is non-neutral but the theoretical underpinnings

of

acyclical real wages are, for the most part, not fully worked
out.

1.5.4

Efficiency Wage Models

A

similar pattern

is evident

in the

Efficiency Wage

models listed in Table 1-5, a subcategory of the New Keynesian
literature.

The efficiency wage hypothesis specifies that

the productivity of workers depends positively on their real
wages, and is embodied in an effort function e(w) which
supplants the labor supply curve.

Given their product prices,

firms set the nominal wage to minimize labor cost per effi
ciency unit of labor, which occurs where the real-wage elast
icity of e(w) is unity.

Firms are on their labor demand

15Ball and Romer were using their model to argue that both nominal and real
rigidities are important for the non-neutrality of money, and in that exercise
the real wage was a free parameter that had to be pinned down.
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TABLE 1-5
EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS
MODEL
Solow (1979)

MONEY-OUTPUT

Neutral

BEHAVIOR OF W/P
Rigid*

Weiss (1980)

Neutral
(Adverse selection
in hiring)

Rigid*

Akerlof (1982)

Neutral
(higher effort and
wages are gift

Rigid*

Shapiro &
Stiglitz (1984)

Neutral
Procyclical with
(Shirking constraint; technology shocks;
labor supply not
otherwise ambiguous
relevant)
exchanges)

Akerlof &
Yellen (1985)

Non-neutral
(Imperfect competition,
menu costs in goods &
labor markets)

Rigid*
(Constant Markup
assumed)

Chatterji &
Sparks (1991)

Neutral
(Continuous effort
function and
endogenous perform
ance standard)

Procyclical with;
productivity
shocks
j

Real wage rigidity is either assumed or implied only in a partial
equilibrium or representative agent framework.
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curves at a real wage that is higher than that which will
clear the labor market and thus there is involuntary unemploy
ment.

This is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1-5, where the

equilibrium real wage is determined initially at point A, the
intersection of the efficiency wage locus e(w) with the labor
demand curve.

The efficiency real wage wQ is higher them the

market-clearing

wage

wc, and

involuntary

unemployment

is

represented by the distance AD.

It turns out that the implications of efficiency wages
for the cyclical behavior of the real wage are model-depend
ent. One of the problems in this literature is that these are
partial equilibrium micro models, and the assumed sources of
cyclical

fluctuations

in the

labor market

are

not

always

clearly specified.

In the simple efficiency wage model in which the effic
iency wage locus is a function of only the real wage,

the

labor supply curve plays no role in determining employment or
the real wage; it merely determines the amount of involuntary
employment.

In this case,

factors which shift

the

labor

supply curve will not affect the efficiency wage or employ
ment.

Because of this, technology shocks are the only source

of cyclical fluctuations in simple efficiency wage models, and
these will produce a procyclical real wage.

(For a positive

shock this is shown as movement from point A to point B in
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Figure

1-5,

Panel

(b) .)

According

to

this

theory,

the

cyclical elasticity of the real wage would be close to the
elasticity of the effort function e(w), which is +1 at the
optimum efficiency wage.
models imply,

This

is comparable to what RBC

and based on the evidence in Table 1-1,

is

counterfactual.

In the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model, the unemployment
rate is a shift variable for the effort function.

e(w,U).

which is interpreted as a shirking constraint on workers.
An

outward

shift

of

the

labor

supply curve

due

to,

for

example, a monetary shock will increase involuntary unemploy
ment.

The higher unemployment rate decreases the chances that

a worker who is fired for shirking will be rehired quickly,
and therefore decreases the expected payoff from shirking at
the current wage.

Thus, an increase in the unemployment rate

allows firms to lower their wages optimally without increasing
shirking.

This results in a downward shift of the efficiency

wage locus (i. e., the shirking constraint) , which follows the
labor supply curve. In the absence of a technology shock the
result will be a lower optimum efficiency wage and increased
employment, i. e., a countercyclical real wage.

Shocks to technology in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model will
shift both the labor demand curve and the shirking constraint
but in opposite directions because the change in unemployment
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will have a negative feedback effect on the propensity to
shirk.

In this case,

the effect of unemployment

on the

shirking constraint will reinforce the direction of movement
of the real wage and

partially offset the effect on employ

ment

Thus,

and

output16.

with

unemployment

as

a

shift

variable in the efficiency wage locus, shocks to technology
will produce a strongly procyclical real wage, as Shapiro and
Stiglitz claimed.

However, if cyclical shocks shift both the

labor demand and labor supply curves in the same direction,
the movement of the real wage is ambiguous.

In efficiency wage models, firms set wages unilaterally
according to an uncontested profit-maximizing rule which is
independent of labor supply.
because

the

efficiency

wage

Workers are willing wage-takers
offer

is

higher

than

their

reservation wage and there is involuntary unemployment.

It

would seem that in order to be able to set the wage unilater
ally and thereby create involuntary unemployment, firms must
have some degree of monopsony power in the labor market17.
This point is reinforced by the fact that the labor market
does

not

clear

at

the

efficiency

wage

(there

is

excess

16The possible outcomes are the same as when supply and demand curves move
in opposite directions.
17

Except for a brief discussion by Weiss (1990) in the context of a
nutrition model, the relationship between efficiency wages and monopsony power
has not been explored in the literature. Also, the capacity of firms to "set" the
real wage requires that they have significant market power over both product
prices and wages.
This is seldom made explicit in the efficiency wage
literature.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
notional supply) and there are unemployed workers who would be
willing to work for less but, like the Outsiders of Lindbeck
and Snower (1988), lack the bargaining power to bid down the
wage and gain employment.

This suggests that a monopsony

model of the aggregate labor market in which the degree of
monopsony power to set the wage varies over the business cycle
might be a useful way to describe the labor market18.
Kalecki-Keynes

This

idea redux is developed more completely

in

Chapter IV of this thesis.

While most efficiency wage models assume that workers
are identical and have the same effort function, the adverse
selection models of Guasch and Weiss (1980) and Weiss (1990)
assume that workers are heterogeneous in productivity,

but

firms can only imperfectly screen for and monitor the produc
tivity of
highly

individuals.

correlated

higher wages

with

If workers'
their

reservation wages are

productivity,

then

offering

is one way of attracting and retaining more

productive workers19. This is a fairly common practice for
employers

in

primary,

high-skill

labor markets

(1970), Rees (1973), Lang and Leonard (1987).

(Reynolds

Thus, paying

* The monopsony wage clears the market below the competitive equilibrium
wage, whereas the efficiency wage is a non-market-clearing wage above the
competitive equilibrium wage,
Monopsonistic firms might pay more than the
monopsony wage to retain productive workers, but possibly less than the
efficiency wage, the difference being determined by the cost of monitoring.
A critical screening parameter in hiring is an applicant's wage history,
or "salary requirements" i. e, their reservation wage. Reservation wages that
are too high or too low may be equally valid reasons for rejection. Thus, a
revealed reservation wage sends a signal about worker quality.
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higher wage differentials may be a simple and direct way for
firms to deal with the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard when workers vary in quality

(Weiss,

1990)20.

One

implication of the adverse selection models is that worker
heterogeneity can be a cause of unemployment and layoffs in
primary markets.

Heterogeneity in the workforce may also be

a factor contributing to anomalous real wage behavior.

Efficiency wage models have gained acceptance

in the

Keynesian camp because they offer choice-theoretic microfound
ations for a rigid non-market-clearing wage,
involuntary unemployment.

and thus for

But therein lies their limitation,

for these are partial equilibrium models of a firm's choices
in its markets, not general equilibrium macro models.

Micro

behavior is imputed to the economy as a whole by assuming a
representative agent on each side of every market.
previously,

As stated

representative agent aggregation is valid only

when the marginal responses of individual agents are homo
geneous.

If efficiency wages are a means

heterogeneous workers

in local

of sorting out

labor markets

that do not

clear, it is not obvious that representative agent aggregation
is appropriate.

An open question then, for the New Keynesian

literature,is the question of whether the real wage and markup

20

There are other ways, such as Okun’s Toll (1981), probation periods,
piecework, tenure systems, and requiring workers to post performance bonds. All
of these are problematical, as discussed in Weiss (1990).
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anomalies are due

in part to

inconsistent aggregation of

heterogeneous labor.

Efficiency wage models appear to be an implicit acknowl
edgment that labor markets tend to be imperfectly competitive,
that workers are heterogeneous, and that problems of asymmet
ric information and adverse selection abound in the employment
relationship.

These kinds of market imperfections are dealt

with more explicitly in the implicit contract and job search
literature, which has largely been supplanted by the efficien
cy wage construct.

Because efficiency wages impart only real

rigidity, money is neutral in the absence of nominal rigidi
ties.

This is evident in Table 1-3, where money is neutral in

all of the models except for Akerlof and Yellen (1985) , which
also incorporated imperfect competition and menu costs.

It is understood that for changes in money to have a
persistent effect on employment and output, there must also be
a source of persistent real rigidity in the system. (Blanchard
and Fischer,

1989).

Efficiency wage constructions provide

microfoundations for real wage rigidity in a partial equilib
rium setting.

However, the behavior of the efficiency real

wage in a general equilibrium setting depends on the particu
lar efficiency wage model employed, and in general is ambigu-
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ous21 [(Blanchard (1986), Ball and Romer (1990)].
vage

constructions

provide

a

rationale

for

Efficiency
involuntary

unemployment, but as yet do not provide much insight into the
behavior of the aggregate real wage in a general equilibrium
framework. Thus, in their present state of development, they
do not have clear-cut implications for the behavior of the
aggregate real wage (Romer, 1996, p.458).

1.5.5

Real Business Cvcle Models

Table 1-6 lists some of the RBC models that have been
cited frequently in the literature.
RBC models contain money.

None of these standard

They are general equilibrium models

with continuous market clearing, in the Classical tradition.
For the most part, business cycle fluctuations are assumed to
be caused by random exogenous shocks to productivity —

real

as opposed to monetary driving forces. This is equivalent to
shifting the labor demand curve against a stationary labor
supply curve in equilibrium, as shown in Panel (c) of
Figure

1-5.

Since the elasticity of the aggregate labor

supply curve is assumed to be small, these models predict a
strongly procyclical real wage, with an elasticity of the real
wage with respect to employment of nearly +1, which is

21

A search of the literature did not yield a general equilibrium macro
model which incorporates efficiency wages in the labor market.
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TABLE 1-6
REPRESENTATIVE REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
MODEL

SOURCE OF
SHOCKS

BEHAVIOR OF W/P

Kydland &
Prescott (1982)

Total factor
productivity

Strongly Procyclical
S’y O ] =* +1.4
p(o,n) == + .90

Long &
Plosser (1983)

Stochastic
productivity

Strongly Procyclical
p(o,n) = +.97

Prescott (1986)

Labor
Productivity

Strongly Procyclicalj
p(o,n) = +.95

Hansen (1985)

Labor
Productivity
(Indivisible labor)

Strongly Procyclical
p(u,n) = + .87

King, Plosser
& Rebelo (1988)

Labor
Productivity

Strongly Procyclical
p(w,n) = +.90

Eichenbaum, Hansen
& Singleton (1988)

Labor
Productivity

Strongly Procyclical
(no estimate given)

MODIFIED RBC MODELS
Rogerson &
Wright (1988)

Monetary Shocks
(Indivisible labor,
Sticky W, Wealth
effects)

Countereye1ica1

Hansen & Wright
(1992)

Productivity, plus
government spending

Procyclical
p(o,n) = +.49
to +.76

Christiano &
Eichenbaum (1992)

Labor Productivity &
government spending
(Indivisible Labor)

Baxter & King
(1993)

Government purchases
temporary, permanent

-1 < ry[o] < 0

Procyclical
p(o>,n) = +.575
to +.81
Countercyclical
^[ e ] = -.70
on impact

♦Temporary and permanent changes in government purchases have different
long-term real wage elasticities; for temporary purchases the elasticity
converges to -.25, and for permanent purchases the long-run elasticity

is +1.0.
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counterfactual. (Compare the elasticities in Table 1-6 with
those in Table 1-1).

Since RBC models provide no role for

money in the business cycle,
necessarily a statistical)
output.

they deny a causal

(but not

relationship between money

and

The observed money-output correlation is explained as

central bank accommodation to real output fluctuations,
interpretation of the data which is controversial.

an

Thus, the

standard RBC models do not offer a comfortable fit to the two
stylized facts22.

Some investigators have modified the standard KydlandPrescott

RBC

model

wealth effects,

by

incorporating

government

spending,

and even sticky wages and monetary shocks

(Rogerson and Wright,

1988).

The addition of government

spending shocks reduces the procyclicality of the real wage.
The implications of the Rogerson and Wright model are almost
Keynesian, except there is no involuntary employment. However,
none of these modified RBC models fit our two criteria as well
as the New Keynesian models of Table 1-4 (Particularly Ball
and Romer (1990)) . They are equilibrium models in which there
is no involuntary unemployment.

Gali (1996) has criticized

these multi-shock RBC models and presented evidence that a New
Keynesian model with imperfect competition, sticky prices and
efficiency wages (e.g., as in Ball and Romer, 1990) is more
22

RBC models have been criticized on other technical grounds which are not
relevant to the present discussion. (See Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985),
HcCallum (1988), Mankiw (1989).
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consistent with the observed low correlation between labor
productivity and employment.

Although the RBC class of models is interesting, they
will not be considered further in this thesis.

Instead, the

thesis will focus on the Keynesian view of the business cycle,
with the objective of discovering what is necessary in order
to reconcile this class of models with the actual behavior of
real wages, markups,

1.5.6

and the money-output connection.

Summary and Conclusions

Traditional Keynesian, New Keynesian and RBC models have
difficulty explaining the empirical behavior of the aggregate
real wage.

The findings and some of their implications are

summarized in Table 1-7.

It is evident that, in the cases of

imperfect competition, counterfactuality extends to the markup
and the implied elasticity of aggregate demand.

No class of

models considered here is problem-free. The various assump
tions about flexible or sticky nominal wages,

prices,

real

wages, imperfect competition, markups and the neutrality of
money have produced a rich and informative body of literature,
which nevertheless falls short of explaining both
facts introduced at the beginning of this chapter.

stylized
Since the

macroeconomic implications of these models also depend on the
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TABLE 1-7
MODEL PREDICTIONS OF REAL WAGE AND MARKUP BEHAVIOR

Model Class

Source of
Rioiditv

Traditional
Keynesian

Nominal
Wages

Keynesian

Goods
Prices

Strongly
Procyclical*

Real Wage
and
Goods
Prices

Rigid(?) *
Strongly
Procyclical*
Counter
cyclical*

Efficiency
Wage

DisEquilibrium
Real
Business
Cycle

Real Wage
<■>
Counter
cyclical*

Markup
u

Elasticity
of Demand
n

None*

00

Counter Procyclical Cyclical**
Counter
cyclical

ProCyclical**

Nominal
Wages and
Goods
Prices

Rigid*
or
Procyclical*

None*

00

Constant*

00

None

Strongly
Procyclical*

None*

00

'Empirically inconsistent
"Theoretically inconsistent
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representative agent method of aggregation, it may be neces
sary to depart from that framework in order to explain the
behavior of markups and real wages23.

We have arrived at the principal working hypothesis of
this thesis, which is that both the real wage anomaly and the
markup anomaly are caused by sources of agent heterogeneity in
the economy which are not being captured by representative
agent models. The principal research objective of this thesis
is to determine if, by moving away from the representative
agent framework, modeling heterogeneity explicitly and employ
ing a more general method of aggregation, it is possible to
explain both the real wage anomaly and the markup anomaly
within an

otherwise

standard Keynesian

setup where money

causes output.

1.6

What Lies Ahead

The approach that will evolve over the remaining chapters
will be to develop an alternative labor-market model based on
imperfect competition and heterogeneous workers in the labor
market. This investigation is in the tradition of the New
Keynesian literature, in that it will explore the implications
of imperfect competition for the money-output connection and
the behavior of the real wage.
23

It differs in that it will

This was advocated previously by Coleman (1984) and Heckman (1984).
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examine the implications of monopsony power of firms in the
labor market, and it departs from the representative agent
method of aggregating individual labor supply.

Neither of

these approaches have been prominent in the macroeconomic
literature.

In Chapter
equilibrium model

II,

I develop

and

analyze

a

static

in which prices and wages are perfectly

flexible but a causal relationship between money and output
exists due to a wealth effect in aggregate labor supply.
Thus, I show that if wealth is a significant determinant of
aggregate labor supply, neither wage nor price rigidity is
necessary to have a money-output connection.

The model is a

useful tool for analyzing the behavior of the real wage over
a monetary-induced business cycle without the
effects of wage and price rigidities.

confounding

If such rigidities are

present, they will tend to reinforce the effects on output and
the real wage implied by the model.

In Chapter III of this thesis I show that the combination
of monopsony power with homogeneous workers
market does not,

in of itself,

in the

labor

improve upon the situation

described in this chapter. I also prove that countercyclical
markups and acyclical real wages cannot be explained in terms
of cyclical elasticities of product demand or labor supply
within a representative agent framework.

This poses a poten-
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fcial problem for macroeconomics, because without the repre
sentative agent assumption, Walrasian microfoundations do not
carry over to the behavior of aggregates in a straightforward
or systematic way.

Chapter IV presents the development of an aggregate
labor

supply

function

for

heterogeneous

employed by monopsonistic firms.

workers

who

are

If workers have nonhomo-

thetic preferences with increasing relative risk aversion,
then the

elasticity of this aggregate labor supply function

will be strongly procyclical in response to monetary policy
actions.

This a sufficient

condition

for markups

to

be

countercyclical and a necessary condition for the real wage to
be acyclical or procyclical. The analysis in Chapter IV is
confined to the aggregate labor market and leads to partial
equilibrium conclusions.

Chapter

V reports

the

comparative

static

results

of

imbedding the aggregate labor supply function of Chapter IV in
the general equilibrium model of Chapter II.
is

important

because,

as

in

the

case

of

This final step
efficiency wage

theory, partial equilibrium arguments can be misleading for
macroeconomics.

In this extended general equilibrium model,

the implied behavior of the real wage is ambiguous, because it
depends

on magnitudes of certain key

elasticities

in the

model.. A. partial equilibrium analysis indicates that the real
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wage will be weakly countercyclical,

acyclical,

or weakly

procyclical depending on the magnitudes of certain monetary
elasticities.

Chapter V concludes with some observations

regarding

methodology

the

employed

and

areas

further research.
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CHAPTER II
A CONNECTION BETWEEN MONEY AND OUTPUT
VIA WEALTH EFFECTS IN A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL
2.1 Introduction and Overview

This chapter presents a flexible-price macroeconomic
model in which employment and real output are affected by
changes in outside money when real wealth is included as an
argument of the excess demand functions for goods, money and
labor.

A one-time exchange of bonds for money reduces the

real value of government bond holdings, producing a reverse
wealth effect in all three markets.
employment

and

output

are

The money multipliers for

unambiguous ly positive

absence of Ricardian equivalence.

in

the

The important conclusion of

this chapter is that, when wealth effects are consistently
specified, neither Keynesian rigidities nor reverse causation
arguments are necessary for explaining the we 1 1 -documented
positive correlation between lagged changes in the monetary
base and output.

This conclusion holds as long as there is

not perfect Ricardian equivalence.

Like Traditional Keynesian models (defined in Chapter I) ,
the real wage in the model of this chapter is unambiguously
countercyclical,
criticism

for

and

that

thus

the

reason.

model
However,

is

also

unlike

subject

to

Traditional

44
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Keynesian models, wages and prices in this model are perfectly
flexible, all markets clear, and yet money is not neutral with
respect to employment and output.

Thus,

the model demon

strates that it is not necessary to have rigid or sticky wages
or prices in order for changes in money to produce changes in
employment and output.

The model is Keynesian in the sense

that changes in the quantity of real money affect employment
and output through a wealth effect on labor supply.
the model provides a

"Keynesian"

laboratory

As such,

in which the

cyclical behavior of the real wage and markups can be explored
without the restrictive assumptions of sticky wages and/or
prices.

This exploration is carried out in Chapters III

through V of this thesis.

2.2

The Correlation Between Money and Output

One of the more important stylized facts of macroeconom
ics is that changes in real GDP over the business cycle are
positively correlated with lagged changes in the nominal money
supply.

The statistical evidence in support of this fact is

overwhelming.

Except for the brief

1990 recession,

every

other official recession since 1945 has been preceded by a
decline in the rate of growth in the money stock, and cyclical
expansions have been either preceded by or roughly coincident
with increases

in the rate of money

growth.

Almost all

econometric studies of this relationship since 1970, employing
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a variety of models and estimation techniques, have confirmed
to

some

degree

Friedman

and

the

Schwarz

original
(1963)

findings
that

and

there

is

positive correlation between money and real

conclusions
a

of

significant

output

in the

short run.

Friedman and Schwarz identified a number of "turning
points" at which a change in the rate of growth of Ml was
followed

by

a

statistically

and

economically

change in the growth rate of GDP.

significant

They concluded from this

that changes in money can "cause" changes in output1. Ander
son and Jordan (1968) estimated significantly positive coef
ficients for a regression of quarterly changes in lagged GDP
on money. Sims (1972) found that money Granger—caused output
in a simple bivariate autoregression.

Sims (1980) later added

interest rates and other control variables to the estimating
equation and found that the interest rate was significant but
the money aggregate was not.

Using annual data from 1954-1976, Barro (1977) found that
only "unanticipated"
Mishkin replicated

innovations in money affected output.

Barro's

study with

quarterly

data

and

longer lags, and concluded that both anticipated and unantici-

1A11 of these empirical studies, including the more recent vector
autoregressions, sure subject to Tobin's critique (1970), post: hoc, ergo proper
hoc. Statistical correlation with a lagged independent variable does not prove
physical causality one way or the other.
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pated changes in money have long-lasting effects on output.
Beroanke (1986) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988) found evidence
that the availability of credit in the banking system signifi
cantly affected lagged real output; however, Meltzer (1995)
has

questioned the quantitative

channel.

Romer and Romer

(1989)

importance of

the

credit

updated the Friedman and

Schwarz study using content analysis of contemporary Federal
Reserve Board records, and concluded that six of eight U. S.
postwar recessions from 1945 to 1980 were preceded by deliber
ate contractionary Federal Reserve policy actions intended to
fight inflation.

Other investigators have come to somewhat different
conclusions from the data. Litterman and Weiss (1987) conclud
ed that the

nominal

interestrate leads changes in output

(inversely) , and that the role of money is insignificant.
King and Plosser

(1984)

found a weak and brief effect of

changes in the monetary base on output, with both Ml and the
credit channel being insignificant; Eichenbaum and Singleton
(1986) found that even the monetary base was insignificant.
Kydland and Prescott (1982) in

the context of a real business

cycle model,

correlation between money and

argued that the

output represents a reverse-causation:

the central

bank's

monetary interventions are reactions to current and forecasted
economic activity, and are partly endogenous. Shapiro(1994)
critiqued Romer and Romer,

and concluded that the Federal
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Reserve's policy actions during the period were endogenous to
current and forecasted conditions in the economy. Thus, part
of the money-output connection may be circular, although the
central bank can exert an influence that is either restrain
ing, neutral or stimulative.
independent agents —

Ultimately, it is the actions of

firms, households and financial institu

tions, which determine the relationship between the monetary
base and economic activity2.

While a short-run positive correlation between money and
output is well established, the economic mechanisms through
which money affects output is not well understood.

Attempts

to quantify the importance of transmission channels such as
interest rates, the exchange rate, asset prices, Tobin's q,
wealth, bank credit and firm balance sheets have had meager
success (Mankiw, 1994; Mishkin, 1995).

To quote Sims (1992):

Monetary aggregates tend to move in the same direction as
aggregate economic activity, as has been repeatedly documented.
...the profession as a whole has no clear answer to the question
of the size and nature of the effects of monetary policy on
aggregate activity.

Thus,

the nature of the money-output connection itself is

somewhat of a puzzle that tends to Balkanize the profession,
and the debate is a continuing one.

2

For contemporaneous reviews of this literature,
Blanchard (1990), Mankiw (1994) and Mishkin (1995).

see

Cagan
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No attempt will be made here add to the body of empirical
evidence regarding the money-output connection, or to recon
cile the different interpretations.
only to point

out that the

The issue is brought up

several monetary transmission

channels that have been heretofore proposed have weak empiri
cal validity, and that this is an area of ongoing research.

In this chapter I show that, in a flexible-price version
of the static

IS/LM model, a one-time change in the monetary

base affects the interest rate and nominal wages and prices.
These in turn affect the real value of household financial
wealth, and if wealth is an explanatory variable in the excess
demand functions for goods, money and labor, employment and
output will also be affected.

This represents an extension of

the wealth monetary transmission channel to aggregate labor
supply.

If firms are also assumed to have monopsony power in

the labor market, as in Chapter IV and V,

then the wealth

transmission channel will extend to labor demand also, which
under monopsony is not independent of the elasticity of labor
supply.

Much of the modern analysis of monetary economics has
been undertaken within an optimal monetary growth framework.
The

seminal

paper

by

Sidrauski

(1967)

showed

that

in

a

Walrasian setup, money is both neutral and superneutral with
respect to real, interest rates and output, thereby overturning
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the finding of Tobin

(1965) that increases in money growth

rates lead to reductions in real interest rates and increases
in the level of output3.

Subsequent authors, however, have

shown that the strong super-neutrality result of Sidrauski
does not hold up in less restrictive specifications, so that
in general changes in money growth rates do lead to changes in
real interest rates and output levels in the long run.

But,

these departures from super-neutrality have not gone consis
tently in one direction.

Some studies

found that

higher

monetary growth rates lead to a higher equilibrium capital
stock and output

(e. g., Fischer [1979] and Cohen

[1985]),

while others found the converse (e. g., Stockman [1986] and
Wang and Yip [1992]4.

Perhaps partly due to this ambiguity,

the sentiment in the literature is that although departures
from super-neutrality are supported by theory, the magnitude
of these departures are small5.

Thus, the lesson from the

optimal monetary growth literature seems to be that money

3Mundell [1963] showed in a traditional non-growth framework that changes
in anticipated inflation led to less them one-for-one changes in nominal interest
rates when wealth was an argument in the consumption function.
As such, the
negative relationship between monetary growth rates and real interest rates is
often called the Mundell-Tobin effect.
4Wang and Yip [1992] show that in the popular money-in-utility-function
setup, the effect of money on output depends crucially on the cross partials of
the utility function and that the comparative statics are inconclusive overall.
Turnovsky [1987] shows that the matter also depends on whether the existing tax
structure induces firms to finance their investment by issuing bonds or by
issuing equities.
5Danthine et al. (1987) provide calculations suggesting that although
violated, the super-neutrality proposition is not an unreasonable approximation.
The studies of Lucas (1980), Geweke (1986) and Stockman (1986) provide empirical
evidence supporting this view.
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plays no role for real outcomes in a Walrasian setting with
perfect markets.

This view that money plays no "real” role in a Walrasian
framework is the premise separating two currently dominant
"schools" of thought that have evolved on the subject of
business cycle behavior —
New Keynesian schools6.

the Real Business Cycle (RBC) and
The RBC models, which maintain the

standard assumptions of the Walrasian setup, attribute short
term

fluctuations

monetary

shocks.

in

output

They

to

explain

real
the

shocks

rather

observed

than

correlation

between money and output as a consequence of a reaction by the
monetary authority to changes in output rather than the other
way around

(Kydland and Prescott,

1982;

King and Plosser,

1984).

The New Keynesian view is that a causal mechanism from
money to output does exist, and this has led to exploring
departures from the frictionless Walrasian setup in one or
more markets. These departures include money illusion; nominal
wage rigidity due to implicit long-term employment contracts;
staggered wage-setting; nominal price rigidity due to menu
costs

and

second-order

gains

from

changing

prices

under

6These "schools" of research have been surveyed by Rotemberg (1987),Fischer (1988), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Phelps (1990), and Mankiw and Romer
(1991, Vol.l).
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conditions of imperfect competition;
constructions.

Although

none of

and

these

"efficiency wage"
explanations

have

dominated the field of play, it would not be inaccurate to say
that the non-neutrality of money at business-cycle frequencies
has come to be identified with the New Keynesian school, which
relies upon inhomogeneities and non-tatonnement market imper
fections7 .

The objective

of

this

chapter

is

to

show

that when

Ricardian equivalence does not hold in a Walrasian framework,
any

monetary

policy

action

which

increases

the

ratio

of

outside money to outside bonds (e. g . , an open market purchase
by the central bank) will lead to a decrease in real interest
rates and an increase in employment and output, i. e ., X show
that money is not neutral even with perfectly flexible prices
and market-clearing. The channel through which an open market
operation affects real interest rates and output is through
its effect on real wealth;

a parity exchange of money for

bonds takes place in nominal terms but not in real terms, and
real economic activity is affected.

In order to show this in the simplest way, the static,
general

equilibrium

employed.

framework of

Patinkin

(1965)

will

be

But, unlike Patinkin's model, which incorporated

7The Monetarist and Post-Keynesian schools also weigh in on the nonneturality of money without necessarily subscribing to New Keynesian mechanisms.
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real wealth as an argument only of the consumption and money
demand functions, in this model real wealth is incorporated as
an argument in all household excess demand functions, i. e. ,
wealth is also assumed to affect aggregate labor supply.

With

real wealth connecting all three excess demand equations,
(goods, money and labor), the model is not block recursive
with respect to the labor market. An open-market purchase of
bonds

increases

nominal prices

and

wages

and

lowers

the

interest rate, the net effects of which are to reduce both the
real wage and the real value of household financial wealth.
The demand for labor increases due to the reduction in the
real wage,

and the supply of

labor

increases because the

wealth effect more than offsets the reduction in the
leisure.

price of

Employment and output increase, along with invest

ment, income, and the demand for real money balances.

The main implication of the model is that, when wealth is
consistently incorporated into a Walrasian framework, changes
in money affect real outcomes and the direction of this effect
is unambiguously positive.

As long as there is at least some

departure from perfect Ricardian equivalence, so that house
holds consider some fraction of their government bond holdings
as net wealth, a positive money-output connection will result.
If agents consider none of their bond holdings as real wealth,
then money neutrality reappears.
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It: is important: to note that the wealth channel through
which money affects real outcomes in this model is absent in
most optimal monetary growth models.
ian equivalence

is a common

This is because Ricard

assumption

in this

class

of

models, implying that government bonds play no role in agents*
intertemporal budget constraints.

In these models, a one-time

swap of bonds for money leads only to a proportionate increase
in goods prices, with no effect on real outcomes.
also the case in the model presented here,

That is

if agents are

Ricardian.

The results derived from the model in this chapter also
match up well with Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), which show in
an overlapping generations framework that open market opera
tions are non-neutral with respect to real interest rates in
fiscal regimes that are "non-Ricardian",(i. e., where govern
ment debt is not fully backed by future direct taxes).They
conclude that government bonds may matter
described
(1965),

in the traditional

Mundell

(1971)].

literature

Aiyagari

however, that output is exogenous,
connection exists in their model.

and

in a manner as

[e.

g . , Patinkin

Gertler

assumed,

so that no money-output

The results of this chapter

show in a simple static framework that the wealth effects
uncovered by Patinkin (1965) in a non-optimizing framework and
by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) in an optimizing framework also
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work to influence the levels of employment and real output8.

The model presented in this chapter has a causal moneyoutput connection
rigidities.

in the

absence of Keynesian

wage-price

The introduction of such non-Walrasian features

would augment the non-neutrality properties derived here, but
are not necessary for the basic results and play no role in
the model presented here.

The results obtained in this chapter have some obvious
implications for the money neutrality debate.

First,

it is

not necessary to leave the Walrasian market-clearing paradigm,
as the New Keynesians do, in order to have a theoretical link
between money and output.

This is not to say that the New

Keynesian research program is on the wrong track, but merely
that the money-output relation need not depend on a Keynesian
rigidity or

inhomogeneity.

Second,

advocates

of the New

Classical/RBC view are no longer required to argue that the
only

causal

relationship

is

from output

to

money,

or to

rationalize the existence of a monetary reaction function.
Under plausible assumptions which do not violate the Walrasian
paradigm, a causal money-output relationship has been revealed

Q

Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1994) also examine non-Ricardian fiscal
regimes in an optimizing framework. As with Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), output
is assumed, to be exogenous in these papers. See also Marini and van der Ploeg
(1988).
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which could serve as a legitimate explanation of the observed
positive correlation.

The significance of this model for the broader investiga
tion of this thesis is that real wealth is a shift variable
for the aggregate labor supply function.

A decline in real

wealth due to an open-market operation will shift the labor
supply curve out, increasing aggregate labor supply, equilib
rium employment and output.

If the wealth effect on labor

supply is strong enough, employment and output could increase
even if the real wage does not decline; this opens up the
possibility that the real wage could be acyclical or even
procyclical.

This also avoids the situation described

in

Chapter I where the assumption of nominal and real rigidities
in New Keynesian models pre-determines the behavior of the
real wage.

Thus, the model provides a framework for analyzing

the unrestricted behavior of the real wage in a monetaryinduced business cycle.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:
complete model is specified in Section 2.

the

The comparative

static analysis of an open market purchase are summarized in
Section 3, and a detailed mathematical analysis of the model
is contained in Appendix B.

Section 4 analyzes the implica

tions of degrees of Ricardian equivalence.

Section 5 presents

some conclusions.
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2.3

The Standard Flexible-Price Macro Model

Consider a closed monetary economy in short-run static
equilibrium with no net growth in population or labor supply.
The economic agents of interest are large numbers of house
holds and firms and a single government entity which includes
a

central

bank.

These

three

classes

of

agents

trade

in

perfectly competitive markets for goods, labor services, money
and financial assets.

Firms trade with households in the

goods, labor and financial asset markets,

demanding

labor

services and funds to finance real investment, and supplying
goods for consumption and investment.

As is customary in models of business cycle phenomena,
the capital stock is assumed to be fixed.

Households receive

wages and profits from firms with which they purchase goods
for consumption and equity shares to add to their financial
wealth.

Since the model is static, agents are assumed to hold

static expectations concerning nominal and real values. The
government purchases goods for public consumption and finances
its operations by levying taxes and issuing fiat money and
debt in the form of perpetuities paying $1 per year.
government is the monopolist issuer of fiat money.

The

In this

chapter, the economic behavior of agents within each sector is
assumed to be sufficiently homogeneous so as to justify its
representation by a representative agent.

Except for having
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real wealth as an argument in the labor supply function the
model is a fairly standard one, and in the interest of brevity
further discussion of microfoundations will be omitted except
where it is pertinent.

2.3.1

Market

E q u ilib r iu m

Conditions

General equilibrium conditions on the aggregate excess
demand functions in the four markets are specified as fol
lows :9
Goods Market:

c d (z, Q) + i d {r,y) +g - y 3(w)
-t- +
- +•
-

Money Market:

m d (y, r, Q) - m = 0

(2-lb)

Labor Market:

I* (v) - Is (w, Q) = 0
~
•+• -

(2-lc)

Asset Market:

f d (z, y, r, m, Q) - f s(r,y)
•+•+ + — +■
- +■

Government Budget Constraint:

= 0

= 0

g + — ~xn =
P
°

P

(2-la)

(2 -ld)

rP

(2-le)

Where z is disposable income, ft is real household wealth,
w = W/P, m = M/P, and signs under arguments denote the signs
of partial derivatives which are the basic behavioral assump
tions of the model.

md = ms and fd = fs are stock equilibrium

relations, since the demand and supply of money and earning
assets are in terms of balances.

Q

A glossary of mathemat:leal symbols with definitions is contained in
Appendix A. Note that the balance sheet constraint on assets allows the market
for financial assets to be ignored.
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Household real wealth is defined as real money balances
plus

the present value

of claims

to

perpetual

cash

flow

streams from government bonds and private equities:

Q

=

Q (P, W, r; M, k B )

=

** +
+
P
rP

•(*)"]

OiKil

(2)

where k is a parameter representing the extent to which the
representative household regards its holdings of government
bonds to be nominal wealth, with k = 0 representing perfect
Ricardian equivalence. Note that

ft is interpreted as net of

private sector liabilities and inside money, which cancel out
in the aggregate.

In order to remain faithful to the static framework, it
is assumed that all endogenous changes in B/P are financed
with lump sum taxes and that

^ = ^ ? = 0 . since it is the
P
rP

effects of one-time changes in the level of money balances
through open market operations that are of interest, these
assumptions

sure

relatively

unimportant10.

The

endogenous

variables of this system, therefore, are P, W, r, t and

t 0>

and the exogenous variables are the government policy vari
ables g f H and B.

Given the equilibrium values

for the

10It is assumed, therefore, that r adjusts endogenously, i. e.,
r » rD + B/P. Assuming that interest payments are bond financed would not affect
the non-neutrality of money in the model, but it would give rise to intrinsic
dynamics which would be inconsistent with the static nature of the setup.
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endogenous variables, the equilibrium values of fl, £ and y can
be determined.

The representative agent in each sector is

subject to a budget constraint: household desired aggregate
consumption and saving is constrained by disposable income and
wealth; firms pay out all profits to households and thus must
finance new investment by selling new equities; finally, as
shown in (2 -le), together with the assumption that

p

=—

rp

=0 ,

the government must finance continuing purchases with lump sum
taxes.

2.3.2

Important Features of the Model

Equations (2-1) describe a standard textbook flexibleprice model in which the classical dichotomy has been bridged
by the addition of a labor market equilibrium condition which
depends on real wealth.

Since n appears in all three excess

demand functions the three markets are linked by wealth ef
fects.

The model is not dichotomous and must be solved out

simultaneously.

Thus employment and output are not determined

independently of money market equilibria.

In general, the

classical dichotomy between real and nominal variables breaks
down in the presence of real wealth effects.

All of the

endogenous variables are free to move instantaneously to clear
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the four markets.

The model contains no Keynesian rigidities,

stickiness or inhomogeneities.

As
(1965)

indicated previously,
except that wealth is

supply function.

this model

follows

incorporated

Patinkin

into the

It does not appear from the literature

labor
that

the implications of open market operations (involving a swap
of bonds for money) have been examined in such as setting.
Phelps (1972) does add wealth to the labor supply function,
but the comparative static exercise conducted (which is mainly
graphical)

is a swap of money for capital.

government

bonds

in

Phelps'

model,

and

so

There are no
the

issue

of

Ricardian equivalence does not arise.

Another important difference is that Phelps constrains
the interest rate to be equal to the marginal product of
capital.

With

this

assumption,

the

real

interest

rate

increases with output due to a monetary expansion, contrary to
the finding here that it must decline in order to equilibrate
the goods market at a higher level of output.
highlights the fact that Phelps
applying to the

long-run

This difference

interpreted his model

steady-state,

whereas

as

the model

presented here is more applicable to the short-run business
cycle where the capital stock is assumed to be fixed and
monetary intervention is more relevant.
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Like Patinkin,
analysis,

and

standard

in contrast

comparative

to

static

Phelps'
analysis

graphical
will

be

employed to determine stability conditions and sign the money
multipliers.

This approach also reveals that the money-output

connection holds up except in the extreme case of perfect
Ricardian equivalence for government bonds.

2.4

Analysis of the Model

The comparative static analysis of this non-recursive
3x3 system involves a fair amount of algebra, and the details
are consigned to Appendix B.

Only the principal results will

be summarized and interpreted in this chapter.

However, it

may be helpful to introduce here some notation and definitions
from

Appendix B.

Differentiation of the system of equations

(2-1)

and

rearrangement produces the matrix differential equation
Adv

=

Gdu, where:
c—
EDGp

A’dv = EDMp
C+)

EDLp

C— 1
EDGr
(r~)
EDMr
(-)
EDLr

EDGW
(--)

•

*

dP
(2-4)

edm w

dz
EDLW^ dW
C— )

.
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-1
0

0

Q'du =

1

" P CQ

-K

d

-- C q
rP “
—K

-i(l-m£)

<**o
dg

d

(2-5)

dM
0

0

■5*

-rP
^ {Q

.

dB

.

In (2-4), nEDXw denotes excess demand in the market for X,
subscripts

denote partial differentiation, and the signs are

signs of the first partial derivatives.

(The partial deriva

tive expansions of each term in A are derived in the Appendix,
but will not be needed in most of what follows.)

The signs of

the first partials depend on the original behavioral assump
tions

contained

in

(2 - 1 ) and on the stability

conditions

derived in Appendix B.

2.4.1

Analysis of an Open Market Operation

The primary question of interest is the effect of pure
monetary policy on real economic variables.

I will examine

the implications of a one-time increase in M with a propor
tional decrease in B/r, i. e., of setting dB = -rDM in (2-5),
with dg = dr0 = 0.

(Details are in Appendix B) .

that the value of k

It may seem

is important for the results of this

model; however it turns

out that as long as k > 0 , the value

of k affects the magnitudes of the comparative static deriva
tives but not their algebraic signs.

The results for the case
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viiere k

=

1

are

summarized here.

The

implications

for

Ricardian equivalence (0<k<1) are discussed in Section 2.5.

COMPARATIVE STATIC DERIVATIVES FOR K = 1
ftp

i -i-1
l

C—>
<■->

C—)
«-»

C -f)

(2 - 6 a)

[EDGr‘EDLW- EDLC'EDGV]} > 0

(2 — 6 b)

(2-6C)

c-j

C -)
CH
dw
= - [A|-1{P-2[-«S(Qp+
dM

<0

(2 — 6 d)

(2 - 6 e)

The results in

(2-6a)

and

(2-6b)

are not surprising,

since P and W are nominal and would increase with M in any
event.

The result in (2-6c) also seems unsurprising, since

Patinkin found that an open market purchase decreased real
wealth. But the result is far from obvious in the full 3x3
system. In Appendix B it is shown that the sum of the first
three terms is negative. One way to see this is to note that
that

(2 - 6 d)

holds unambiguously,

which means

that

n must

decline in order to restore equilibrium in the labor market.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
The sign of

(2 - 6 e) is unambiguously negative due to

stability condition (i) [See Appendix section B.2] and here
these

results

contradict

Phelps

(1972) ,

but

agree

with

Patinkin and economic reasoning: an increase in money balances
and a corresponding decline in the supply of outstanding bonds
will cause bond prices to increase; the interest rate must
decline in order to equilibrate the goods market following the
wealth shock to consumption.

The partial derivatives of n are:
M + xB
P
rP

zP

kB + jz_
rP
r

< 0

in
zP

> 0

< 0

(2-7a)

(2-7b)

(2 —7c)

The sign of (2-7a) is strictly ambiguous, but the fact that
the nominal wage bill is on the order of 10 times greater than
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nominal interest payments on bonds and money implies that it
is positive11.

The conclusion is that an even exchange of bonds for
money between the public and private sectors increases both
the price level P and nominal wages W.

The net effect of dP

and dW reduces real wealth ft, which creates disequilibrium in
all three markets.

The decline in real wealth stimulates an

increase in labor supply which is accommodated along a stat
ionary and downward sloping labor demand curve by a reduction
in the real wage.

This produces a higher level of employment

and output. In the goods market the effect of the reduction in
the real wage and wealth on consumption demand is more than
offset by an increase in income and the increased investment
demand induced by a decline in the interest rate.

Finally, an

open-market operation causes money supply to increase in real
terms,

i. e. the increase in the price level is less than

proportional to the increase in M, and money is not neutral.

It is shown in Appendix B that dP/dM has
positive value when

k

its largest

= 0, i. e., when dP/dM = P/M.

For

Economic Report of the President, 1992. As of 1991:IV, total employee
compensation [Table B-22] was $3,425.1 Billion; Federal net interest paid [Table
B-79] was $190.5 Billion; M2 [Table B-65] was $3,425.4 Billion and the monetary
base [Table B-67] was $324.78 Billion. (All data in annualized 1991 dollars.)
Imputing a 5% annual interest rate to the monetary base, W£d exceeded (.OSMjj +
B) by $3,2178.4 Billion, or 16 times. Using M2 the ratio is 8 times. Therefore
Op is unambiguously positive.
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k

> 0, dP/dM < P/M,

which means that d(M/P)/dM > 0 and the

real money supply increases. Thus, the demand for real balanc
es must also increase, implying that the income and substitu
tion effects on money demand are greater than the wealth
effect.

2.4.2

Summary of the Results.

Under the behavioral assumptions of the model (which are
standard) the reduction in the value of real wealth induced by
an open market purchase stimulates private agents to increase
employment and output, their rates of saving and investment,
and their holdings of real money balances.
original private wealth,

A portion of the

in the form of bonds,

will have

vanished and the motivation of the private sector is to regain
lost utility by increasing
accumulation.

income and the rate

of wealth

An open-market sale of bonds would have just

the opposite effects all around.

Although

this

static

short-period

model

is

somewhat

antiquated, its predictions are unambiguous and match up well
with the

stylized

facts

of

active monetary

intervention;

Expansionary monetary policy stimulates investment, employment
and output, with a corresponding rise in prices and wages and
a decline in the real interest rate.

The implications of the
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model that depart from the stylized facts of the business
cycle are (a) any unemployment is voluntary, since the labor
market always clears;

(b) with decreasing returns to labor,

the aggregate real wage is countercyclical.

These properties

derive from the Walrasian heritage of the model.

The terms "involuntary unemployment" is another way of
saying the labor market does not clear.

Such a non-Walrasian

feature is characteristic of many New Keynesian models (See
the related discussion in Chapter I .)

The results of this

section indicate that although non-clearing markets may be
important for explaining involuntary employment, they are not
necessary for money to be non-neutral.

The fact that the observed aggregate real wage appears to
be anything but countercyclical has prompted Kuh (1966) and
more recently Hall

(1991) to conjecture that the aggregate

marginal product of labor is constant, or nearly so.

In the

model presented here, the more elastic the labor demand curve,
the larger will be the money multiplier on output, i . e . , the
wealth effect will be more pronounced. In the extreme case of
constant returns to labor, yz = a = w,
demand function £d(w) is undefined.

ye£ = 0, and the labor
Conditions in the labor

market will then be defined by I = £s(a,n) ; the equilibrium
values of I and y are determined by labor supply which, with
a constant real wage,

is a function of only A.
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effect of an open-market transaction is transmitted to output
via the multiplier:

dM
Thus,

Q dtf

with a constant-returns technology the real wage

is

fixed and the wealth effects of an open-market transaction on
employment and output in this model would be stronger.

2.5

Ricardian Equivalence

A case has been made for a positive causal connection
between money and output in the absence of Ricardian equiv
alence (k=1) .

As one would expect, for the case of perfect

Ricardian equivalence

(k

= 0) it is possible to show after

some algebraic manipulation,

that dP/P = dW/W = dM/M,

therefore d(W/P)/dM = 0, d(M/P)/dM = 0 and dfi/dM = 0.

and

Bonds

exchange for money, but bonds are not counted in real wealth
so wealth doesn't change and money is neutral.

It is clear

that it is the presence of government bonds as a component of
wealth and not money or equities that causes the non-neutral
ity of open-market operations in this model.

The question of whether government bonds represent net
wealth to the private sector remains a controversial one. (see
Barro

(1974, 1976), Buchanan

(1976), Feldstein

(1976), and

more recently Bernheim (1987), and Buiter (1991).
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is whether it is reasonable to assume that government bonds
are perceived by private agents as a temporary postponement of
increased tax liabilities which are equivalent

in present

value, i.e., whether government bonds should be counted as net
wealth, by the private sector12.

In the final analysis this

is an empirical question, but it becomes a theoretical issue
because of two sets of canonical assumptions that are normally
made in macroeconomic modeling,

namely,

those

of rational

expectations and the representative agent.

The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is closely allied
with the perfect foresight version of rational expectations.
For an individual bondholder to equate his claim to a definite
stream of cash receipts to another stream of uncertain tax
liability payments and cancel them out in his mind requires
not

only

something

close

to

perfect

foresight,

but

some

additional assumptions. One of those assumptions is that the
bondholder will be the taxpayer who is liable for those tax
bills when they are levied.

There are several ways that an

individual bondholder can avoid the tax levy even under the
assumption of infinitely lived agents or intergenerational
altruism, but the main point is that the distribution of bond
holdings and the distribution of their implied tax burden
among households are not necessarily the same unless one is
12

It appears that Ricardo recognized the prevalence of "fiscal illusion",
and did not actually subscribe to the concept which has been associated with his
name. See O ’Driscoll (1977) and Bernheim (1987).
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talking about a representative agent.

In that event,

the

representative agent consumer pays all of the taxes, either
directly or indirectly through ownership of all the firms, and
government bond payments simply go from one pocket of the
representative agent to the other.

If bonds are perpetuities

and government debt service is financed out of current taxes,
then not much foresight

is needed if tax collections

coincident with bond receipts.

are

The absence of a store of

value will be obvious to the representative agent.

The model described in this chapter is a representa
tive agent model, but it is also a timeless static equilibrium
model in which agent expectations are static.
open to criticism on those grounds13.

As such it is

The representative

agents of this model are naive and myopic, and plausibly could
have fiscal illusion with respect to the incidence and inevit
ability of future taxes.

If so, then there still may be a

case for wealth effects. The real issue here has to do with
the level of aggregation. Bonds and other debt contracts of
the private sector do cancel out when aggregating over the
private sector, even on a balance sheet basis.

Cancelling out

all debt claims between the government and private sectors on
the basis of equivalent present value of assets and liabili
ties would be equivalent to aggregating the government and

13In the concluding section of this chapter I argue that the implications
of this static model should hold up in a dynamic framework with rational
expectations.
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private sectors together and eliminating the distinction14.
That would be moving in the direction of a Robinson Crusoe
economy, and although there are uses for such a model, it does
not make for very interesting macroeconomics.

Thus,

although

the

Ricardian

equivalence

hypothesis

follows as a logical consequence of rational expectations and
representative agent aggregation,
fallacy of composition.

it potentially involves a

What can be perceived as net wealth

by a subcategory of consumers who are bondholders, cannot be
net wealth for the collective representative agent15.

On

the other hand, if some fraction of bondholders have fiscal
illusion, or bondholders as a group do not completely discount
their claims for implied taxes and regard some fraction of
their bond holdings as net wealth, then Ricardian equivalence
will be imperfect for a representative agent who

is truly

representative, and there may be a wealth effect from govern
ment bonds.

This possibility will now be investigated.

In this model
equivalence)

k

= 1 (non-equivalence) and

k

= 0 (perfect

represent the polar extremes of the Ricardian

14

To be consistent, the same equivalence proposition should be applied to
transfer payments and other pecuniary government services. Taking this to its
logical conclusion would also eliminate financial markets, firms and money,
institutions which enable consumers to deal with time and uncertainty.
15The fact that foreign entities who are not subject to direct U. S.
taxtion hold approximately 15% of Treasury securities means that the implied tax
burden is somewhat larger than the domestic bond receipts.
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equivalence controversy.

An interesting question

is what

happens in the intermediate case when bondholders regard some
positive fraction of their bond holdings as wealth, i. e. when
0 <

k

< 1.

Given the structure of the model, deriving the

comparative static results for this case is a rather tedious
exercise. (See Appendix B, Section B.4) . the argument will be
summarized here.

2 . 5 . 1 Comparative Static Results for 0< k <1

Suppose that the model has a money-neutral equilibrium
solution for an open-market operation when 0 < K < e < l , where e
can be arbitrarily small.

Then it follows that dP/P = dW/W =

dM/M, d(W/P) = 0 and dr/dM = 0.

Now examine the implications

for dfl:

Q
where 0 = B/M , and under the neutrality conditions assumed,
which cancel to 0

Thus, in order for money to be neutral we must have either
(a)

k

= 0, or (b)

dM

= 0.

The first condition in (a) has

been ruled out by assumption. As for (b) , we have:
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— = irdB _ b ]
dM
MldM Ml

so that. d0/dM = 0 if and only if dB/B = dM/M, i. e ., if
0 = B/M remains constant.

But this implies that an open-

market operation, for which 0 is most definitely not constant,
will

be non—neutral

when

government bonds that

0<k <1.

Any

positive

amount

of

is regarded behavior a 11v as private

wealth will produce a non-neutral response to an open-market
operation in this model16. Money neutrality requires perfect
Ricardian equivalence on government bonds.

This conclusion

can be stated as follows:
With real wealth effects in all three markets, an
open-market purchase is non-neutral and increases
employment and output as long as 0 < k < 1.
The consequences of imperfect Ricardian equivalence for
other real variables can be similarly derived.

In Appendix B,

Section B.4, it is shown that the signs of dP/dM and dW/dM are
both positive and independent of the value of

k

.

It is also

true that:

dM

If dw _ W dPl
PldJf P dMl

(2 .8 )

16the magnitude of the non-neutral response will depend directly on the
value of k in the interval [0,1].
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Substituting the expressions for dP/dM and dW/dM for the case
where 0 < k < 1 in Appendix B, Section B.4 into Equation 2.8,
expanding and collecting terms,

I derive the result that the

real wage declines unconditionally. Thus:
dw
- i

f
{

= 0, K = 0
<o,o<K i l

(2- 9>

Applying the same reasoning as before, it follows that
real wealth 12 must also decline in order to achieve equilib
rium in the labor market, and the implications of the model
will hold except for the extreme case of k = 0, i. e., perfect
Ricardian equivalence.

Of course, the closer

k

is to 1, the

larger in magnitude those implications will be.

The

foregoing analysis also makes

it clear that

any

change in the ratio of bonds to money will be nonneutral.
This would include the fabled "helicopter drop" of currency,
or more realistically, a one-time devaluation of the currency.
The fact that neutrality arises in the constant 0 case is
uninteresting because there is no mechanism for maintaining a
constant ratio of bonds to money while the monetary base is
being

changed.

Open-market

operations

are

the principal

vehicle for fine-tuning the rate of growth of the money supply
and are undertaken precisely because they are not neutral.
They are, in Woodford's (1995) terminology, delicate instru
ments of non-Ricardian monetary policy.
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2.6

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a model in which money is non
neutral with respect to the real interest rate, employment and
output

in a Walrasian general

equilibrium

framework

when

wealth is incorporated consistently into all household excess
demand

functions and Ricardian

perfectly.

equivalence

does

not

hold

The predictions of the model are found to be

unambiguous and surprisingly

"Keynesian,"

An

increase

in

money causes a decrease in the real interest rate, an increase
in employment and output, and increases in nominal wages and
prices.

The source of non-neutrality is the fact that the central
bank can make a parity exchange of money for bonds only in
nominal terms?

it cannot bring about a parity exchange in

terms of the components of real wealth.

The central bank is

in an analogous position to Keynes' workers who attempted to
set their real wage by bargaining for a nominal wage;

it

behaves as if it had "money illusion" in the bond market,
except of course there is no illusion.
nominal open-market operations

The

intention of

is to affect real economic

activity, and the monetary policy transmission mechanism is a
change in the real value of private wealth.

The swap of bonds

for money reduces the real value of wealth held in the private
sector, and correspondingly reduces the real value of govern

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
ment

obligations.

Monetization

of

the

government's

debt

entails a corresponding reduction in real private wealth, to
which agents respond predictably: they strive harder to regain
lost utility.

The model presented here is a static,

non-optimizing

general equilibrium model in which capital, money and bonds
are exogenous and expectations are static, i. e . , a tradition
al static macroeconomic model with naive agents. Nevertheless,
the implications of this simple framework match up well with
those of the optimal monetary growth literature.

As in that

literature, when Ricardian equivalence holds perfectly, open
market

operations

neutral.

But,

perfectly,

if

then

imply

no

wealth

Ricardian

open

market

effects

equivalence
operations

and

holds
do

money
less

imply

is

than

wealth

effects, which turn give rise to an unambiguous causal moneyoutput connection.

It is fairly standard practice to assume that capital
stocks are fixed when analyzing macroeconomic fluctuations at
business-cycle frequencies.

An important question, however,

is whether the non-neutrality results obtained here would hold
up in a

dynamic framework in which money and bonds have non

zero growth rates and agents form rational expectations. The
analysis of Mundeli and Tobin,

which assumed output to be

exogenous, showed that with real wealth as an argument of
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consumption and money demand functions, changes in the growth
rate of money cause changes in real wealth and real interest
rates.

It should be evident from the results derived in this

chapter that if wealth is consistently incorporated into a
dynamic framework,

so that wealth is also an argument for

labor supply, then monetary policy actions would be both non
neutral and non-superneutral.

The question naturally arises as to whether the qualita
tive effects of money on output via real wealth represent
significant quantitative effects.

No attempt will be made

here to answer this empirical question, other than to point
out that the higher the elasticity of aggregate labor demand,
the greater will be the magnitude of the money multipliers on
real interest rates and output.

It is important to note that

the monetary transmission mechanism in the present model,
which operates through an effect on wealth, differs from the
mechanism present in most of the optimal growth literature,
the significance of which is typically assumed to be small.
In the optimal growth literature, perfect Ricardian equiva
lence is typically assumed at the outset, which precludes any
wealth effect from monetary policy actions.

It appears that the wealth effects

examined

in this

chapter, which arise in the case of less-than-perfect Ricard
ian equivalence, are becoming of more interest in the liter
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ature.

This is partly due to the fact that wealth effects

seem to be

important

for

solving the price-indeterminacy

problem which arises when the central bank targets interest
rates instead of a monetary aggregate (Leeper, 1991; Woodford,
1994.)

It is also partly due to the significance that wealth

effects have for monetary and fiscal policy,
Aiyagari and Gertler

(1985)

as argued by

and Marini and van der Ploeg

(1988).

It appears that wealth fell out of favor as an explan
atory

variable

at

about

the

same

time

the

neo-classical

synthesis unraveled. This may have been unjustified. It does
not seem unreasonable to assume that households take their
current

real

financial

wealth

into

account

when

making

important choices about consumption, saving and leisure; or
that

subsequent changes

wealth

as

a

fluctuations

in the market value

consequence
compel

those

of

inflation

decisions

to

and
be

of

financial

interest-rate
revised.

reasonableness is not always a reliable guide.
evidence would be more persuasive.
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Empirical

CHAPTER III
MONOPSONISTIC LABOR MARKETS AND AGGREGATE REAL WAGES
3.1 Introduction and Overview

An important conclusion in Chapter I was that it appears
to be difficult to construct an aggregate model in which money
and

output are positively

correlated

acyclical or mildly procyclical.

and

real

wages

are

This conclusion appears to

hold up over a broad range of macro-models including those
ordinarily classified as Traditional Keynesian, New Keynesian,
and Real Business Cycle models1.

The Traditional Keynesian approach to rationalizing the
non-neutrality of money was to posit some form of nominal
wage-price rigidity or stickiness which worked by influencing
aggregate labor supply.

A major criticism of this class of

models was their prediction of a countercyclical real wage, as
well

as

failure to

explain

why

nominal

rigidities

would

persist under conditions of perfect competition.

Chapter I contains a review of the relevant macroeconomic literature and
arguments which lead to this conclusion.
The macro-model classifications
"Traditional Keynesian, Mew Keynesian”, etc., used in this Chapter are also
defined in Chapter I.

80
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New Keynesian models have provided a number of competing
explanations for wage-price stickiness,

including models of

imperfect competition in which the economic incentives for
price-setting agents to change prices is weak.

Efficiency-

wage models of the labor market imply rigid real wages and
neutral money under profit maximization (Akerlof and Yellen) .
Models

of monopolistic

competition require the

additional

assumption of second-order menu costs in order for money to be
non-neutral,

and

some

of

these

models

predict

procyclical real wages which are counterfactual2.

strongly

Christiano

and Eichenbaum (1992) point out that, in general, Keynesian
models understate and Real Business Cycle models overstate the
degree of positive correlation observed between real wages and
employment.

Chapter II presented a f lexible-price general equilibrium
macro model with wealth effects in labor supply.
model,

as

operations

with

Traditional

resulted

in

Keynesian

changes

in

models,

open-market

employment

through their effect on aggregate labor supply.

In that

and

output

However, the

model in Chapter II makes a ,,Keynesian,, connection between
changes in money and output under the assumptions of perfect
competition and perfectly flexible wages and prices, thereby

Real Business Cycle models also exhibit strongly procyclical real wages,
but deny a role for- money. These models will not be considered further in this
thesis.
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avoiding one of the major criticisms of Traditional Keynesian
models.

This result suggests that, while nominal wage-price

rigidities may be necessary for disequilibrium explanations of
unemployment,

they

are

not

necessary

connection between money and output.

for

establishing

However,

a

as with the

Traditional Keynesian models which rely on aggregate labor
supply to produce a money-output connection, the real wage in
the model of Chapter II is unambiguously countercyclical.
Thus, the model described in Chapter II is unsatisfactory to
that extent.

The objective of the next three chapters of this thesis
is to show that it is possible to reconcile, within a Keynes
ian framework,

both

sets of stylized facts:

the

positive

correlation between money and output, and acyclical or mildly
procyclical real wages.

This

chapter

explores

the

implications

of

imperfect

competition in the labor market for the behavior of real wages
and markups. The question explored in this chapter is: Does
the assumption of monopsony power in the labor market help to
reconcile Keynesian-type models with the empirical record on
real wages?

In a Keynesian

model with a perfectly competi

tive labor market, the profit-maximizing equilibrium real wage
will be countercyclical

if the marginal

product

of

labor

declines with employment when the capital stock is fixed,
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which is generally assumed.

However, with monopsony power in

the labor market the profit-maximizing equilibrium real wage
is less than the marginal product of labor by a markdown
factor which depends directly on the degree
power.

of monopsony

If monopsony power in the labor market is weaker in

expansions than it is in recessions, then the markdown will
vary

accordingly

and

the

real

wage

may

be

procyclical,

acyclical, or at least less countercyclical than it would be
under perfect competition.

This chapter explores

in some

detail the implications of the standard monopsony model for
this question, and in particular, determines the conditions
that are necessary for a monopsonistic labor market to exhibit
acyclical or procyclical real wages.

In addition to providing a possible explanation of the
absence of countercyclical real wages, there are three reasons
for investigating the implications of monopsony power in the
aggregate labor market. First, it complements the more recent
New Keynesian literature on imperfect competition in the goods
market; in fact, monopsonistic labor markets have been largely
overlooked

in

the

macroeconomic

literature.

Second,

the

behavior of the labor market is critical to a Keynesian moneyoutput connection, and unlike New Keynesian models of imper
fect competition in which behavior in the labor market is
implicit,

with monopsony power the aggregate

takes center stage and

labor market

the elasticity of aggregate
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supply plays an
outcomes.

important role in determining equilibrium

Finally,

the

monopsony

assumption

provides

a

different interpretation of the empirical evidence on markups
of price over marginal cost, i. e., as markdowns of real wages
from the marginal product of labor.

Econometric studies of U. S. industry data have consis
tently found evidence that markups of prices over marginal
factor cost are countercyclical [Bils (1987) , Rotemberg and
Woodford (1991) ].
stood.

The reasons for this are not well under

The assumption of monopsonistic labor markets allows

for an interpretation that the observed markups are actually
markdowns which vary countercyclically with monopsony power.
With monopsony power there is a close relationship between the
behavior of markdowns and real wages, which will be examined
in this Chapter.

The main contribution of this chapter is to show that in
the Traditional Keynesian setup, incorporating monopsony power
into the labor market in a representative agent framework,
does not lead to either acyclical or procyclical aggregate
real wages.

In fact, with monopsony power the real wage is

more countercyclical than if the labor market were perfectly
competitive.

Correspondingly,

monopsony model are procyclical.

markups

in

the

standard

Both of these predictions

are counterfactual, and move us further away from explaining
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the stylized facts. Thus, in the Traditional Keynesian setup,
monopsony power alone is of no help in explaining the real
vage and marlcup anomalies.

Further analysis in this chapter shows that the stumbling
block here is the representative agent method of aggregation,
the logical requirements of which preclude the elasticities of
either either aggregate goods demand or aggregate labor supply
from being procyclical.

Thus, the major conclusion of this

chapter is that macro models which utilize the representative
agent method of aggregation cannot explain the cyclical behav
ior of real wages or markups in terms of cyclical changes in
demand or supply elasticities.

Thus, one way to to reconcile the Keynesian money-output
connection with real wage behavior may be to relax some of the
restrictive assumptions of the representative agent method.
That

is

the

objective

of

Chapter

IV,

which

extends

the

analysis of monopsony power in the labor market to the case
where

workers

are

heterogeneous

and

representative

agent

aggregation is not applicable to labor supply.

The chapter proceeds as follows:

Section

3.2 briefly

describes the real wage and markup anomalies.
relates

these

competition,

anomalies
and

to

presents

standard
an

Section 3.3

models

of

imperfect

interpretation

in

terms
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monopsonistic labor markets. Section 3.4 discusses the role of
monopsony power in the labor market search literature, which
provides some justification for assuming monopsony power in
a static equilibrium framework.
chapter

are

derived

in

The principal results of the

Section

3.5,

where

the

monopsony model is analyzed in some detail.
restates the conclusions of the chapter.
arguments

and

mathematical

derivations

standard

Section

3.6

Some supporting
are

contained

in

Appendix C.

3.2 The Real Wage and Markup Anomalies

Macroeconomic theory has found it difficult to provide a
satisfactory explanation for two persistent stylized facts of
the business cycle: (1) The aggregate real wage is acyclical,
and at times slightly procyclical [Abraham and Haltiwanger
(1995)]; (2)

Markups of price over marginal cost are counter

cyclical

concentrated

in

(1988), Rotemberg

industries.

[Bils

(1987),

Hall

& Woodford (1991) ]3. (A summary of this

evidence is contained in Chapter I .)

The observed behavior of the aggregate real wage has been
an anomaly in macroeconomics ever since Keynes grappled with

A procyclical variable increases with output and employment, a countercyc
lical variable moves just the opposite.
References to cyclicality imply the
existence of a business-cycle generating mechanism in the economy which causes
output and employment to move in irregular cycles.
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it in The General Theory. The absence of a strong correlation
between aggregate real wages and employment contradicts the
theory of competitive labor markets, in which the real wage
cam be either procyclical

or countercyclical

depending on

whether the labor demand curve shifts or the

labor supply

curve

shifts when

employment

and output

change4.

The

absence of any consistent statistical relationship between the
aggregate real wage and employment is an anomaly which has
motivated a number of reappraisals of the applicability of the
standard competitive
market.

market model

to

the

Any of the standard assumptions —

aggregate

labor

market clearing,

perfect competition, declining marginal labor productivity,
utility and profit maximization, perfect information, leisure
as a normal good, and the representative agent (RA) method of
aggregation —

are suspect for the labor market.

It appears

that for a model of the aggregate labor market to be consis
tent with the stylized facts, at least one of these canonical
assumptions may have to be abandoned.

The cyclical pattern of price markups is also not well
accounted for by standard price theory.

Econometric studies

of U. S. industry data have consistently found evidence that
markups in concentrated industries are countercyclical. [Bils

4Obviously, one curve must: shift more than the other for the real wage to
change. Real Business Cycle models assume that the sources of cyclical fluct
uations are shocks to technology or productivity which shift only the labor
demand curve. Many of the Older Keynesian models assume fixed technology and
associate shifts of the labor supply curve with changes in aggregate demand.
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(1987, 1989); Hall (1988); Rotemberg and Woodford (1991)].
Bils found that markups in two-digit level industries de
creased by 3.3% for each 10% expansion in output; Rotemberg
and Woodford found elasticities of markups relative to hours
worked on the order of -1.

This evidence is consistent with

the view that many goods markets are imperfectly competitive,
and that the degree of market power possessed by firms varies
over the cycle.

However, theoretical mechanisms which could

explain cyclical market power at the

aggregate level are not

well developed.

The real wage and markup anomalies are closely related
and may have a common source.

The idea that monopoly power in

goods markets (measured as the percentage markup of price over
marginal cost) might vary countercyclically originated with
Pigou (1937) and Kalecki (1938), and was mentioned by Keynes
(1939) as a possible explanation for the early Dunlop-Tarshis
finding of procyclical real wages.

Keynes'

conjecture was

that if monopolistic firms use markup pricing and tend to
lower their markups in an expansion,

the ratio of nominal

prices to wages will decline, resulting in a procyclical real
wage.

Although the stylized facts on markups and real wages

are closely related, it will be shown later in this chapter
that the necessary conditions for real wages to be procyclical
are

stronger than

for markups to be countercyclical;

former imply the latter, but not conversely, i.e.,
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conjecture is not enough to obtain acyclical or procyclical
real wages.

3.3 The Interpretation of Countercyclical Markups

3.3.1 Countercyclical Monopoly Power

In this subsection I discuss countercyclical markups in
terms of monopoly power in the goods market.

The case of

monopsony power in the labor market is treated in the next
subsection.

The studies of markups by Bils and Rotemberg and Woodford
shared a common premise that goods markets were monopolistically competitive and labor markets were perfectly competi
tive, and therefore attributed the cyclicality of markups to
changes in the degree of monopoly power over the business
cycle.

With these assumptions, the relationship between the

markup and monopoly power is given by the first order condi
tion for profit maximization for a monopolist.

Assume that a monopolist has a short-term production
function y = F(£, k) where labor I is variable and capital k
is fixed, with F£ > 0, FZJt < 0 ; the monopoly price is given by
the industry inverse demand curve P(y). With a perfectly
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competitive labor market, the money wage W will be the market
wage.

The monopolist's profit is then:
n(y,W,r) = P{y)y-Wl-rk

(3*1)

Since capital is assumed to be fixed in the short run, y is a
function of only the level of employment.

The first-order

condition for profit maximization is, in markup fora:

E H

w

-

(3.2)

1

li+1

[1 -L]

n
Here Fs is the marginal product of labor, tj is the elasticity
of total market demand faced by the firm, and L =
Lerner's index of monopoly power. (0 < L < l).

1\/r\ | is

with perfect

competition assumed in the labor market and capital fixed in
the short run, marginal cost

is W/F£.

With L > 0,

price

exceeds marginal cost and the difference is called a markup.

Equation 3.2 gives the

optimum markup

for

a profit-

maximizing monopolist, and it is evident that a countercyc
lical markup at the firm or industry level implies countercyc
lical monopoly power L and procylical elasticity of demand, t|.
Thus, a profit-maximizing monopolist will lower its markup in
response to an increase in demand if and only if the elastici
ty of demand also increases in the vicinity of the equilibrium
price as the demand curve shifts out.

However, if the market

demand curve shifts iso-elastically, the markup will remain
constant.
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The problem is that there appears to be very little basis
in conventional price theory for demand elasticities to be
procyclical.
problem,

In the

namely,

most

common

setup

of

the

consumer's

a homothetic utility function and

linear

budget constraint, all demand elasticities are constant with
respect to the scale variable, income.
which

demand

assumption of

elasticities

vary

with

A market model in
income

non-homothetic preferences.

requires

This

is

the

not

a

particularly acute problem for microeconomic analysis, since
it has

been

known

for

some

time

that

the

assumption

of

homothetic preferences, which implies linear Engel curves, has
been repeatedly rejected by household expenditure studies.
(Prais and Houthakker
(1980),

pp.142-145;

(1971 Chap.

Deaton

(1992)

2; Deaton and Muellbauer
p.9).

Microeconomists

have no basis for assuming that consumption preferences of
individuals or households are homothetic.

When it comes to aggregation and macroeconomics, however,
nonhomothetic

preferences

are

problematic,

because

they

invalidate the representative agent method of aggregation and
require some form of nonlinear aggregation5.

When aggrega

tion is nonlinear there is no simple correspondence between
the functional forms which are used to describe the behavior

Aggregation, issues are not confined to macroeconomics. The first level of
aggregation over consumers is a household demand curve.
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of individual agents and firms, and those which would consis
tently describe the corresponding behavior of aaggregates. The
whole idea of micro-foundations for macroeconomics is chal
lenged.

This may be why nonhomothetic preferences are not

prevalent in the macroeconomic literature.

A theoretical basis for countercyclical market power
can be found in game-theoretic analyses of collusive oligopol
istic behavior ( Friedman

(1977, 1983), Rotemberg and Saloner

(1986), Bagwell and Staiger (1995)).

One conclusion of this

line of research is that tacitly colluding oligopolies are
likely to behave more competitively (i. e ., engage in deviat
ing price wars) during booms than in busts.

Of the models

tested by Rotemberg and Woodford [1991], a model of implicit
oligopolistic collusion gave the best fit to industry markup
data.

These models were reduced form markup equations at the

firm or industry level, not structural general equilibrium
models.

The extension of this approach to a general equilib

rium framework is an active area of research by Rotemberg,
Saloner and others.

Although it is potentially an alternative

explanation of countercyclical markups, it is not within the
scope of this thesis, which is to explore the implications of
imperfect competition in the labor market.
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3.3.2 Countercyclical Monopsony Power

One of the major messages of this thesis is that there is
an alternative interpretation of the evidence in the litera
ture on markups, which is that firms engage
wage—setting

behavior

over

the

business

in strategic

cycle,

and

have

stronger monopsony power over wages in recessions than in
expansions.

If,

in contrast to the

studies

cited

in the

previous section, if firms are assumed to be price-takers and
wage-setters, then what appears to be a markup of price over
marginal cost can be interpreted as a markdown of the wage
from

the

firm's

marginal

revenue product.

With

perfect

competition assumed in the goods market and monopsony power
assumed in the labor market, the profit-maximizing markdown
relationship becomes:
PF£
~W~

6>0

where e is the wage-elasticity of labor supply.

(3.3)

If both the

goods and labor market were perfectly competitive, the profitmaximizing price P would be equal to marginal cost W /F£ and
there would be no markup or markdown.
power in the labor market,
Wr

However, with monopsony

the marginal cost of labor is

ll

—— [1 + — J and is greater than average cost W by the amount of
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the markdown6.

The real wage W/P is less than the marginal

product of labor by the proportionality factor [1 + l/e]-1.
The ratio PF^/W which was interpreted as a price markup in
Equation 3.2 can now be interpreted as a wage markdown in
Equation 3.3.

If labor markets are monopsonistic,

and if

wage markdowns are countercyclical, the implication would be
that the elasticity of labor supply e in Equation 3.3 must be
procyclical and monopsony power l/e must be countercyclical.
The inference would be that labor supply in equilibrium is
less elastic (less sensitive to wage differentials) in reces
sions than in expansions, and conversely7.
of monopoly,

the

challenge

As in the case

is to explain why

e might

be

procyclical, and to determine what assumptions about the labor
market are consistent with that explanation.

Of course,

a monopoly-monopsony combination is possi

ble8. The corresponding first-order condition would then be:

The marginal cost of adding one worker is the incrementally higher wage
W paid to that worker, plus (dW/dL)L, the wage increase paid to all infra
marginal workers in the absence of wage discrimination.
The latter expression
is equal to W/e, the amount of the wage markdown from the marginal revenue
product. See also Figure 3-1.
7This is just an inference from the empirical record. It does not say that
e is procyclical in the standard monopsony model. In fact, in Section 3.5.3, I
prove that just the opposite is the case.
An interpretation in terms of
collusive wage-setting behavior, analogous to Rotemberg and Woodford [1991], is
possible but will not be pursued here.

O

This general case may be more realistic, since monopsony power in the
labor market may be associated with strong monopoly power in the goods market.
According to Joan Robinson (1932, p. 227), "A monopolist must necessarily be a
monopsonist of the factors which he employs". This statement would be
especially applicable to a workforce with firm-specific or industry-specific
skills.
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PFg
~W~

PjJ]
[1

Here

the

ratio

marginal cost as

PF^/W

(3.3)

+ ^]

reflects

both

price

markups

over

in Equation 3.2 and wage markdowns

from

marginal revenue product as in Equation 3.3.

This equation

shows that hypotheses about the cyclicality of markups

M ( t|

,e)

are necessarily joint hypotheses about the cyclical behavior
of r\ and e.

Since

and e are not observable, it appears that

it would be difficult to identify empirically their separate
contributions.

This identification problem, which tends to

confound statistical estimates of labor supply and demand
elasticities from aggregate data, is discussed in Killingsworth (1983) and Pencavel (1986).

The interpretation of the markup evidence depends on what
assumptions one wishes to make about the competitiveness of
goods

and

factor markets.

The

studies

cited

previously

focused on monopoly power l/r\ and assumed that labor markets
were

perfectly

competitive

(l/e

=

0) .

I will

take

the

opposite approach and assume that labor markets are monopso
nistic and explore the implications of monopsony power and
heterogeneity in the aggregate labor market for macroeconomic
outcomes, especially the
and markdowns.

the predicted pattern of real wages

In order to focus on the implications of
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monopsony power in the labor market I will henceforth assume
in this thesis that the goods market is perfectly competitive,
i. e., 1 /ti = o.

3.4 Monopsonistic Labor Markets in Search Equilibrium

Although the case of a pure monopsony employer has often
been regarded as somewhat of a textbook curiosum, applicable
only to isolated company towns, professional sports leagues
and university faculties, the construction of models involving
monopsony power has been an important line of research in
labor market theory. (Boal and Ransom [1997] provide a recent
comprehensive survey.)

This is because a competitive market-

clearing model has been unable to account for some important
and commonly observed phenonema, (e.g., involuntary unemploy
ment, sticky money wages, acyclical real wages, wage differen
tials, etc.)

As a consequence, many theorists have abandoned

the frictionless Walrasian tatonnement paradigm in favor of an
explicit

analysis

of

out-of-equilibrium

wage-setting

market adjustment processes (Lilien and Hall, [1986])9 .
has produced a voluminous

literature

and
This

on the economics

of

search and disequilibrium dynamics in labor markets.

Q

Much of the impetus for this research was the search for microfoundations
of Keynesian macroeconomics, which began in the 1970's, e. g., Phelps (1970).
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Two
theory

dominant

are:

(a)

characteristics
an

emphasis

on

of

labor

matching

market

search

workers

to

job

vacancies, implying that the relevant labor supply to a firm
is the number of workers rather than hours, with individual
labor supply assumed to be fixed;

and (b) the assumption that

firms set wages (or wage offers) which workers either take or
reject.

There is no presumption in this literature that the

labor market operates

like

a competitive

auction

market.

Monopsony power is implicit in most search theory models as a
consequence of the assumption that firms make wage offers and
workers are wage-takers.
the

absence

of

an

Arrow [1958] pointed out that, in

auctioneer,

price-setting

necessarily

defaults to agents and price-setting by agents is the de facto
exercise of market power10.

Thus, it should not be surpris

ing that monopsony power is implicit in most search models of
the

labor market.

Lippman

and McCall

[1975],

where

However,

(E.g.,
[1976

monopsony

Phelps
],
power

[1968], Mortensen

Pissarides
is

[1976]

explicitly

[1970],

and

Baily

recognized).

the monopsony power of search theory occurs

dynamic, out-of-equilibrium market-adjustment framework.

in a
An

important question is whether the dynamic monopsony power in

Arrow's observation applies strictly where agents’ offer prices are
oncontested and become the transaction price. This is seldom, if ever the case
in oligopoly.
In Bertrand duopoly, for example, there is a dynamic pricing
sequence which leads to the competitive price as an equilibrium. Union wage
bargaining involves bilateral monopoly, the outcome of which is generally
indeterminate.
These exceptions are not considered to be relevant to the
aggregate U. S. labor market.
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search disequilibrium persists or vanishes when a state of
equilibrium is attained.

Host macro models,

including the model described

in

Chapters II and V, are highly aggregated general equilibrium
models.

There are several advantages to utilizing a static

equilibrium framework in this investigation: (a) It is simpler
to formulate and explain; this helps to highlight the essen
tial

differences

approaches;

(b)

between
Within

the

the

monopsony

scope

of

this

model

and

thesis,

other
we

are

interested in examining the implications of monopsony power is
the labor market for macroeconomic equilibrium outcomes; the
models in Chapter II and V are static equilibrium models.
Thus, the specification of monopsony power in those models
needs

to

specified.

be an equilibrium one,
The question is, then,

since dynamics

are

not

does the assumption of

monopsony power in an underlying disequilibrium search process
imply the existence of monopsony power in equilibrium?

Appendix

C

contains

a brief

review

of

the

relevant

literature on this topic, specifically, the works of Mortensen
(1970), Diamond (1971, 1982), Rothschild (1973), Baily (1975)
and Pissarides (1976, 1988).

The important conclusion from

this review is that if wage-setting firms are governed by
profit-maximizing behavior in disequilibrium trading, then in
the absence of any countervailing market power the optimum
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wage path will converge to the monopsony wage in equilibrium.
In

general

the

long-run

equilibrium

or

stationary

state

resulting from a dynamic monopsony search process retains a
markdown and is not a competitive equilibrium (Baily (1975) ,
Diamond, (1982)).

Thus, for profit-maximizing firms, monopso

ny power in disequilibrium implies monopsony power in equilib
rium —

the auctioneer is not rehired.

This

conclusion provides

some

justification

for

the

methodology employed in this and subsequent chapters, which
assumes monopsony power in the labor market and utilizes a
static equilibrium framework.

There are also precedents for

this approach in the literature; Okun (1981) and Chick (1983) ,
for example, feature the static monopsony labor market model
in

their

respective

interpretations

of

the

economics

of

Keynes, while asserting that the underlying market adjustment
process is a search process.

3.5

A Neoclassical Static Monopsony Model

This section explores the implications of a standard
neoclassical model of the labor market for the elasticity of
labor supply and the cyclicality of markdowns and the real
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wage.

Here the analysis is conducted in a static partial

equilibrium framework11.

It is shown more formally that,

while procyclical elasticity of labor supply is a necessary
and sufficient condition for markdowns to be countercyclical,
a stronger sufficiency condition is required for the real wage
to be acyclical or procyclical.

The most important finding in

this section is that labor supply elasticity in the standard
choice-theoretic monopsony model will always be countercycli
cal when preferences are assumed to be convex and homothetic.
This parallels the situation for monopoly, where homothetic
preferences imply constant demand elasticities.

These results lead to the conclusion that representative
agent models, which preserve homotheticity in aggregation, are
incapable of explaining countercyclical markups or acyclical
real wages in terms of procyclical elasticities of either
goods demand or labor supoply.

Thus, these anomalies cannot

be explained by standard market models of imperfect competi
tion that employ the representative agent method.

3.5.1 A Standard Model of Monopsony

The essential features of nondiscriminating monopsony
are: (a) the firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve;

11In Chapter V the analysis will be conducted in a macroeconomic general
equilibrium framework.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
(b) all workers are paid the same wage, and (c) profit maxim
izing by the firm results in a monopsony wage that is less
than labor*s marginal revenue product.

The real wage and the

equilibrium levels of employment and output are all less than
would prevail under perfect competition.
than

its marginal revenue product,

Labor receives less

and the

difference

is

appropriated by the firm as monopsony rents.

A firm maximizes profits when it hires labor services up
to the point where the marginal product of labor equals its
marginal cost.

A monopsonist firm faces an upward sloping

labor supply curve and must raise its wage offers in order to
attract additional job applicants.

It is assumed that the

firm knows the labor supply curve £s(w), and sets the wage to
maximize the following profit function:

it(w)

=

F(£,k) - w£ 8 (w)

- rk

(3.4)

where F(£,k) is assumed to be a linearly homogeneous quasi
concave production function;

t represents a flow of labor

services; k represents the capital stock, which is assumed to
be fixed in the short run

over the business cycle;

w = W/P

is the real wage; and r is the rental cost of capital.
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first-order condition

for profit maximization equates the

marginal revenue product of labor with its marginal cost12:

PFje

=

W[l + l/e]

(3.5)

Here, e is the real wage elasticity of a static labor supply
curve, defined as

e

= (dle/Ze)/(dw/w)

(3.6)

If the monopsonist firm does not discriminate when it
raises its wage offer, it must offer the higher wage level to
all

of

its employees

and the marginal

cost

of

hiring an

additional worker is the nominal wage W plus the monopsony
markdown
(Note:

W/e

which

Equation

equation 3.3.)

3.6

represents
is

a

the

infra-marginal

rearrangement

of

the

cost13.
markdown

It will be convenient to work with equation

3.6 in real terms:

Fz

=

w[l + l/e]

(3.7)

12

The firm chooses W (for a given P) and accepts the supply of labor at
that wage. Since the locus of profit-maximizing employment is on the labor supply
curve, this is equivalent to choosing the profit-maximizing level of employment.
The quasi-concavity of F(£, k) guarantees the second-order conditions for a
maximum.
13The possibility of discriminating monopsony is excluded here. One way to
justify this is to assume that discrimination among identical workers would lower
productivity and induce quits. The monopsonist incurs an opportunity cost of
foregone producer surplus for choosing not to discriminate.
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where w = W/P.

w

This can also be written:

=

([1 +l/e]_1 )Fjg = EF£

(3.8)

Equation 3.7 shows that with monopsony the equilibrium real
wage is less than the marginal product of labor by the amount
of the markdown, w/e£w.

The markdown factor is:

E(e) = [1 + l/e]"1 ,

Following

Lerner

[1934],

l/e

0 < E < 1

is a

(3.9)

measure

of the

firm's

monopsony power over the real wage; higher elasticity of labor
supply

implies

lower

monopsony power

markdown) , and conversely.

(i.e.,

The limiting

a

smaller

case of a perfectly

elastic labor supply curve corresponds to perfect competition
where both firms and workers are wage-takers.
factor

E can be

interpreted as an

index

The markdown

of labor

market

competitiveness, since E * 1 as l/e ~ 0, and E • 0 as l/e -* «.
Under pure monopsony, employment, output and the real wage are
less than if the firm were a perfectly discriminating monopso
nist

or

if the

labor market were

perfectly

competitive.

Figure 3-1 shows these relationships, along with the amount of
the monopsony markdown w/e.

It is evident from Equation 3.9

that countercyclical

markdowns under profit maximizing monopsony imply procyclical
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W

Figure 3-1.

Monopsony Power in the Labor Market

- r ?

Figure 3—2. Countercyclical Monopsony Power
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elasticity of labor supply e; in the monopsony model they cure
logically equivalent.

However, I

show in the next section

that the procyclical requirement on e is stronger for acyc
lical

or procyclical

real

wages

than

for

countercyclical

markdowns.

3.5.2

Endogenous Elasticity of Labor S u p p Iv

In order to have cyclical changes in output and employ
ment, there must be some mechanism which shifts either the
aggregate marginal product curve or the aggregate marginal
labor cost curve (or both) to a new equilibrium point in real
terms14.

Two possible mechanisms have been treated exten

sively in the business cycle
product

of

labor curve

supply curve,

(l)

the marginal

against a stationary

labor

because of exogenous productivity shocks

technology F(£,k)
or

shifts

literature:

to

(the Real Business Cycle (RBC) mechanism) ;

(2 ) the labor supply curve shifts against a stationary

marginal product curve, due (for example) to workers’ monetary
misperceptions of the real wage or perceived changes in real
wealth (the Traditional Keynesian mechanism) .
make use

Here, I will

of the framework established in Chapter

II,

and

assume a Keynesian shift of the labor supply curve due a
wealth effect.

(The specific source of labor supply shifts is

14
Unless otherwise stated, only equilibrium trading will be assumed in this
thesis.
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not important here; the immediate purpose is to focus on the
cyclical behavior of e.

However, throughout this chapter and

subsequently the analysis is confined to models in which only
the labor supply curve shifts).

For the purpose of exposition I will

assume

a

labor

supply curve that is monotonically increasing with w, so that
l/€jgw = eW£f

elasticity of the real wage with respect to

employment which is a function of I, and E = [1 + eWje)-1*
Now assume a non-neutral one-time increase in the nominal
money stock (as described in Chapter II) which decreases real
nonlabor income through a negative effect on wealth, which in
turn

causes the

labor

supply curve to shift

out

so

that

employment and output increase15. (A more complete analysis
of this mechanism in macroeconomic general equilibrium
presented in Chapter II) .

is

With employment increasing, the

elasticity of the profit-maximizing real wage with respect to
employment is given by applying the elasticity operator

to

Equation 3.8.

«i[w*]

=

**[E]

(?)

+

«i[Ff]

(3.10)

(-)

In the wealth effects macro-model of Chapter II, an open-market purchase
of government bonds increases W and P nonproportionally and decreases the value
of real wealth Q from which nonlabor income is derived. The net effect in the
model is an increase in employment and output. To quote Hall [1980], "Changes
in the money stock unambiguously shift the labor supply function."
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Equation (3.10) follows from the elasticity of the product EF2
in equation (3.8). For the elasticity of the equilibrium real
wage with respect to employment to be non-negative, the sum of
the elasticities of E and F£ must be non-negative.

A neces

sary condition for the monopsony real wage to be procyclical
is for S]g[E] > 0.

Since E = [1 + l/€£w]_1, the wage elasticity

of labor supply e£w must increase as employment and output
increase.

However,

this

is only a necessary

condition;

A

sufficient condition for the optimum real wage to be either
acyclical or procyclical is for (3.10) to be non-negative,
i. e . :
>o

(3.ii)

It can be shown that:

«i[E]

=

(3.11)

i + e£w

so that the elsticity of e£w must be procyclical and large
enough to satisfy the inequality in Equation 3.11.

Thus,

procyclical elasticity alone is sufficient for markdowns to be
countercyclical, as indicated by Equations 3.3 and 3.9, but
for the real wage to be either acyclical or procyclical the
stronger inequality condition in (3.11) must be satisfied, due
to the assumed negative elasticity of the marginal product of
labor.

Thus, even if e£w is procyclical, the

real wage could

be countercyclical, acyclical or procyclical depending on the
magnitude of the elasticity of e2vr

Of course, as long as e£w
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is procyclical, w will be less countercyclical than if e2w
were constant or decreasing. Real wages are more likely to be
procylical if the marginal product of labor F2 is inelastic
and e£w. is procyclical and highly elastic with respect to
employment16.

The

conclusions

from

this

analysis,

for

the

Traditional

Keynesian setup, are:

1.

Under static equilibrium monopsony, a necessary
condition for real wages to be procyclical and for
markdowns to be countercyclical is for the elasticity
of labor supply to depend on factors that shift the
labor supply locus, i. e., it must be endogenous
to the driving forces of the business cycle.

2. Procyclical elasticity of labor supply is a sufficient

condition for markdowns to be countercylical, but only
a necessary condition for real wages to be acyclical or
procyclical.

For a monopsonies the inverse of the marginal product of labor curve is
not a labor demand curve.
The firm's demand for labor is determined by the
equality of marginal product and marginal labor cost, and depends on e,u. Also,
it should be clear from the preceding discussion that the reduced-form elasticity
of w in (3.11) represents the response of e to a shift of the labor supply
curve, and is not the same as the change in e£w along a stationary labor supply
curve.
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3. A sufficient condition for real wages to be either
acyclical or procyclical is that

[e ], the elasticity

of the elasticity of labor supply, be positive and
large enough in magnitude so that

(* ^ V )

*

l * i w l

( 3 -12)

This is a necessary and sufficient condition for the real wage
to overcome the "tyranny of the labor demand curve."

3.5.3

Elasticity of Labor Su p p Iv in the Standard Model

In Appendix C, Section C2, I show that in the standard
monopsony model with homothetic preferences, the elasticity of
labor supply e is always countercyclical. implying that the
standard monopsony model presented here is inconsistent with
countercyclical markdowns or acyclical real wages.

The cause

of this inconsistency is the assumption of homotheticity.

In the standard labor-market model, labor supply is a
function of the real wage and nonlabor income: £ 8 = lB(w, v) .
This means that the elaticity of

labor

supply

is also

a

function of w and v, with de/dw < 0, de/dv > 0. When homo
thetic preferences are specified in the standard monopsony
model,

e increases with real nonlabor income v.

this imply for the cyclicality of e?

What does

The only shift variable
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for* the labor supply function in this model is real nonlabor
income v, which may be regarded as being derived from property
or wealth.

Since d£s/5v < 0, a decline in v will cause the

labor supply curve to shift out,

increasing the

employment and output in monopsony equilibrium.
8 e/8 v

>0,

level of
But since

e will decrease and thus be countercyclical.

As

the labor supply curve shifts out and the economy expands,
monopsony power

1 /e

will

increase,

the

markdown

will

be

procyclical and the real wage will be more countercyclical
than it would be in a perfectly competitive labor market.
Thus, the implications of the standard monopsony model with
homothetic preferences

are

inconsistent with

the

stylized

facts of countercyclical markdowns and acvclical real wages.
In this respect the standard monopsony model

is even more

counter factual than a perfectly competitive model of the labor
market.

The reason why this standard setup is counterfactual,
with or without monopsony power, is the assumption of homo
thetic preferences U(c,£) which determines the algebraic sign
of the change in the elasticity of the demand for leisure, x\g
in Equation C2.8, reproduced below:

dld
(!-**)

%
dv
(l-£rf) (l-£d)

J

>0
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(3.13)

Ill
(In Equation 3.13r I represents leisure and £d represents the
demand for leisure, in keeping with the notation in Appendix
C and Equation C2.8)

With homothetic preferences, 3tije/8v = 0,

and from Equation 3.13, 3e/dv > 0 .

In order for 8e/3v to be

negative, di\£/dv would have to be positive and large enough to
offset the positive influence of the second term (an elastici
ty condition corresponding to Equation (3.11)); but if this
were the case,

individual preferences would not be homoth

etic17.

This result by itself does not constitute an adequate
basis for rejecting the neoclassical model of individual labor
supply or the standard monopsony model at the level of the
firm.

The evidence on markups and real wages refers in most

instances to highly aggregated data, and may be irrelevant for
many purposes of microeconomic analysis18.

The implications

for aggregate models of the labor market are more serious, and
are addressed in the next subsection.

17
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) also make this point for the elasticity of
product demand. Their econometric tests rejected homothetic models of demand.
18
There is some evidence that real wages are more procyclical at lower
levels of aggregation, and that aggregation introduces a countercyclical bias in
measurements of the real wage. (See Chapter I). Such evidence is not favorable
to models which employ the representative agent.
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3.5.4

Implications For Aggregate Labor Su p p Iv

In macroeconomic modeling it is common practice to
assume a "representative agent" whose behavior is described by
demand and supply functions which are implicitly assumed to be
an. exact

linear

aggregation

of

corresponding

individual

demands and supplies, i. e ., an aggregate labor supply curve
is posited as:

Ls(w, v) =

Z^Cw,

vL)

(3.14)

where L 8 and Is are assumed to have the same homogeneous
functional form.

When exact linear aggregation is applicable,

it preserves a one-to-one correspondence between the function
al forms at the macro and micro levels, thereby rationalizing
the idea of "microfoundations" for macroeconomics.

Notwithstanding the

intuitive appeal of

(3.13)

as an

"adding up" method, it is mathematically consistent only for
the quasi-homothetic class of indirect utility functions which
have the Gorman polar form (Deaton and Muellbauer, [1980, Sec.
6.3]):

U(W, P, Yl) = ai(W,P) + b(W,P)Yi
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Where YL is total income or expenditure.
aggregation of (3.14),
but b(W,P) cannot.

For exact

linear

and YL can vary among individuals,

When at = 0, preferences are homothetic.

The corresponding demand for leisure, which can be derived
using Roy's identity, can be written in the following form:

fd (W, P, Yl) =

^(W,?) + P(W,P)Yi

In Equation 3.15, ai(W,P)

(3.15)

is a minimum leisure requirement

that can vary among workers, P(W,P) is the marginal propensity
to consume leisure out of total

income,

for all workers, and Yj^ = WT +

is the total income

ment.

which

Leisure is a normal good and therefore

must the same

0 > 0.

endow
Since

leisure and consumption are the only two commodities they must
be gross substitutes, and therefore [3ai/8W + 5P/3W) < 0.

It is apparent that demands must be

linear

in total

income Y^ with the same coefficient P(W,P),i. e . , all workers
must have linear Engel curves for leisure with the same slope
P,

but possibly different intercepts c^. When preferences are

homothetic,

= 0 for all workers, Engel curves are identical

rays through the origin,

the

income-elasticity of

leisure

demand is unity, and the wage-elasticity of leisure demand is
the elasticity of P(W,P) which is independent of the distribu-
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'tion of worker endowments19. When preferences are quasi-homothetic, only aggregate or per capita endowments of nonlabor
income and time matter for aggregate demand.

The

labor

supply

function

corresponding

to

equation

(3.15) is:

es(W, P, Yl) = T - at(W,P) - P(W,P)Y±

(3.16)

The individual labor supply function derived from the
solution to the consumer's problem

will have this form if and

only if the consumer preferences represented by U(c,I) are
quasi-homothetic20. In other words, for exact linear aggreg
ation (and thus the representative agent) to be valid, the
functional forms in Equations (3.15) and (3.16) are required
at the micro-level; that functional form is a solution to the
consumers' problem if and only if the individual's budget
constraint

is linear

and continuous

and

preferences

are

quasi-homothetic, as in Equation (3.14).

19

Deaton (1992) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1987) emphasize that linear
Bngel curves, which are implied by the homotheticity requirement of the
representative agent method, have been consistently rejected in empirical
studies.
20

The class of quasi-homothetic utility functions include Cobb-Douglas,
with Sf * 0, Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) with a{ equal to a
positive constant, and the Stone-Geary Linear Expenditure System (LES) with
Sf constant and minimum demand quantities cQ, iQ that are positive.
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If the time endowment T is the same for all workers,
linear aggregation of the labor supply function in (3.16) will
reproduce the same form with average endowments Y and a(W,P)
in place of Y£ and
P.

The

(P) , respectively, and the same value for

elasticity

of

individual

labor

supply

for

this

functional form is:
(3.17)
[oti + | i

-

2*]

where Yt = WT + VL. At the micro level, individual elastici
ties at a given wage W depend on individual endowments
a^ P), and therefore may vary among individuals.

and

Under exact

linear aggregation the elasticity of aggregate labor supply
will have the same functional form as Equation (3.17), with Y
and a(W,P)

replacing Y£ and aL.

(Because elasticity is a

logarithmic measure, there is no linear aggregative relation
ship between individual and aggregate elasticities) .

The cyclicality of e for the quasi-homothetic class of
labor supply functions can be determined by differentiating
Equation

(3.17)

with

respect

to

Y,

the

income

or

scale

variable:

(3.18)
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Since 5(J/3W < 0 and (da/dVl + 3P/3W) < 0 , it follows that de/dY
> 0. Since Y = WT + V where V is nonlabor income, it also
follows that de/dV will be positive in both the aggregate and
disaggregated

versions

of

Equation

(3.17),

derivation and accompanying discussion

and

from

the

in Appendix C,

the

elasticity of labor supply in the aggregate model will be
countercyclical,

not

procyclical,

agent aggregation is valid.
in a

whenever

representative

The assumption of monopsony power

Keynesian model with representative agent aggregation of

the labor market will result in countercyclical real wages and
procyclical markdowns, both of which are counter factual.

3.6 Conclusions

The main conclusion of this chapter is that the assump
tion of monopsony power in a Keynesian labor market does not,
by itself, lead to an explanation of countercyclical markdowns
or acyclical aggregate real wages when the representative
agent method of aggregation is employed21.

The representa

tive agent method is valid only if preferences are quasihomothetic.

If preferences are assumed to be quasi-homothet

ic, then the elasticity of labor supply of the representative
worker will be countercyclical (as it is for each individual
worker) ,

and

this

implies

procyclical

markdowns

21

and

an

This conclusion holds in the absence of positive exogenous shocks to the
marginal product of labor, and applies also to the possibility of explaining
these two anomalies in terms of procyclical elasticity of goods demand.
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aggregate real wage that is more countercyclical than it would
be under perfect competition.

Alternatively,

if preferences

are

assumed to

be

not

quasi-homothetic, then nonlinear aggregation does not preserve
functional forms derived at the micro level, and the logical
basis for microfoundations is compromised.

This would be

counter to the macroeconomic research program of the past two
decades22.

This chapter has revealed that the assumptions which
underlie the representative method of aggregation preclude an
explanation of

the real wage and markup anomalies in terms of

cyclical elasticities of labor supply or goods demand.

If the

elasticities of aggregate goods demand and aggregate labor
supply have any economic significance, the empirical record on
markups and real wage behavior suggests that perhaps the real
aggregate economy is not that homothetic.

Therefore, the next

chapter of this thesis departs somewhat from representative
agent

aggregation

in the

labor

market,

and

explores

the

implications of monopsony power when labor is heterogeneous
and the distribution of agent characteristics matters.

22

It should be noted that the representative agent (homotheticity)
assumption is ubiquitous in macroeconomic theory, and is implicit in all attempts
to extrapolate theories of the individual consumer and the firm to higher levels
of aggregation.
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CHAPTER IV
AN AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION FOR HETEROGENEOUS LABOR
4.1 Introduction and Overview

In the flexible-price macro model of Chapter II, a one
time increase in the money stock raised the price
lowered the interest rate,
aggregate wealth.

level,

and reduced the real value of

Since the aggregate labor supply function

in the model of Chapter II was based on a representative
agent, only the mean or per capita real wealth effect mattered
for labor supply1. In Chapter III it was shown that when a
representative agent is assumed for aggregate labor supply, an
increase in labor supply due to an aggregate wealth affect
will always be accompanied by a decreasing or countercyclical
wage-elasticity

of

labor

supply.

The

implication

for

monopsonistic labor markets is that the real wage would be
more countercyclical (and therefore more counterfactual) than
under

perfect

Chapter

competition.

III was

precludes

an

that

the

explanation

The

principal

representative
of

conclusion

agent

countercyclical

of

assumption

markups

and

procyclical real wages in terms of procyclical elasticity of
aggregate labor supply.

1In the representative agent model of Chapter II the aggregate or meanlevel wealth effect is sufficient to shift the aggregate labor supply curve and
make the connection between a change in the money stock and real output. However,
the real wage in that model is countercyclical.
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In this Chapter I show that, by moving away from the
representative agent framework for labor supply and allowing
for worker heterogeneity

and distribution

effects,

it

is

possible to construct an aggregate labor supply function that
exhibits procyclical elasticity, which was shown in Chapter
III to be a necessary condition for real wages to be acyclical
and a sufficient condition for markups to be countercyclical
When labor markets are monopsonistic. This is accomplished in
a standard decision-theoretic framework with the additional
requirement that preferences are nonhomothetic. The resulting
aggregate

labor

supply

function

has

the

potential,

imbedded in a general equilibrium framework,

when

of predicting

cyclical behavior of markups and the real wage that is more
consistent with the stylized facts.

The spirit of this investigation is squarely within the
New Keynesian literature, in that it explores the implications
of imperfect competition in the labor market for the moneyoutput connection and the behavior of real wages.

It differs

in that it does not utilize the representative agent method of
aggregation for labor supply, a feature that is common to both
the New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle literatures. Conse
quently, the marginal responses of individual workers are not
restricted by the homotheticity assumption, and the distribu
tion of workers' marginal responses matters.
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Individual labor supply is assumed to be constrained by
a fixed work week and workers are assumed to be heterogeneous
with respect to their nonlabor income endowments and their
preferences for risk.

This heterogeneity gives

rise to

distribution of reservation wages which provides the

a

link

between individual and aggregate labor supply.

A key assumption

is that nonlabor

income

is derived

primarily from holdings of financial assets, augmented on the
low end by transfer payments. Therefore,
nonlabor income,

the distribution of

and consequently of reservation wages,

is

proportional to the size distribution of real wealth holdings
in the workforce,

which is assumed to be Lognormal2.

The

aggregate labor supply function takes on the properties of the
size distribution of financial wealth in the workforce.

I show that if workers have nonhomothetic preferences
with increasing relative risk aversion then the elasticity of
the reservation wage function will be an increasing function
of real nonlabor income; if real nonlabor income declines for
all workers, the elasticity of the reservation wage function
will

decrease,

implying

(i)

aggregate

labor

supply

will

increase at all wages, and (ii) the elasticity of labor supply
will increase.

Thus, the real wage-elasticity of labor supply

2

There is theoretical and empirical support for the lognormal assumption
in the literature, e. g., Sargan (1957), Atkinson (1975), Pestieau and Possen
(1979) and Vaughn (1988).
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will be procyclical.

This result: requires only the assumption

of increasing relative risk aversion, and is independent of
the functional form assumed for the distribution of wealth.
I also show that if nonlabor income is assumed to be distrib
uted Lognormal, the

point elasticity of the distribution

is

inversely related to the inequality of the distribution of
nonlabor income in the labor force, measured by the variance
of

the

logarithm.

A

decrease

in the

inequality

of

the

distribution of nonlabor income will cause the elasticity of
the distribution to increase over a central range of reserva
tion wages which includes the mean.

This result is specific

to the Lognormal distribution.

I also show that if workers have increasing relative risk
aversion for wealth, they will rebalance their financial-asset
portfolios in response to an open-market purchase of bonds by
the central bank in a heterogeneous manner.

Wealthier workers

with higher relative risk aversion will reduce their bond
holdings

and

income

disproportionally,

and

will

absorb

a

disproportionate amount of the additional money created by the
banking systemn.

This will reduce the dispersion of the

distribution of income from bonds in the workforce, which will
cause the elasticity of the labor supply function to increase
as it shifts out.

An open market sale of bonds would produce

the opposite result.
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Computations
produce

with

a

large positive

calibrated
(i.

version

e., procyclical)

of

the

labor

model
supply

elasticities for aggregate wages corresponding to labor-force
participation rates of 40% to

78%.

This range includes the

current U. S. labor-force participation rate of 66% at the
calibrated mean reservation wage.

Sensitivity tests indicate

that the model is fairly robust against variations in its key
parameters.

The model is critically dependent on its two

principal assumptions: nonhomothetic preferences with increas
ing relative risk aversion; and

Lognormal distributions of

wealth and nonlabor income in the work force.

This

chapter

makes

a

theoretical

connection

between

monetary policy actions and aggregate labor supply by modeling
the effects of open market operations on the distribution of
wealth and nonlabor income.

Open market operations shift

the aggregate labor supply curve and change its elasticity
procyclically over a relevant range of reservation wages.
This "monetary theory" of aggregate labor supply,
with the

assumption of monopsony power

together

in labor markets,

provides a theoretical basis for countercyclical markups and
acyclical

or

procyclical

real

Traditional Keynesian setup,

wages

within

an

otherwise

and may serve to restore some

respectability to that class of models.
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The Chapter is organized as follows: The static monopsony
model with heterogeneous labor supply is formally specified
and developed in Section 4.2.

In Section 4.3 the theoretical

and empirical relevance of the Lognormal distribution to this
problem is discussed, and the mathematical properties of the
distribution are described.

Section 4.4,

supplemented by

Appendix D, contains the principal analytical result of the
chapter,

which

is the construction of

an

aggregate

labor

supply function, the elasticity of which depends on monetary
policy actions.

Section 4.5 describes the calibration of the

model to the U. S. economy, and the computational procedures.
Computational results are presented in Table 4-4 and Exhibits
4-1 through 4-15 at the end of Section 4.5, and are the basis
of the claims made for the model.

Section 4.6 presents some

conclusions that may be drawn from the research described in
this chapter.

4.2

In this

Heterogeneous Labor Supply

section

I develop an aggregate

labor

supply

function for a workforce that is heterogeneous with respect to
nonlabor income.

The approach taken preserves the principle

of individual utility maximization, while allowing aggregate
labor supply to be determined by the distribution of wealth in
the workforce.

The aggregate supply function thus derived is
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a monotonic transformation of the distribution of wealth in
the workforce.

4.2.1

Heterogeneous Workers

I will

investigate

sources of heterogeneity

the
in

implications
individual

of

labor

two

possible

supply:

(1 )

increasing relative risk aversion with respect to nonlabor
income, and (2 ) a distribution of reservation wages based on
heterogeneous nonlabor income endowments.

Increasing relative risk aversion is a departure from
homotheticity that has some theoretical and empirical support
in the literature (Arrow, 1970).

However, it has the distinct

disadvantage of excluding most of the standard utility funct
ions used in economic theory, and requires some form of non
linear aggregation for both leisure and consumption.

In an

attempt to preserve a role for standard assumptions

about

preferences, I will also examine the case where preferences
sure identical and homothetic,

but workers differ in their

nonlabor income endowments and therefore in their reservation
wages.

The advantage of focusing on nonlabor income as the

heterogeneous parameter is that it is potentially measurable,
it has a plausible connection to macroeconomic variables, and
it already plays a role in the standard labor-market model.
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4.2.2 Indivisible Labor

The first assumption will be to equate hours with workers
by assuming that labor services can be traded only in fixed
quantities of h hours per period.
schedule to a firm,

an industry

Thus,

the

labor

supply

and the economy will

be

measured by the number of workers who choose to work h hours
at the prevailing wage.

There
literature
supply.

is

considerable

support

for this approach to

in

the

modeling

macroeconomic

aggregate

labor

First, macroeconomic theory and policy have been

more concerned with changes in the number of persons employed
and unemployed than in total hours or changes in the length of
the work week.

Many specifications of the aggregate labor

market in theoretical models make no important distinction
between the number of workers and hours per worker. Second,
although there are small adjustments in the length of the work
week in the manufacturing sector, it is well established that
most of the quarterly and annual variation in aggregate manhours comes through fluctuations

in the number of workers

employed rather than in hours per worker.

Some evidence for

this claim is presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 below, which are
taken from Heckman (1984) and based on Coleman (1984) .
quote Heckman from the original:
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Table 4-1
Fluctuations in Total Hours, Hours per Worker, and
Ntmfaer of G*»loyees 1970-1979
Deviation froa Trend, in Percentage Points
Annual Data
Tear
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
<70+71+74+75)/2

Total
Hours
-3.12
-2.17
1.44
2.30
-0.95
-5.85
1.25
2.28
3.11
1.71

Hours Per
Worker
-0.92
0.03
0.51
0.27
-0.59
-0.47
0.48
0.29
0.28
0.16

No. of
Enplovees

-6.05

-0.98

-5.08

-

2.20
2.20

0.93
2.04
-0.34
-5.41
0.77

2.00
2.84
1.57

Source: Table 103, BLS Handbook of Labor S ta tis tic s , B u lle tin 2070.
Taken from Heckman (1984) and Coleman (1984)

Table 4-1
By Industry
Average Percentage Point Deviation from Trend fo r the Two
Contractions of the 1970's, 1970-1971 and 1974-1975
Total
Hours

Hours Per
Worker

Private Business
-6.1
-1.0
Total Nan-Agricultural
-5.2
-1.0
Mining
-2 .9
-1.2
Construction
-11.2
-0.3
Manufacturing
11.4
-2.0
Transportation and
-5.1
Public U t i lit ie s
-1.3
Wholesale and R etail Trade
-2.9
Finance, Insurance and
-2.5
0.2
Real Estate
Services
-2.5

No. of
Emolovees
-5.1
-4 .2
-1 .6
-11.0
-9.5
-3 .9
-0.04
-2 .7
-0 .6

Source: Tables 103 and 72, BLS Handbook of Labor S ta tis tic s , B u lletin 2070
Business S ta tis tic s , 1979. Taken from Heckman (1984) and Coleman (1984).
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...any serious empirical model of business-cycle labor market:
fluctuations must account for manhour variations at the exten
sive margin (employment or labor-force entry decisions) as well
as manhour variations at the intensive margin .... The *repre
sentative consumer' always works, and so an interior solution
labor supply theory is invoked to account for the facts. Tables
1 and 2 reveal how poorly a representative consumer model des
cribes the facts. As Coleman (1984) stresses, the data do not
support a representative consumer model... As long as represent
ative consumer models are used, micro evidence cannot be used to
"calibrate'' macro models.

The analysis

of

Chapter III

is consistent with

Heckman's

comments, in that it was demonstrated that the representative
agent construction precludes a model from exhibiting acyclical
real wages.

Other

labor

economists

Knieser and Goldsmith

seem to

(1987),

concur

in their

with

survey

Heckman.

article on

models of the aggregate labor market, report aggregate elast
icities based on annual data for the entire postwar period
1948-1985, and conclude that:
...the elasticity of aggregate employment with respect to real
GNP [.44] is over twice the elasticity of the average workweek
with respect to real GNP [.20]. Thus, cyclic movements in labor
utilization appear to be dominated by changes in the number of
workers with jobs rather than characterized by short hours or
worksharing arrangements...
Any satisfactory model of the
aggregate labor market must be consistent with these empirical
regularities..... In order to shed light on aggregate movements
in employment, micro-economic reseeurch must account for changes
in labor force participation rather than variations in hours
of work of the continuously employed individual.
[Italics added]

Pencavel (1986, p. 83), also citing Coleman, concludes that:
...the larger part of the movement in aggregate manhours over
the business cycle is attributable to movements in the number of
workers employed and not to movements in the hours worked of
those continuously employed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
Lilien and Hall

(1986)

arrive at the same conclusion

based on their analysis of annual U.S. data on per capita
hours from 1956 - 1983, which updates and confirms Heckman's
conclusion from BLS data.
(1980,

Ch.

11,

pp.

Finally,

283-290)

discuss

Deaton and Muellbauer
the

implications

of

quantity rationing in the labor market, and conclude that:
...for short-run analysis there are many types of jobs in which
it is more realistic to take hours as given or at any rate set
by employers. To some extent this is true even in jobs where
overtime at a higher wage rate is common.

There also is precedent in the macroeconomic literature
for treating labor supply as discrete and indivisible, (e.g.,
Sherman and Willett [1972]; Branson [1989], p. 123; Hall and
Taylor [1983] pp. 452-455).
and Rogerson and Wright

Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988)

(1988) have developed models with

"indivisible labor", where it is assumed that each worker is
endowed with the same fixed unit of labor per time period.

Treating aggregate labor supply as a flow of workers
providing fixed quantities of labor is also consistent with
the search models of labor market adjustment which are assumed
to underlie the static equilibrium framework.

Thus,

the

assumption that individual labor hours are traded only in
fixed quantities has considerable precedent in the business
cycle literature.

With fixed individual labor supply the

operative labor supply decision of the consumer is whether to
work at the

extensive margin;

utility maximization
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applies,

but

with

a

highly

constrained

opportunity

set.

Aggregation of labor supply will be over workers at their
extensive margins of labor-force participation3

4.2.3

Behavioral Asstimptions About the Labor Market

I will

assume that the

labor services

of

individual

workers are purchased only in discrete units of h hours per
worker per time period, due to technological or institutional
quantity constraints,

and will abstract from variations in

hours per worker and perturbations in h.

Thus, this assump

tion is taken merely as an institutional datum4.

I also assume a large population of potential labor-force
participants

who

have

identical

tastes

for

non-negative

The approach here differs somewhat from that of Rogerson and Hanson
(1988), who assumed that individual preferences for leisure are discrete and
therefore nonconvex.
Instead, I assume that preferences are convex but are
quantity-constrained, resulting in a discrete, nonconvex opportunity set for the
individual worker. The nonconvexity will be overcome in aggregation by assuming
a continuous distribution of reservation wages over workers.

&

There is some variation in h by industry and occupation, and one could
extend the model by assuming a finite set {h-} and working with an aggregate
average h. This complication will be avoided here. Also, no presumption is made
here that the institutional datum h is Pareto optimal, or anything other than an
accepted norm of implicit labor contracts given by history and the institutional
setting. The origins, history and political economy of the 8-hour workday and
the 40-hour workweek in the U. S. and England have been researched by Dankert,
Mann and Northrup [1965]; Langenfelt [1974], Cross [1988, 1989], Hinrichs, Roche
and Sirianni [1991], all of whom emphasize the important roles of religious and
cultural norms and the political influence of organized labor. The standard 40hour workweek in U. S. manufacturing has not changed significantly since 1946,
and there appears to be no strong movement underway to reduce it. (Owen [1989]).
It appears to be in long-run equilibrium.
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quantities of a composite consumption good c and nonmarket
(leisure) time I which can be completely represented

by a

concave subutility function U(c,£) with the standard proper
ties that Uc > o, Ujg > 0, Ucc < 0 and U££ < 0.

In addition, I assume that each worker

has tastes

and

preferences for holding a portfolio of endowed wealth n as a
store

of

value,

disaggregated

in the

form

of real money

balances m = M/P and earning assets f = F/P (where m + f =

fl) ,

and that those preferences can be represented by a concave
subutility function H(m, f) which possesses the same proper
ties as U.

Earning assets provide utility by earning a return

in the form of income, and appreciation which is not certain.
Thus,

earning

assets

are

risky.

Money balances

provide

utility by facilitating transactions and providing a risk-free
store of value compared to earning assets.

Each worker

has choices to make regarding c, £, m and f.

I will assume that workers have identical preferences over
c,£,m and f which are weakly separable, i. e. ,

?(c,e, m, f)

=

Y[ U(c,£), H(m, f) ]

This will enable the analysis of optimum choices to be carried
out in separate stages, wherein U and H are optimized indepen
dently subject to their own constraint sets.

That being the
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case,

X will defer

discussion

of

the workers'

portfolio

balancing problem until later in the chapter (Section 4.4 and
Appendix D, Section 7) where it will play a major role.

In

order to concentrate on the labor market at this stage, I will
assume that each worker's portfolio balance problem has been
pre-solved, and each worker holds an amount of endowed wealth
fli = aini + (l_ai)nir where a£ is the fraction of wealth held
in earning assets.

This results in each worker receiving

portfolio income from the yield on earning assets:
= airfii.

y L = rf£

This, together with transfer payments ti from the

government, constitutes a worker's source of nonlabor income
vi * Yi. + ti..

In the most general case, n L, ai and t if and consequently
vir are all different for each worker.

Thus I assume that

workers have identical convex indifference maps but differ in
their wealth endowments and nonlabor income.

I also assume

that the number of workers is sufficiently large and compact
that the distribution of nonlabor income among the worker
population can be well described by a cumulative distribution
function $(v) that is continuous and twice differentiable.

4.2.4 Individual Labor

Su p p I v

Subject to Quantity Constraints

This section contains a more formal specification of
individual labor supply subject to quantity constraints.
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The approach to specifying
worth (1983),

With the

the labor market follows Killings-

Rogerson (1988)and

Branson (1989) .

imposedquantity constraint,

or 1-h, but not both.

I can

be either 0

The consumer's problem becomes, with

the additional quantity constraints:

Max
c ,1
c <
and £ =
or t =

U(c,£),

subject to the constraints
(4.1)

+ w(l-£)
1
1

- h

where w = W/P is the real wage, and 1 is the maximum time
available in the time period.

Because of the discrete labor

hours constraint, the constraint set of (4.1)

is not convex

and therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a constrained
maximum are not applicable5 .

In general the marginal rate of

substitution between c and I will be different from the real
wage w at both corner points, and will not be a guide to which
point has the higher level of utility.

(See Figure 4-1) .

For a worker with nonlabor income vL who is offered a
real wage w to work exactly h hours, the choice is between
only two points on his budget line cL = vt + w(l-£) :

choose

between work and leisure based on the highest total (direct)

®The sets {c, 1-h} and {c, 1} are disjoint, i. e. {c, l-h>n{c, 1} = 0,
and therefore {c, l-h}u{c, 1} cannot be a convex set.
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utility between U(vi, i) and U(V£ + wh, l-h) .

For a given h,

each worker's choice will depend on the values of w and vL.
The offered wage at which a worker is just indifferent between
working h hours or not at all is called his reservation wage.
t»L, and is formally defined by the identity :

V l(y,q, h) =

Equation

(4.2)

U0 (vir 1 ) - Uj^Vi + ©jh, l-h)

expresses the worker's

s

o

(4.2)

indifference at the

reservation wage.

U0 is the section of the utility surface

along t = 1, and

is the section along t = l-h.

(See Figure

4-1).

It is assumed that monopsony firms set the wage w that is
offered to all workers, including the marginally unemployed
workers.

(See Chapter III for a discussion of the monopsony

assumption and its motivation.)

The worker's binary choice

between work and nonwork can be reduced to a reservation wage
rule :6
0,

hL

w < ©

=

(4.3)
h,

w > ©

The reservation wage © will be a monotonic increasing function
of v, f(v) , the properties of which can be derived from (4.2)

6Thls follows 'the development in Killingsworth [1983]
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via the implicit function theorem7.
Appendix D) .

(The derivation is in

Thus, values of v, w = i|r(v) , w and h completely

parameterize the individual worker's constrained decision.

Figure 4-1 illustrates the binary choice confronting an
individual worker whose labor supply is constrained to a fixed
number of hours h.

Each worker will be on an indifference

curve corresponding to their nonlabor

income.

v0, vlr v2,

etc., and each worker has a reservation wage

= ijr(vi) at

which they are just indifferent between working h hours at
that wage or not working and receiving only their nonlabor
income vL.

The opportunity set of a worker with nonlabor

income endowment v^ is constrained to the two sets of points
{(vir 1 ) ; (v± + wh, l-h)}, w > 0 , and thus the only relevant
portions of the indifference map are along the separate vert
ical lines defined by I = 1 and I = l-h.

In general,

a

worker's indifference curve will not be tangent to the offerwage budget line at points such as A0, A x, etc. along the
hours constraint line in Figure 4.1, and the worker's marginal
rate of

substitution

at these points

will

not equal

the

reservation wage.

7

The theorem is applicable here due to the assumptions about U(c,£), which
also guarantee that t(v > will be monotonic. See Appendix D, Section Dl.
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Figure 4-1.

Constrained Labor-Leisure Choice
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Although a worker's choice to accept work at or above his
reservation wage may be the best he can do under the quantity
constraint, in general it will not be globally optimal absent
that constraint.

Some workers will be over-employed in the

sense that they would prefer to work fewer than h hours at the
prevailing wage, and others with lower reservation wages may
be underemployed in the sense that they would be willing to
work more hours at the prevailing wage and are receiving
rents above their reservation wage8.

4.2.4

Aggregate Labor Supply

The main implication of quantity constraints

in this

model is that, to a first approximation, changes in aggregate
labor supply over the business cycle will be determined by the
participation decisions of potential workers at the extensive
margin in response to changes
endowments,

rather

than

in the wage offer or their

adjustments

in hours

of

employed

workers. The supply of 'h-hour' blocks of labor services to a
firm (and ultimately the economy) will be determined by the
number of individuals who choose to participate in the labor
force at various wage levels.

The aggregate labor supply

curve, then, represents a supply of workers at the margin of

O

The behavioral pressures against the fixed hours constraint may give rise
to shirking and absenteeism by over-employed workers, and moonlighting by
underemployed workers. The model presented here abstracts from those
possibilities.
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labor—force participation,

and will

be

determined

by

the

cumulative distribution of reservation wages in the workforce,
(designated by *(w) = Pr(w < w) , an approach suggested by
Ben—Porath (1973).

The general functional form of the aggregate labor supply
function can be expressed as follows:

Ls(w,a) = Nh$(w,a),
0 < $(w,a) < 1,

(4.4)

lim $(w,a) = 1
w

-

oo

3#/3w = <p(w,a) > 0
The cumulative distribution function $(w,a), with parameter
vector a, represents the proportion of the workforce popula
tion N having a reservation wage a less than or equal to w,
and therefore who are willing to work h hours at the wage w.
The marginally employed worker has a reservation wage a = w.
The parameter vector a contains shift variables which capture
exogenous changes in the distribution of nonlabor income.

The
absolute

concavity
risk

of

aversion,

U

ensures
which

in

that
turn

it

ensures

reservation function a = t(v) is monotonic.
Section Dl.)

has

decreasing
that

the

(See Appendix D,

It follows that:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
€(w,a) = Pr(o) < w ) = Pr(f < w ) = Pr(v < g(w)),
where g = f"1

(See Figure 4-2) . Then (4.4) can be written in

a composite form as:

L*(w, a) = Nh$(g(w), a),

g(w) = ^ ( v )

(4.5)

The aggregate labor supply function is a composite function of
(a)

$(v,ot) the cumulative distribution of nonlabor

income

(nonhuman wealth) in the workforce, and (b) the inverse of the
reservation wage function, g(w) = iji-1 (v) , which relates

the

reservation wage, and thereby the labor force participation
rate, to nonlabor income.

Figure 4-2 illustrates three possible reservation wage
functions, with constant (4r0) , increasing (fx) and decreasing
(f2) elasticities, and their respective inverses g ^ w ) .
The wage-elasticity of this aggregate labor supply function is
equal to the product of two elasticities:

ezw =
or

e

=

2 ’g [ * ( g ) 3 ' S ’„ i:g (w )]
y

' 9

(4.6a)
(4.6b)

where ^ [ y ] = d(log y)/d(log x) is the elasticity operator.
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W
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Figure 4-2.

Reservation Wage Functions
Their Elasticities, £
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Equation (4.6) follows directly from (4.5) and the elasticity
of a composite function; the elasticity of aggregate labor
supply is the product of the elasticities of the two functions
4(g) and g(w) .

Note that since f is monotonic,

«wtg(w)] = 1 / Z - e.

Changes in the elasticities of either $ or g will result
in corresponding

changes

in

elasticities of elasticities.

e£w.

Expressed
= ^[Y]

in

+

terms

of

if x

represents a procyclical variable such as employment, output,
money supply or the price level, A positive value for ^x [£]
means that e will also be procyclical.

It remains to consider the determinants of these func
tions in this model, derive expressions for their elasticities
and subject them to comparative static analysis.

4.2.5

Elasticity of The Reservation Wage Function

Individual preferences determine aggregate labor supply
through the reservation wage function $ = i|r(v) , and will also
affect the elasticity of aggregate labor supply through the
inverse function g(w).
establishes a

The reservation wage function also

link between aggregate labor supply and the

distribution of nonlabor income (or wealth).
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The properties of f are derived in Appendix D, where it
is shown that 5 , the elasticity of $ is constant for homothetic preferences (f0 in Figure 4-2), and increasing with v
for preferences that have increasing relative risk aversion Rr
(e. g-,ti in Figure 4-2)9. In the homothetic case £'= 0' =
£^[9] = 0 , and the elasticity of aggregate labor supply will
be unaffected by the reservation wage function lfr as v changes.
However, in the case of increasing relative risk aversion,
> 0 , 0 * < 0 , £^.[0 ] < 0 and therefore ^,[0 ] will make a
negative contribution to &v[e] i. e:

KC*1 = KlYl + KtQ1
(?)

(4-7>

(-)

This means that e will increase whenever nonlabor income
declines.

Since

labor supply increases when v declines,

the change in e will be procyclical.

Thus,

a reservation wage function based on homothetic

preferences will not change the elasticity of labor supply as
nonlabor

income

preferences

with

declines.

However,

increasing

relative

a

function
risk

based

aversion

on

will

increase the elasticity of labor supply as nonlabor income
declines.

Since labor supply also increases when nonlabor

income declines, IRRA will cause e to be procyclical.

Q

Since uncertainty has not been explicitly modeled, R. can be interpreted
as a measure of the relative concavity of D(c, SL). Decreasing relative risk
aversion can be ruled out theoretically; see Appendix D.
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Thus, heterogeneity of preferences, in the specific form
of increasing relative risk aversion

for nonlabor income

(wealth) is one possible source of procyclical elasticity of
aggregate labor supply.

Arrow (1970) shows that increasing R r is the only nonhomothetic specification that is consistent with the Expected
Utility Theorem, and also argues that it is the only specifi
cation that is consistent with a wealth elasticity of the
demand for cash balances greater than unity, which has been
found in several empirical studies.
be

luxury

goods,

or

at

least

Cash balances appear to

not

necessities,

and

that

stylized fact is consistent with increasing Rr .

It

remains

to evaluate

the

possible

changes in the elasticity of S(g) on e.

effects

of

It is clear that if

preferences are homothetic, 0 is constant and the only way
that c can change is through changes in y.

A necessary and

sufficient condition for e to be procyclical is that
^[yj

< 0 in the vicinity of the equilibrium real wage. For

a general

cumulative distribution function i there

is no

assurance that this will be the case, or that 3v[y] will be
monotonic over the entire domain of *.
elasticities,

it will

be

necessary

to

To evaluate point
assume
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functional form for *.

That issue will be taken up in the

next section10.

4.3 The Distribution of Nonlabor Income and Wealth

4.3.1

Nonlabor Income and Wealth

The real nonlabor income of a household is defined
the sum of real financial and transfer income.

as

More specifi

cally:

v = V/P = (B/P + T/P + n)

>

0

(4.8)

where B is nominal interest receipts on government bonds, n is
total returns from private equity claims, T represents nominal
transfer receipts from the government sector, and P is a price
index.

Excluding the equalizing effect of transfer payments,

which accrue mostly to lower income households, the distribu
tion of income from bonds and equities is likely to be similar
to the distribution of the holdings of those assets in the
workforce.

For example, the flow of nonlabor income can be

related to nonhuman wealth n as follows:

v =

r[(B+T)/rP + 7r/r] =

r[« - M/P]

(4.9)

10Once the homotheticity assumption is abandoned, distributions and the
functional forms used to represent them matter.
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Here M is the aggregate money supply (e. g . , M2), £1 is the
stock of real nonhtunan wealth including "transfer" wealth, and
r is the real market rate of interest on long-term claims.
(Note that in (4.9), v is not a function of r.)

Thus, the

distribution of v would be proportional to the distribution of
f = (£2 - M/P), which consists of bonds, equity and transfer
payments in the workforce.

I have assumed a very large number of households which
can be ordered on R+ according to their nonlabor income v at
a point in time.

I also assume that their measure on that

interval is such that the distribution of nonlabor income over
households can be represented by a continuous distribution
function i(v, a) that is twice differentiable in v and each
element of the parameter vector a.

Two critical questions

are: How is nonlabor income distributed in the population, and
what would be a reasonable functional form to describe it?

4.3.2 Stylized Empirical Facts on Nonlabor Income

There is an extensive body of empirical literature on
the distribution of income in the U. S. and Britain (e. g.,
Lydall

(1973),

Champernowne

(1973),

Blinder

(1974) , Smith

(1975, 1980), Atkinson (1983), Slottje (1989), and Bergstrand
et al (1994) ; also, the Review of Income and Wealth) .
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all of these studies have focused on the distribution of
earned income, and even when property income is included there
is very little data on the separate distribution of nonlabor
income as defined in (4.8) above.

Most income distribution

data include retired, disabled, the very wealthy and other
individuals who are not part of the labor force. Available
data appears to be insufficient to directly estimate a distri
bution of

nonlabor

participants.

income

only

among potential

workforce

Nevertheless, it is possible to infer some of

the essential characteristics of such a distribution from the
income distribution data that is available.

There is a broad consensus among the several studies of
the distribution of wages and salaries and total income.

This

was best summarized by Lydall (1973, pp. 66-67), whom I will
paraphrase in the interest of brevity:
(1) the distribution is "hump-shaped", and if it is confined to
adult males working full time the left-hand tail is asymptotic
to the income axis.
(2) the central part of the distribution, between the 10th and
80th percentile, is close to Lognormal. However, the tails of
the distribution contain an excess of frequencies compared with
the Lognormal (i. e., are leptokurtic in the log of income).
(3) The upper tail often approximately follows the Pareto
law for at least the top 20 per cent of the distribution.

Thus the distribution of earned income is unimodal, positively
skewed,

leptokurtotic,

and asymptotic to the income axis.
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Neither the Lognormal nor the Pareto distributions give a
satisfactory fit over the entire range of incomes.

If the distribution of nonlabor income is considered to
be roughly proportional to the distribution of wealth,

as

suggested by Equation (4.8), then there is some theoretical
justification for assuming that the distribution of nonlaor
income is Lognormal, based on Gibrat's
effect.”

(Gibrat,

1957).

"Law of proportional

If zt is a stochastic variable

distributed according to an arbitrary

distribution Ft (zt) at

time t, and subsequent values of z are generated by a process
zt+1 =

Uj. •zt

where the u^. are i.i.d random variables, then

zt = Zq’IIu^, where zQ follows some arbitrary initial distribu
tion. This is a first-order Markov process; zt depends only on
zt-1 and the random element u^..
be written as

The evolution of z

log zt = log zQ + Z(log uk) .

can also
Under the

assumptions which are necessary for the application of the
Central Limit Theorem, zt will be described by a self-repro
ducing Lognormal distribution.

[Aitchison and Brown

(1954,

1963) ].

This has some intuitive appeal because the evolution of
the distribution of financial wealth can be viewed as such a
process, where

- nt = pllt and p is a random return that

is i.i.d across households. This random variable p is not
necessarily a pure interest rate, but a periodic effective
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return that reflects the combined effects of saving,
saving, asset management, market returns and risk.
similar to Friedman's view (1953)

dis

This is

that the distribution of

income is the result of different choices by individuals with
different tastes and preferences, tempered by chance11.

Gibrat's law of proportional effect was used by Champe m o w n e (1936; 1973) , Kalecki (1938) , and Aitchison and Brown
(1963) to derive the size distribution of total income.
Champernowne's

limiting distribution was Pareto, but Aitch

ison and Brown (1954) showed that, with a small alteration of
his assumptions,

Champernowne's model produces a Lognormal

distribution. Wold and Whittle (1957) and Steindl (1972) used
methods similar to Champernowne's to derive an asymptotically
Pareto distribution of wealth,

and Vaughn

their results using a life-cycle model

of

(1988)

extended

saving.

Their

results are also subject to the Aitchison and Brown critique.
Sargan (1957) developed the most comprehensive model of wealth
accumulation,

for which the only tractable solution was a

Lognormal distribution.
Possen

(1979)

directly,

and

Using Gibrat's method, Pestieau and

derived

a Lognormal

studied

the

effects

distribution
of

risk

of

wealth

aversion

and

government tax parameters on the inequality of the distrib

11Blinder (1974) has criticized such stochastic models of income and wealth
distribution for their lack of decision-theoretic content. His criticism does
not apply, however, to the models of Sargan (1957) and Vaughn (1979, 1988), which
are based on intertemporal optimization.
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ution.

Thus, the Lognormal distribution has been established

both empirically and theoretically as a useful description of
the distribution of total income for populations which include
but are not limited to the workforce.

Another reason for choosing the Lognormal distribution in
this

investigation

is

that

it

more

represent the relevant range of
Pareto distribution.

likely

nonlabor

to

accurately

income

than

the

The concentration of transfer payments

near the lower end of the income range is likely to create a
mode,

or Lydall's "hump1', which the Pareto cannot produce.

Also, most households in the highest guintile of the income
and wealth distribution, where the Pareto fits best, are not
likely to be included in any useful definition of the labor
force.

Financial wealth in the U. S. is highly concentrated

with a Gini coefficient of .90; In 1989 the top 1% of wealthholders

owned 48% of the financial wealth

(Wolff, 1994) .
but

it

in the U.

S.

Approximately 30% of these were over age 65,

is reasonable to assume that all were

financially

independent12. Thus, the thinner upper tail of the Lognormal
distribution should be a better approximation to the distribu
tion of wealth in the labor force.

The Pareto distribution

12

Persons over age 65 made up about 20% of both the lowest and highest
deciles of the wealth distribution in 1979 (Radner and Vaughn, 1987). Excluding
them would thin out both tails. Excluding the independently wealthy would thin
out the upper tail significantly, due to their large share of total wealth.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
also has the disadvantage of having an infinite variance for
some very reasonable values of its single parameter.

For these reasons,

the Lognormal distribution will be

used to characterize the distribution of financial wealth and
nonlabor income in the remainder of this chapter.
posited as a reasonable choice in order to proceed.

This is
We do not

really know what the distributions of wealth and nonlabor
income in the workforce are.

More research in this area is

needed, especially on the extent to which the distributions of
income and wealth change over the business cycle.

4.3.3 The Lognormal Distribution13

The Lognormal distribution is:

X

-(lnx - n)2]
.
,
z 2
dx = N(lnx |fi, a2), x > 0
ax
(4-10)

where N( •|ji, a2) represents the Normal distribution with mean
H and variance a2.

The jth moment of A about the origin is:

*j' = exp{j fi + %j2o2}

(4.11)

from which the mean a and variance fi2 of A are given by

13Xhe classical reference on the Lognormal distribution and its appli
cations is Aitchison and Brown (1963).
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a = exp ifi + %a2}
(4.12)
P2 = [exp{a21> - l]exp{2/x + a2}
Other useful characteristics of the Lognormal are:
mode:

exp{/x-

median:

a2}

(4.13)

exp {/*}

(4.14)

coefficient of variation P/a = y = [exp{a2> - I ]*1

(4.15)

Note that fi is the arithmetic mean of In x and also the
geometric mean and the log median of x. The parameter a2 is
the variance of In x, and although it is a measure of relative
dispersion from (4.15), it is not the variance of x, which is
given in (4.12).

The Lorenz measure of income inequality for

the Lognormal is can be defined in terms of the standardized
Normal distribution (Aitchison and Brown, op. cit.):

L = 2N(a//2|0,l) - l

(4.16)

Values of L can be obtained from tables of the standardized
Normal distribution for values of a.

Note that dL/da > 0, so

a decrease in a2 corresponds to a decrease in income or wealth
inequality.

Figure

4-3(a)

shows

a

family

of

Lognormal

functions for n = 0 and several values of a2.

density

Figure 4-3 (b)

shows density functions for a2 - 0.5 and several values of n.
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Figure 4-3(a) Lognormal density functions for n = 0 and
various values of a2.

l-o

i)

I

2

3

4

Figure 4-3(b) Lognormal density functions for a2= .5 and
various values of /x
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the relationship between the Normal and Lognormal distribu
tions allows the following useful transformation:
V
A(w)

=

z
| Mr

o2)dw

= J(p (z)d z =

z

lnw - fi
a

_

(4.17)

N(z I

0 , 1)

If nonlabor income and reservation wages are measured in log
units,

then all the properties of the Normal distribution

apply.

This fact is utilized to advantage in Appendix D and

the computations of Section 4.5.

Another useful property of the Lognormal distribution is
that it has a closed form under a log-linear transformation of
the random variable.

Aitchison and Brown (op. cit.) prove the

following theorem:

If X is distributed Lognormal A(n, a2) and Y = aXb ,
then Y is distributed Lognormal A (In a + b/i, b za2) .

It is evident that a multiplicative shift of magnitude a
will change n by In (a) but will not affect a2.

However, an

exponential transformation Xb will affect both n and a2 as
shown.

This property of the Lognormal will turn out to be

useful in the analysis to follow.
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4.4 The Lognormal Aggregate Labor Supply Function

Specifying A(w) for the function *(g(w)) in Equation
(4.5) yields the following expression for the aggregate labor
supply function:
L s(ir;n,o2) = tfhA(w| n, a2) ,

w>0

(4.18)

Here N represents the total size of the available workforce,
h is the fixed number of hours per worker, and A(w)

is the

cumulative distribution of reservation wages, which in this
instance is a linear transformation of the distribution of
nonlabor income v, which itself is a linear transformation of
the distribution of wealth. The simplest form of a reservation
wage function derived from homothetic preferences is i|r(v) = v,
whereupon g(w)

= ^_1(v) = w.

In general U will be non-

homothetic, the argument of A will be g(w) and a composite
function will be involved, as indicated in Equation (4.6).
This aggregate labor supply function has two shift variables
ft and a2, both of which enter into the moments of A.

Figure 4-4 shows graphs of the labor supply function A(w)
and its elasticity e(w) and marginal factor cost functions,
for a mean reservation wage of $500 per week, a minimum wage
of $200 per week, and a coefficient of variation of approxi
mately 1.

This is a benchmark case that will be used in

Section 4.5.
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FIGURE 4 - 4

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE
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4.4.1 Procyclical Aggregate Labor Supply

In the Traditional Keynesian setup, with technology and
labor productivity assumed to be fixed in the short run,
increases in aggregate output and employment are associated
with shifts of the aggregate labor supply curve. That

is

exactly the mechanism that is assumed to be at work in the
present model. The shift variables of the lognormal aggregate
labor supply function are /x and a2, which are also the parame
ters of the distribution of nonlabor income.

Thus, changes in

the distribution of nonlabor income, or wealth from which it
is derived, will cause the aggregate labor supply curve to
shift and change its shape.

Expressions for the partial derivatives of A with respect
to fi, and a2

are derived in Appendix D and are summarized

below. (Subscripts denote partial derivatives.)
z

Ay

=

-i fz<p (z)dz

<0

(4.19)

z

(4.20)

> 0,

In w < fi

< 0,

In w > n

(4.21)
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These partial derivatives show that

(a) a decline

in

geometric mean nonlabor income v will increase labor supply at
all wages;

(b)

an increase in the inequality of

nonlabor

income, measured by an increase in a2, will increase the labor
supply of lower wage workers (In w < ft) and decrease the labor
supply

of higher-wage

workers

(In w > (i) .

This

is

the

response of aggregate labor supply to an increase in

the

inequality of workers' nonlabor income14.

Conversely, a decline in a2 decreases the inequality of
v and increases the labor supply of high-wage workers and
reduces the labor supply of lower-wage workers.

The density

of reservation wages will increase in the vicinity of the log
median15.

Since the elasticity of the distribution function

A(w) at a point wQ is a measure of its relative density there,
an increase in the concentration or density of reservation
wages corresponds to an increase in the elasticity of labor
supply.

As a2 declines, nonlabor income becomes more homoge

neous and consequently labor supply becomes more elastic in
the vicinity of the median reservation wage.

In the limit as

^ T h e symmetry of the dispersion effect is due to the symmetry of a2, the
variance of In w, about fi in the Lognormal distribution.
15It follows from Equations (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) and Figure 4-3
that a decline in cr alone will shift the mean reservation wage to the left and
the mode to the right, leaving the median unchanged. A decline in fi alone will
shift all three parameters to the left. A decline in both ft and a2 will increase
the concentration of reservation wages around the new lower median e*‘. Aggregate
labor supply will increase at most wages, and most importantly, the elasticity
of labor supply will increase in the vicinity of the original log median
reservation wage.
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ct2

0, all workers have the same nonlabor income and reserva

tion wage,

and

labor

supply

is perfectly

elastic.

This

indicates an inverse relationship between the dispersion of
wealth (i. e. inequality) the elasticity of labor supply at
the log median reservation wage.
distribution of wealth,

The more

compact

the

and therefore the distribution of

reservation wages, the greater the response of labor supply to
a change in the wage, i. e., the greater is the elasticity of
labor supply.

4.4.2

The Monev-Elasticitv of Aggregate Labor Supply

The shift variables p. and a2 are metrics of the nonlabor
income distribution.

Nonlabor income payments are in nominal

values, with real values determined by the price level.

The

geometric mean or log median of v can also be expressed in
terms of nominal values V and the price level P:

(i = E[ln v] = E[ln (V/P) ] = E[ln V] - In P

(4.22)

Thus, an increase in the price level P without a proportional
increase in nominal nonlabor income V, reduces p and conse
quently,

from Equations

(4-12) through (4-14),

reduces the

mean a, variance P2, mode and median of the distribution.
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An Increase in the price level alone will shift the density
function

<p(v)

to

the

left,

increasing

its

skewness

and

increasing #(w) at every w.

To
income

the

extent that contractual

in Equation

transfer payments,

(4.7),

payments

particularly

bond

of

nonlabor

interest and

are fixed in nominal terms and are not

indexed, nonlabor income will not move proportionally with
changes in the price level and the aggregate labor supply
function will shift due to a change in the price level. The
function will be static with respect to changes in P only if
all nonlabor income payments are perfectly indexed.
analysis that follows,

I assume that

level is a shift variable for this

In the

the aggregate price
labor

supply function

through its effects on (i.

In flexible-price macro models, an increase in money is
usually associated with an increase in aggregate demand and
the price level. For example, in the model of Chapter II the
response to a one-time open-market purchase is a less-thanproportional increase in the price level and a reduction in
the interest rate.

For the aggregate labor supply function

developed in this chapter,

an increase in the price level P

unaccompanied by a proportional increase in nominal median
nonlabor income will reduce all values of v proportionately,
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shifting

the

entire

aggregate

labor

supply

curve

toward

increased supply at all wages16.

The outward shift in the labor supply curve will due to
an increase in P will reduce e at every wage, because the mean
of the distribution will be declining while
values will increase at each wage.
through

its

affect

on

the

price

the marginal

Thus, monetary policy,
level,

will

shift

this

aggregate labor supply function, but the price-level effect on
€ will be countercyclical.

It turns out that an increase in P alone will have no
effect on the dispersion parameter a2, because:

a2 = E[(In v)2] - (E[ln v])2
= E[ (In V)2 - 2 (In V) (In P) +(ln P)2] - (E[ln V] - In P)2
= E[ (In V)2] - (E[ln V])2
Thus

a2, the measure

of

dispersion

or

inequality

of

the

Lognormal distribution is unaffected by changes in a scale
factor relating v and V, which is what the price level is17.
A change in P will shift A procyclically, but it will not

^■®In Chapter V this shift mechanism for labor supply is imbedded in a fullfledged general equilibrium macro model.
17
This result is specific to the Lognormal distribution, because of the
log-linear property described in Section 4.3.3. Note that an increase in the
price level will have an effect on P2, the variance of the Lognormal distribu
tion, through its effect on (i. (See Equation 4.12).
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change the dispersion of A and therefore will not have a
procyclical effect on e, the elasticity of the distribution.

4.4.3

Portfolio Rebalancing with Increasing Rn

In the macroeconomic model of Chapter II, an open-market
purchase of bonds for high-powered money reduces the total
amount of bonds outstanding and also reduces the interest rate
and the value of real wealth.

If workers are holding optimum

portfolio allocations of bonds and money prior to an openmarket operation, then those allocations will be changed to
reflect the new asset quantities and relative prices.

In

giving up bonds for money, workers will reduce their holdings
of risky assets but also forego interest income.
asset reallocation

How the

is accomplished over the population of

workers will determine the effect on the distribution
nonlabor income.

of

In this section I will show that if workers

rebalance their portfolios in a way that is nonhomogeneous,
open market operations will affect a2, and consequently the
elasticity e.

The portfolio balancing problem is well known in the
literature, and only the points essential to the analysis at
hand will be emphasized here.

A more rigorous argument based

Arrow (1970), and Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) is presented in
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Appendix D, Section 7, which will be incorporated

by refer

ence.

In terms of the notation of Equation (4.8), I define two
classes of real financial assets in the aggregate economy:

Earning assets:

f =

(B/rP + w/r)

Real money balances:

m = (M/P)

Earning assets provide a return r which is not certain, while
money offers no return but provides transaction services in
consumption.

Aggregate portfolio shares are:

A = f/n and (l-A) = m/n

The value of A in the aggregate is determined by the ratio of
the value of earning assets to total financial wealth, which
is influenced by monetary policy. In particular, for the non
neutral open-market purchase of bonds described in Chapter II:

dA
dM

<

0

(4.24)

The sign of nM is negative from the results of Chapter II.
Thus, a non-neutral open-market purchase necessarily reduces
the proportion of aggregate wealth that will be held in risky
income-producing assets such as bonds.
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For an individual wealth-holder, I define:

a^ — f^/n^,

(1—a^) — m^/n^

Individual wealth-holders allocate their wealth between f and
m to maximize the utility of services obtained by holding
them. A standard assumption is that the utility function for
wealth H(Q) = H(f + m) is concave and at least twice differen
tiable, so that wealth-holders are risk averse and prefer to
diversify between f and m. The standard setup, with indiffer
ence curves tangent to a budget constraint at an interior
solution, is illustrated in Figure 4-5, (a) and (b).

It is well known that, in the two-asset case, if prefer
ences are assumed to be identical and homothetic, then wealthholders have constant relative risk aversion

(Rr) and the

marginal rate of substitution between risk-free and risky
assets

will

be

independent

of

the

size

holdings. (See Appendix D, Section D7.)

of

total

wealth

Therefore, identical

homothetic preferences imply that the relative demands, or
optimum portfolio shares, for the two asset classes, will be
the same for all wealth-holders and equal to the aggregate
portfolio.
balance

Jt also implies that the fractional portfolio

adjustments

to

an

open-market

operation

will

be

identical for all workers, and therefore homogeneous across
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We»<-TH £ * f,n & C 'j P filh

Figure 4-5(a). Portfolio balance decision with Homothetic
Preferences (Constant Relative Risk Aversion)

ZjifatiSJC*/ r%7H

Figure 4-5(b). Portfolio balance decision with
Increasing Relative Risk Aversion
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workers.

Homogeneous rebalancing adjustments will not change

the dispersion of the distribution of v.

The case of homothetic preferences

is illustrated in

Figure 4-5(a).

The assumption that H is homothetic implies

the following:

(a) a.L is independent of ni and is equal to A

for

all wealth-holders;

(b)

the wealth-expansion path

of

optimum portfolios will be a ray from the origin, along which
the marginal rate of substitution will be constant; [This is
shown as points A-B-C

in Figure 4-5(a)];

(c)

normal goods but neither is a luxury good;

f and m are
(d)

the Engel

curves for both f and m are rays with 45° slopes.

Thus, whatever adjustments wealth-holders make to their
portfolio shares

[air 1-ajJ, in response to an open market

operation, it will be the same for all wealth-holders, and the
change in income yield vL will be proportional
therefore proportional to rAf^ = vLia.

to S1L and

It has already been

shown above, in the case of changes in P, that a proportional
change in v has no effect on the dispersion parameter a2 of
the Lognormal distribution of v.

Therefore,

homothetic

preferences rule out any distribution effects on v from an
open-market operation.

1ft

The interest rate r is also changing, but the substitution and wealth
effects of this are independent of the size of wealth holdings and consequently
are the sane for all wealth-holders.
That is the main implication of the
homotheticity assumption.
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However, if H has increasing relative risk aversion,
a^ will decrease with

(See Appendix

Increasing relative risk aversion implies:
rate of substitution between

D,

Section

D7.)

(a) the marginal

f and m will

increase

with

wealth; (b) wealthier investors will require a higher expected
rate of return to hold the same portfolio mix, and will hold
a smaller proportion of the risky asset for the same return;
(c) the wealth-expansion path of optimum portfolios will have
a decreasing slope, favoring m as shown in Figure 4-5(b); (d)
money balances are a luxury good19.

The functional properties of increasing Rr can be demon
strated by applying the elasticity operator

to the marginal

rate of substitution in the first-order condition for the
constrained maximization of H (f ,m ) , given by Equation D 7 .2 in
Appendix D:

*’
4 ~li]=®‘’[|j]=roh'] - ?» ( 4 h w

♦««<*■>] -

i

This expression gives the relationship between the elast
icities of marginal utility of f and m as n increases along
the wealth expansion path, which is a locus of optimum points
(f*, m*) for a constant r.

If l+r, f/m = a/(l-a) and df/dm

19With decreasing absolute risk aversion, the amount of risky assets held
will increase with wealth, but their share of wealth in the portfolio will de
crease. Formally, 0 < £^[f{] < 1 and £^[a{] < 0
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remain constant as ft increases, the path will be a ray from
the origin as shown in Figure 4-5(a). But then the above
expression is zero and relative risk aversion must be the same
for all points (f,m) along the path; since a different r will
map out a different path, that must be true for the entire
indifference map.

Constant relative risk aversion implies

that the utility function H is homothetic; the wealth expan
sion path will be a ray from the origin,

along which the

marginal rate of substitution on each intersecting
ference curve will be the same.

indif

Along that path, the own-

price elasticity of the demand to hold absolute amounts of f
and m will also be constant, as will be their portfolio shares
a and (1-a).

Arrow

(1970)

showed that if H has increasing Rr, the

above expression is positive. [Arrow, 1970, Appendix [5]]; see
also Appendix D, Section D7.)
(where f/m = a/(1-a)),

-df/dm,

In that case, along a ray
(1+r)

and H ^ H f

will have

positive wealth elasticity and therefore will be increasing.
The slope of the wealth expansion path (with (1+r) constant)
will be df/dm = a/(l-a), and from Arrow's proof:

rQ [df/dm] = 2jj[a/ (1-a) ] = ^ [ a ] - ^[(1-a)] < 0

Since, necessarily, ^ [ a ] + £Jj[(l-a)] = 0, the conclusion is
that increasing Rr implies that ^Q[a] < 0.

Portfolio shares
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in ‘the risky asset class will decline with wealth and the
wealth expansion path will have a declining slope, as shown in
Figure

4-5(b)20.

Since

the proof

restriction on values of f and m,

of

this

holds without

the indifference contours

in f-m space must be asymmetrical, as shown in figure 4-5(b) .
This is consistent with the assumption that m is a risk-free
asset.

Thus, with an open-market operation wealth holders must
rebalance

their

portfolios,

rebalancing occurs

in

but

with

increasing

a nonhomogeneous

way.

Rr

this

Workers

with

higher amounts of income from bonds will reduce their bond
income more than proportionally to those receiving lower bond
income,

and will absorb a disproportionate amount of the

additional money created by the open market operation. The
result of this portfolio balance trading

in the financial

markets will be a reduction in the dispersion of nonlabor
income in the workforce, i. e.

3of 3A

„

3m

Assuming

perfect

(4.26)

0

15a 15m

information

and

efficient,

frictionless

financial markets this will happen instantaneously.

20

It is assumed that H has decreasing absolute risk aversion, so that
the amount invested in earning assets £ increases with Q even though the
portfolio share declines.
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With increasing relative risk aversion, a.L is a function
of

and r , and for a continuous distribution of fl over

workers we may write a(r,fl) .
demand

function

which

Note that a (r,n) is a relative

depends

on

preferences,

but

since

preferences depend on wealth and wealth is distributed over
the workforce, the distribution of a(r,H) will depend on the
distribution of Q, subject to the aggregate constraint:
00

A = |a(r,n) A.(n)dn

where 1CH)
force21.
a(r,ft),

(4.27)

is the density function for wealth in the work

Thus, for a given r, A is the weighted average of
and will be a function

of the parameters

of the

density function 1(£I).

To

use

a

concrete

example,

let

H(H)

be

Pratt's

utility

function with decreasing RA and increasing R r as introduced in
Appendix D, Section D4, Equation D4.3.:

H(U) = -exp (-np/p)

0 < p < 1

21

The relative demand for money may also be a function of an individual's
income, in which case a(*) = a(r,y,Q), where y = v if the individual is not
working and y * v + wh if working. Whether both income and wealth need to be
included as scale variables in the money demand function is not a settled issue
in the literature.
To simplify the notation, the income variable will be
supresaed in the material immediately following.
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Relative risk aversion for this function is:

-H"I2/H» «

Thus

the

Qp + (1 - p) « np for large n .

wealth-elasticity

approximately p.

of

relative

risk

aversion

is

Since relative risk aversion increases

proportionally with n at the rate p , a reasonable assumption
would be that to a first approximation a(r,fl) declines propor
tionally with increasing wealth at the same rate, i. e. ,
^nCa I *

“ P*

This corresponds to the function a(r,n) = n _p.

Xf we also assume that n is distributed in the workforce
according to a Lognormal distribution A ( n | Mu,au2) , then we
have:

= e x p ( -p/ifc,+ % P2ff«)

(4.29)

Although we do not know the values of the parameters

and

<JU2 for the distribution of wealth

the

in the workforce,

relationship between A and a2, the dispersion parameter of the
nonlabor
Theorem

income
2.1

distribution,

of Aitchison

and

can

be

Brown,

found

by

previously

Section 4.3, in the following argument.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

utilizing
cited

in

170
If v is distributed A(fi, a2) and f = v/r, then f is
distributed

A(-ln r + n, a2) . With increasing relative risk

aversion, f = a(r,n)n.

Using the Pratt utility function,

f =(n1_P)n, where p is the elasticity of relative risk aver
sion.

But if n is distributed A (fi0, ctu2) , then f must also be

distributed A((l-p)jtu, (l-p)2<xB2).

Equating the dispersion

parameters in the two exprssions for the distribution of f
gives aB2 = a2/(l-p)2. Substituting this in Equation 4.29 and
deriving the elasticity of a2 with respect to A, yields:

rA [g2] = oA o-2

2(12
~-t p2a

> 0

(4’30)

Thus, for this nonhomothetic utility function, the elasticity
of the change in a2 associated with a change in A depends
directly on C(l-p)/p]2 and inversely on the value of a2.

The

effect of portfolio rebalancing on the dispersion of nonlabor
income, represented by a2, will be greater for small values of
a2 (low Gini coefficients) and for values of p less than %.

These results lead to the conclusion that, with increas
ing relative risk aversion and a Lognormal distribution of
wealth,

an open-market purchase of bonds will

dispersion

(inequality)

of

the

distribution

of

reduce the
financial

wealth and nonlabor income. This provides a second channel
through which changes in monetary policy can not only shift
the aggregate labor supply function A, but most importantly,
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change its elasticity22.

In this formulation, both n and

a2 are shift variables for aggregate labor supply A(w) and its
elasticity e?

fj. is affected by P and a2 is affected by r and

ft indirectly through A.

The implications of the flexible-price macro model in
Chapter II, if not significantly altered by the additional
monopsony assumption,
market

operation

function

will

and change

effects on P,

r,

lead to the conclusion that an openshift

its

and ft.

this

elasticity
This

aggregate
through

labor
its

constitutes,

supply

short-run

in effect,

a

monetary theory of aggregate labor supply.

The

comparative

static

derivatives

of

A

and

e with

respect to P, r and A are derived in Appendix D, section D5
(Equation D5.ll) and section D6 (Equation D6.10). The results
are summarized below:
%

SJrte] =-3JfCA] - £ % [ P ] +
o
In these two equations, ^x[y]

po

(4.32)

is the elasticity of y with

respect to x, z - (In w - /i)/a, and <p(z) and N(z|0,l) are the
standard Normal density and cumulative distribution functions.
22

Note that this argument implies that monetary policy will have a
countercyclical effect on the dispersion (or inequality) of nonlabor income.
With increasing Rg , relative demand functions for financial assets will be nonhomogeneous.
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f z<p(z)dz
r*[A] = - If -®

<j[ N { Z |0,1) jr« [P]
z

(4.31)

J (z2-l)<p(z)dz
+ (i-p)
p2o2

(z^-D -

N ( z 1 0 ,1 )

^[A^Cr]

The elasticity ^ [ a 2] from Equation 4.30 above has also been
incorporated

in the

model.

In

the

next

section,

these

equations are evaluated numerically for calibrated values of
li, a2 and p for the Lognormal distribution and plausible
values

of the monetary elasticities on the right hand side.

4.5 Numerical Analvsis of

and J & J L 1

The story that emerges from the foregoing analysis is the
following:

The aggregate labor supply function based on the hetero
geneous preferences of workers and the distributions of wealth
and nonlabor income forms part of the wealth effects trans
mission channel from monetary policy actions to real output.
The aggregate labor suppy curve is shifted procyclically by
changes in the aggregate price level, and the elasticity of
labor supply is affected procyclically
economy-wide interest rate.

by changes

With monopsony

in the

power in the
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labor market, this will cause the markdown to be counter
cyclical and the real wage to be less countercyclical than
under perfect competition.

A money-output connection has been

established in a Keynesian model that is capable of exhibiting
countercyclical markdowns and acyclical real wages.

Q. E. D.

The objective in this section is to determine if the
model equations 4.31 and 4.32 produce positive money-elasticities of A

and e for plausible values of their parameters.

The equations will be calibrated to representative benchmark
values of their parameters for the U s. economy, the elastici
ties of A and e will be computed, and various metrics will be
examined.

4.5.1

Calibration of the Labor Supply Function

Values of the parameters /z and a2 will be chosen to
approximate a realistic distribution of reservation wages in
the U. S. economy.

I will utilize the three-parameter Log

normal distribution with minimum value

t

= $200, representing

a fixed 40-hour week at a minimum wage of $5.00 per hour.
The mean of the Lognormal is given in Equation (4.12) as
a = exp(/x + %a2) . I will choose n and a2 to set a = $300, so
that r + a = $500, which was approximately the average weekly
wage in the U. S. economy in 1997.
wage variable will then be w > $200.

The range of the real
Using a weekly wage
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based on a fixed 40-hour week is consistent with the previous
specification of indivisible labor in in Section 4.2.4, with
h - 40 hours per week.

The dispersion parameter a2 determines the Lorenz measure
of inequality of nonlabor income in Equation (4.16)23:
L = 2N(a/i/ 2 |0,1) - 1.

Calibrating o2 to an empirical Lorenz

index for wealth or nonlabor income will complete the calib
ration of A.

Table 4-2

shows Gini (Lorenz) coefficients for

labor and nonlabor income from IRS data for the years 19521981 [Slottje, (1989)].

The IRS definition of nonlabor income

includes interest, dividends, rents and other nonlabor income
reported on annual

income tax returns24. The Gini coeffi

cients in Table 4-2 were calculated by Slottje after fitting
a Beta distribution of the second kind to the data.

(The

Beta-2 distribution is a generalization of the Pareto and
Lognormal

distributions).

Slottje's Gini

coefficients

for

nonlabor income are about .44, and nonlabor income is about

23

The Lorenz measure L is also called the Gini coefficient in the
literature, cf. Slottje (1989) discussed below.
24The IRS data used by Slottje includes rental income which is not
included in the definition of v, and excludes nontaxable transfer payments which
are included in v. Host likely these are poor substitutes in terms of their
place in the distribution, so it is not clean: what effect this difference would
have an the Gini coefficients in Table 4.3.
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TABLE 4-2

FROM SLOTTJE (1989)
GINI COEFFICIENTS OF INEQUALITY FOR T H E
marginal

distributions o f l a b o r

earnings,

NON-LABOR INCOME AND TOTAL I N C O M E
Year

Labor
Earnings

Non- Labor
Income

Total
I n co m e

1952
1 953
1 954
1955
1 956
1 95 7
1 958
1 95 9
I960
1961
1962
1 963
1 964
1 965
1 966
1967
1 96 8
1 969
1 970
1 971
1 97 2
1 97 3
1 974
1 975
1976
1977
1 978
1979
1 980
1981

0.315984
0.308689
0.314139
0.292814
0.309093
0.304369
0.328202
0.328636
0.324847
0.327761
0.327357
0.331319
0.334521
0.336319
0.354057
0.357665
0.359180
0.350569
0.352415
0.349765
0.347857
0.346091
0.345076
0.343290
0.339111
0.355421
0.319399
0.351257
0.341018
0.338273

0.417585
0.4 1 55 73
0.414786
0.383159
0.400836
0.399035
0.426538
0.425430
0.424995
0.422926
0.421785
0.422219
0.422931
0.420617
0.442451
0.445950
0.445534
0.447051
0.447873
0.444327
0.437317
0.433483
0.429350
0.437048
0.429775
0.446047
0.402100
0.435840
0.438637
0.443703

0.308228
0.301865
0.306825
0.286143
0.302263
0.297942
0.321043
0.321852
0.318466
0.321165
0.320973
0.324817
0.328128
0 .3 2 98 1 7
0.347503
0.351236
0.352791
0.345054
0.347007
0.344480
0.342563
0.340735
0.339255
0.337841
0.333742
0.349723
0.314278
0.345278
0.336195
0.333119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

176
one-third more concentrated than labor earnings (L = .34) and
total income (L = .33).

Although

Slottje's Gini coefficients

vere derived from annual data,they should be equally valid for
weekly income because the Gini coefficients of both the Beta-2
distribution and the Lognormal distribution are invariant with
respect to a constant multiple of the income variable25

One problem in utilizing Slottje's data here is that it
includes

all

taxpayers,

including

the

retired

and

other

nonworkers, whereas the wealth and nonlabor income of interest
here is confined to the workforce26.

Wolff and Mar ley (1989)

report Gini coefficients of .82 for financial wealth (exclud
ing real estate) , but this also includes the retired and very
wealthy who are not in the workforce. In 1989 the wealthiest
1% of the U. S. population held 48% of financial wealth, and
the top 20% held 96% [Wolff (1994)].

Financial wealth is

highly concentrated in the general population, and most of it
is owned directly or indirectly by individuals who are not in
the workforce.

It is likely that both financial wealth and

nonlabor income derived from it are less concentrated in the
workforce than in the general population, but we really don't

25Weekly time series data on nonlabor income would probably have a larger
coefficient of variation than annual data. However, the relevant distribution
here is cross-sectional, over individuals. There is no apparent reason why the
inequality of the distribution of nonlabor income over individuals would differ
significantly if measured weekly instead of annually.
26Cross-sectional data on nonlabor income for workforce participants was
not readily available, but might be reconstructed from the Survey of Consumer
Finance, a project which might be useful for future research.
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know. The scant: statistical evidence indicates that a Gini
coefficient in the range of 0.4 to 0.5 would be reasonable for
the distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce.

I will

use the mid-range value of 0.45.

A minimum weekly reservation wage of

t

= $200, a mean

a =• $500 and a Lorenz coefficient of .45 correspond to cali
brated values of (i = 5.347 and a = .8444 (a2 = .713) for the
Lognormal distribution.

For this distribution, the mean of

$500 corresponds to a labor-force participation rate of 66.0%,
which is close to the official estimate for the U. S. economy.
(Economic Report of the President, 1992, Table B-34.)

4.5.2

Calibration of Monetary Elasticities

What remains is to calibrate the elasticities in Equat
ions (4.31) and (4.32).

I will test a range of values for

eachr but a plausible benchmark case should have some empiri
cal support.

^[P]

positive and less than 1 for a non

neutral open-market operation.

Initially I will set it equal

to 0.8 and test for sensitivity to higher and lower values.

Note

that &K lr]

is

the

reciprocal

of

the

interest-

elasticity of money demand in the Keynesian liquidity pref
erence relationship.

Although M represents the nominal money

supply, a change in M causes a change in the equilibrium value
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of r along the money demand schedule, and the elasticity of
this change in r is the reciprocal of the interest-elasticity
of money demand.

The relevant interest rate depends on the definition of
money and its assumed substitutes. An open market operation is
a swap of government bonds for high-powered base money, but
most

bonds

traded

in

open-market

operations

have

short

maturities and the change in the monetary base acts through
fractional reserve multipliers to change the monetary aggreg
ates. The relevant money aggregate to use here should include
those forms of money stocks which sure utilized by investors as
risk-free alternatives to bonds and equities,
which is held for the speculative motive.
the

relevant

measure

of money,

because

i. e., money

I will use M2 as
because

checkable

savings accounts and money-market mutual funds are superior to
demand deposits as a store of value and are commonly used as
cash accounts in portfolio management [Laidler (1977,1980)].
The institutional money instruments in M3 have little rele
vance for workforce participants. Dornbusch and Fischer (1977)
and McCallum (1989)] advocate M2 as the relevant definition of
money in its speculative function.

From 1987 to 1992 The

Federal Reserve used the growth rate of M2 as an intermediate
policy target27.
27

Since 1992, Federal Reserve policy has been to target inflation and the
federal funds rate, letting M2 be endogenous to the economy within broad target
bands.
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Host: empirical studies of the money demand function have
estimated cross-elasticities of Ml with respect to short-term
rates of near-money substitutes such as savings accounts and
time deposits28. These estimates of the interest-elasticity
of Ml have varied widely
consensus on whether

(See Table 4-3) , and there is no

long rates or short

rates,

real

or

nominal rates are more important determinants of Ml demand.
Precision is not possible in these circumstances, but all that
is required for the present purpose is a representative orderof-magnitude value for the interest-elasticity of M2.

Laidler

(1980)

employed

several

different

structural

models to estimate M2 demand elasticities from U. S. data for
the period 1953-1978.

His estimates for the three-month T-

bill interest elasticity of M2 ranged from -.121 to -.176 with
a clustering in the - .147 to - .176 range.

(Coincidentally,

these are close to the averages for time deposit and long-term
bond interest elasticities for Ml in Table

4-3,

including

Laidler's own estimate of -.150 for the long-term bond.).
Initially, I will set the value of ^[M*1] to -.15, and test
the sensitivity of the model to higher and lower values.

This

value appears to be representative of the short-run interest

28

See, for example, the surveys by Feige and Pearce (1976), Laidler
(1977), and Judd and Scadding (1982).
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TABLE 4-3.

Interest Elasticity of Money Demand
Ml Interest Elasticities

Investigator

Time
Deposits

90-Day
T-Bills

Long-Term
T-Bonds

Feige (1964)

-.093

Hamburger (1966)

-.185

-.014

-.160
-.246

Lee (1967)
Tiegen (1969)

-.094

-.019
-.104

-.123

Gramlich &
Kalchbrenner (1970)

-.349

-.190

Goldfeld (1973)

-.279

-.049

Goldfeld (1976)

-.039

-.038

Hafer & Hein (1979)

-.040

-.02

Laidler (1980)
Average

-.200

--

-.04

-.160

-.154

-.06

-.178

elasticity of M2 relative to short-term government securities,
the principal trading vehicle in open-market operations.

£^[A], the interest-elasticity of the proportional demand
for risky assets, depends on the utility function assumed to
represent preferences.

According to Tobin's (1958) version

of the portfolio balance model, A(r) should be inelastic at
high interest rates and highly elastic at low rates, approach
ing perfect elasticity as r approaches zero. Tobin calculated
bounds for this elasticity for an assumed quadratic utility
function.

Quadratic utility, however, has neither decreasing
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R& nor increasing Rr, and is inappropriate in the present
context.

Tobin's use of indifference curves in mean-variance

space requires special assumptions which are inconsistent with
both decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative
risk aversion [Borch (1969), Feldstein (1969), Hart (1975)].

However, given values for

and

[A] can be

determined from the following relationship (Equation (D5.8) in
Appendix 0):

Representative values for the U.S. economy at the end of 1991
are:

f = $5,035 Trillion,

m = M2 = $3,439 Trillion, which

give a value of A * f/(f + m) = .594. (Economic Report of the
President, 1992).

A benchmark value of -.15 will be used for

as indicated above.

Note that for homothetic prefer

ences (constant relative risk aversion)
nonhomothetic

preferences

aversion ^ [ M d] > 1 .
will

with

[Md] = l, and for

increasing

relative

risk

This implies that ^r[A], and thus £^[e],

be larger for preferences with increasing relative risk

aversion29.

I will compute results for both kinds of prefer

ences and test the sensitivity of the results to the assumed
values of these elasticities.

2Q Preferences enter into the determination of the elasticity of e via
and the portfolio balance model.
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The remaining parameter is p, the elasticity of relative
risk aversion.

From the argument leading to Equation 4.30 we

have:

(1 ~ P)2 = a2/a 2

The value of a2 = 0.713 has already been specified.
assumption that H is distributed A

With the

aj2) , a value for aj2

can be derived from the Lorenz (Gini) coefficient for A from
the relation

Lu = 2N(au/V21 0,1) - 1.

It appears that Gini

coefficients for the distribution of financial wealth in the
workforce have not been reported in the literature; however,
an approximate value can be inferred from Gini coefficients of
total household wealth for the employed.

Table 4-4 lists Gini coefficients derived from several
cross-sectional studies of households.

Gini coefficients for

measures of the household wealth of workers are shown in Wolff
(1980) and Diaz-Gimenez et al (1997).

The Gini coefficients

in Table 4-4 correspond to broader definitions of wealth than
the one used in this thesis30.

What is needed here is an

empirically derived Gini coefficient for the size distrib-

30The data in Table 4-3 exemplifies some of the methodological problems in
the measurement of wealth. Different investigators have utilized different data
bases, made different adjustments to the data, and employed different definitions
of wealth. Consequently, Gini coefficients from different studies are not
strictly comparable.
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Table 4-4.

Gini Coefficients for Household Wealth
SOURCE
_ PATA1.

1969

0.66

Service and
Unskilled
Workers (20%)

Total
Assets

0.74

Total Sample

Disposable
Wealth

0.73

Wolff (1987)

Disposable
Wealth
Net Worth

0.79

Wolff (1992)

0.74

Weicher (1997)

SCF
Total Sample

SCF
Total Sample

By
Top
2nd
3rd
4th

Income
quintile
quintile
quintile
quintile

Marketable
Wealth
Financial
Wealth

Marketable
Wealth

1992

Wolff (1980)

0.83
0.93
0.78
0.69
0.72
0.77

Wolff (1994)

0.69
0.69

1984 SIPP
1988 SIPP
1989

REFERENCE

Total
Assets

Total Sample
1989

GINI

MESP fNBERI

Professional,
Managerial,
Clerical and
Sales, Craft
and Operative
Workers (80%)

1983

WEALTH
DEFINITION2

SCF
Total Sample

Net Worth

0.74

Weicher (1997)

SCF
Total Sample

Net Worth

0.73
0.83

Weicher (1997)
Wolff (1998)

Total Sample

Net Worth

0.78

Diaz-Gimeniz,
Quadrini, &
Rios—Rull (1997)

All Workers

0.74

MESP: a synthetic data base constructed by Richard Ruggles in the 1970's fo r the NBER.
SCF: Survey of Consuner Finances, Federal Reserve Board.
SIPP: Survey of Income and Program P articip atio n , US Bureau of the Census.
^Total Assets * financial assets ♦ home equity ♦ consuner durables + businessequity.
Disposable Health * Total Assets ♦ other real estate ♦ cash value of pensions - debt.
Marketable Wealth * Disposable Wealth - consumer durables.
Net Worth * Total Assets plus autos and other real estate - debt.
Financial Assets = Marketable Wealth - home equity.
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ution

of Treasury

securities,

equities

and

money

in

the

workforce population; in lieu of that, a rough estimate will
be conjured from the data in Table 4-4.

It is well known that financial wealth is more concen
trated than household net worth in total population.

(A Gini

coefficient of 0.90 vs. 0.80.)

That may not be true of the

labor

financial

force,

however,

because

assets

are

held

disproportionally by the very rich who are not labor force
participants in the sense being used here.

Wolff

(1995)

shows that the richest 10% of households own approximately 90%
of stocks and bonds and 60% of deposits.

Excluding this top

tier would leave 10% of stocks and bonds and 40% of deposits
to be held by the workforce.

The degree of concentration of

these remaining financial assets in the workforce population
is unknown, but it is most certainly less than their concen
tration in the total population.

In order to proceed, I will

make an instrumental assumption (based on Table 4-4) that the
Gini coefficient for the size distribution of financial assets
in the workforce lies within the range of 0.66 to 0.74.

I

will choose the midpoint of this range, 0.70, and test for
sensitivity to the upper limit of 0.74.
close to the Gini

The value of 0.70 is

coefficients of wealth

for the
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quintiles of household income in the 1989 SCF, and also for
the SIPP data31.

Setting 2N(ffu/V2 10,1) = 0.70 yields au2 = 2.15281, and
this in turn gives:
p = 1 - a/Oa

=

1 - (.8444)/(1.4672) = .424

The corresponding value for Lu = 0.74 is p = .471.

This completes the

initial calibration of the model.

Computational results are presented in the next section.

4.5.3

Computational Results

It may be helpful to restate the purpose of the investi
gation

at this

stage.

The key question

is:

Does

this

calibrated labor supply function exhibit positive elasticities
of

both A

and

e£v

participation rates
money?

over

a

relevant

range

of

labor-force

in response to a one-time increase in

If so, then the function exhibits procyclical wage-

elasticity, suggesting that its underlying economic mechanism
could serve as an explanation of countercyclical markups and
procyclical

real

wages.

If not,

then

we

have

another

32Wolff (1998) points out that, unlike the SCF, the upper tail of the
wealtb distribution is missing from both the SIPP and PSID data bases, making
them more useful for studying the wealth accumulation behavior of the middle
class.
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counter factual model and the problem introduced in Chapter I
remains.

A positive money-elasticity of A(w)

at a real wage wQ

implies that an open-market purchase will increase the supply
of labor at that wage.

A positive money-elasticity of e at

the same real wage wQ means that e is procyclical at that
wage; this occurs when the relative density of reservation
ages increases at that wage.

If both elasticities are

positive over a range of wages, it implies that labor supply
increases with procyclical elasticity over that range.
relevant range of the aggregate real wage

for the U.

A
S.

economy would correspond to a range of labor-force participa
tion rates of 65% to 80%. which encompasses the observed rates
for the aggregate labor force. [(Ehrenberg and Smith (1991);
Economic Report of the President, 1992), Table B-34].

Since

this aggregate labor supply function is a cumulative Lognormal
distribution, labor-force participation rates are the values
of the function, which can be obtained from tables of the
standard Normal distribution N(z|0,l) .

For example, the mean

wage of $500 for this three-parameter Lognormal distribution
corresponds

to

an

LFPR of N( .4164610,1)

=

66.0%.

Thus,

elasticities at and above the mean reservation wage will be
relevant.
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Finally, where the elasticities are both positive, their
magnitudes should be realistic in terms of the money-employment relationship.

At the end of 1991 the civilian workforce

was 125.7 million, representing a labor-force participation
rate of 66% of the total population.

The unemployment rate

was 7.1%, and total employment was 116.7 million workers.

At

the same time, nominal M2 was $3,439 Trillion, and had grown
at a rate of 3.0% over the previous 12 months.

Given these

numbers, an M2 labor supply elasticity of +1 would imply that
a 1% ($34.4 Billion) one-time increase in M2 would induce a 1%
increase in aggregate labor supply (1.25 million workers).
With an M2 multiplier of approximately 8, this would corres
pond to a 4.3 Billion (1.4%) increase in the monetary base of
$317 Billion.

The monetary base actually grew by 6.4% during

1991, so the implied expansionary policy would constitute 22%
of the total monetary base expansion for the year.

A monetary

elasticity of labor supply of +2 would require only one-half
as much increase in the monetary base.

Fifteen cases were computed, each representing a differ
ent parameterization of the model.

The details are shown in

Exhibits 4-1 through 4-16 located at the end of this section.
The results are summarized in Table 4-5.

The computational setup (in Mathcad 4.0) for the homo-
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thetic Case H is shown in Exhibit: 4-1 (a); computed values and
graphs are shown in Exhibit 4-1(b).

The M2-elasticity of

labor supply is positive over the entire range of wages, but
the M2-elasticity of e is positive only up to the weekly wage
of $395, corresponding to a labor-force participation rate
(LFPR) of (N(— .110,1) = 46.0%.

Above that wage the elasticity

is negative and e is countercyclical.
tion wage of

$500

countercyclical32.

At the mean reserva

the elasticity of e is -0.5
In fact,

and

e is

e is countercyclical over the

entire relevant range of reservation wages.

This result is

consistent with the main conclusion of Chapter III, i. e . , it
is not possible

for

e to be procyclical

at

the

average

aggregate wage if preferences are homothetic.

I will now turn to the results of the nonhomothetic cases
NH-1 through NH-7.

To represent preferences with increasing relative risk
aversion requires that the elasticity of the reservation wage
function $(v) be an increasing function of nonlabor income v . ,
i. e.r

> 0.

(See Section 4.2.5 and the proof in Appendix

32

Aitchison and Brown (1963) argue that the median (geometric mean ef1) is
a more logical measure of central tendency for the Lognormal distribution. In the
homothetic case of Exhibit 4-1, e is slightly countercyclical at the median of
$410 with an elasticity there of -.083. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on
acyclical real wages relates to the equilibrium real wage, which appears to be
in. the vicinity of the mean of $500, at a labor-force participation rate of 66%.
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Computational Results of the Labor supply Model

PARAMETERS_____ COMPUTED QUANTITIES
L— .45
M2
Exhibit/Case Lu
ERM
EflM rM [e]a
EMP
■'TT +LFPR“
4-1

H

.70

.8

-.15

1.0

-0.5

$

395 46.0%

.70

.8

-.15

1.1

+0.5

$

835 71.2%

4-3 NH-2

1.3

+1.3

1 ,300 74 .4

4-4 NH-3

1.5

+2.1

1,599 75.9

4-2 NH-1

4-5 NH-4

-.25

1.1

+0.34

4-6 NH-5

-.05

1.1

+1.3

.95

-.15

1.1

+0.33

682 69.5
539 66.9

4-7 NH-6

730 70.1
1 ,300 74.4

4-8 NH-7

.74

.8

-.15

1.1

+0.06

4-9 NH-8

.70

.8

-.15

IcMc

+3.0

$ 694 77.1%

-.25

***

+1.9

664 76.8

4-10 NH-9
4-11 NH-10

.5

-.15

***

+3.5

720 78.1

4-12 NH-11

.8

-.10

***

+4.5

714 77.9

+1.8

663 76.0

+0.05

575 66.5%

4-13 NH-12

.74

.8

-.15

***

4-14 NH-13

.70

.95

-.25

1.05

.95

-.25

tir*

+1.7

647 75.2

.10

-.15

***

+2.6

752 77.9

4-15 NH-14
4-16 NH-15

.74

BMP = 2J,[P]; ERM = ^[M*]; EflM = ^[M*] f L = Gini Coefficient
of nonlabor income. Lu = Gini coefficient of wealth.
is the elasticity of e at the mean reservation wage of
$500 per week, where the labor-force participation rate is 66.0%.
+ W and +LFPR* are the maximum reservation wage and labor-force
participation rate for which the elasticity of e is positive.
*** EQM * 5 = 61n(w +1), which increases with w.
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section D3.).

The simplest specification is that 5* — 6 > 0,

a constant, from which it follows that:33

i - Sv
» = t(v)= exp(5v)-l

(4.34)

v = f-1(v) = g(o) = (In (w + 1 ))/S
0 * ^w Cg] =

This

specification

was

w/[(w+l)ln(o+l) ]

implemented

by

substituting

the

function g(w) in place of w as the argument of A(w|jLi,a2) in
the elasticity equations 4.25 and 4.26 of Section 4.4.

This is facilitated by setting:34

z = (ln[g(w)] - n)/a,
whereupon
and

g(w) = exp (m + oz) = ln(w(z) + l)

(4.35)

w(z) = exp(fexp(/i + az)) - l

Setting the constants of integration to 1 in the derivation of the
reservation wage function if implies that 5(0) = 0 and f(0) = 0, i. e.,
workers without nonlabor income have a reservation wage equal to the minimum
weekly wage t = $200.
34

In principle the chain rule for the elasticity of a composite function,
which is the basis for Equations 4.6 and 4.7, can also be used, but
y ] and ?[6]
are functions of g(w) and the integrals in Equations 4.25 and 4.26 still have to
be evaluated. The transformation between the Normal and Lognormal makes this
straightforward.
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Equations 4.31 and 4.32 were evaluated using the standard
Normal distributions q>(z) and N(z|0,l)

as before,

and the

results were transformed back in terms of w(z) using Equation
4.35.

The constant parameter S was set to calibrate the

distribution at the mean reservation wage of $500 per week,
and incorporates the scale factor h - 40 hours in a work week.
All of this is shown in the computational setup for the nonhomothetic case NH-1 in Exhibit 4-2(a).

Table 4-5 shows the results for this representation of
nonhomothetic preferences, for assumed values of 1.1, 1.3 and
1.5

for EftM, representing the range of values estimated by

Meltzer

(1963),[l. 15];

(1959), [1.8]

Laidler

(1971),[1.4];

and

Friedman

The elasticities of both A and e are positive

and larger than in the homothetic case, and increase with EflM.
(See Table 4-5 and Exhibits 4-2(b) through 4-4(b).

In Case

NH-1 the M2-elasticity of e at the mean reservation wage of
$500

is +0.5 and

increases

significantly with the higher

values of EflM in Cases NH-2 and NH-3.

More importantly, it is

positive up to a reservation wage of $1,599 per week, corres
ponding to a labor-force participation rate (LFPR) of 75.9%.
For this particular specification of nonhomothetic preferences
and monetary elasticities, e is procyclical and elastic with
respect to a one-time change in M2.
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Using the parameters of case NH-1 as a benchmark, Cases
NH—4, 5 and 6 test the partial sensitivity of the results to
changes in the assumed values of the monetary elasticities ERM
and EMP.

Increasing ERM to -.25 (which is about the largest

estimate found for T-bond interest elasticity and is five
times the average estimate for T-bills) reduced the magnitude
of

slightly, from +0.5 to +0.34, and lowered the upper

bound of its positive range slightly, to 70.1%. Reducing ERM
to -.05 had precisely the same effect on the benchmark case as
increasing EflM from 1.1 to 1.3.

Increasing EMP to 0.95 in

Exhibit 4-7 had about the same effect on the benchmark case as
increasing ERM from -.15 to -.25, and decreasing EMP to 0.5
(not shown) increased the elasticities and positive range by
small amounts.

Thus, it appears that for this specification

of nonhomothetic preferences,
somewhat sensitive
elasticities,

to

although

implications of the model are

the assumed values of the monetary
there

is

a

vector

of

empirically

supported values for which the elasticity of e at the mean
wage is positive.

The computed results of the benchmark Case NH-1 were not
sensitive

to

small

nonlabor income.

changes

in

the

Gini

coefficient

for

However, Case NH-7 (Exhibit 4-8) indicates

that there are limits to the degree of wealth inequality for
which

this

model

will

exhibit

procyclical

elasticities.

Increasing the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution
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from .70 to .74 (which corresponds to p = .471) reduced the
elasticity of € at the mean to +0.06 and made
cyclical above it35.

e counter

Increasing the Gini to 0.8 (not shown)

produced results very close to the nonhomothetic case (Exhibit
4—1(b), with £Jj[A] < 1.

This result implies that monetary

policy would have a weaker influence on aggregate labor supply
if the concentration of financial wealth in the workforce were
greater than a Gini coefficient of 0.74.

Cases NH-8 through NH-13 are based on an alternative rep
resentation of preferences in the model.
-3,

In Cases NH-l,-2 and

was treated as exogenous and results were obtained

for arbitrary values of 1.1, 1.5, and 1.5.

For each case,

was assumed to be constant over the full range of v and
w.

This appears to be inconsistent with the nonhomothetic

specification that

> 0 , because

both

and £ measure

the proportional response of workers to a change in a scale
variable.

The reservation wage function t(r(v) can be inter

preted as the Engel curve of the demand for leisure in the
constrained work/leisure choice problem of Section 4.2.3, with
S as its elasticity.
complements

and are

If leisure and money balances are
luxury goods

and

if preferences

have

Note that elasticity of e of 0 at the mean reservation wage is still
more procyclical than in the homothetic case, where the elasticity of at the mean
is -0.5. This can also be seen by comparing the graphs of Exhibits 4-1 and 4-8
at the mean, reservation wage of $500.
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increasing relative risk aversion, then the wealth elasticity
of the demand for money balances should change proportionally
with the income elasticity of the demand for leisure36. This
feature can be incorporated in the model by setting:

S'aCM*] = I

so that
rate as C*
£ =

Sm —

v > e - l

(4.36)

[M*3] is endogenous and will increase at the same
For the present reservation wage function
ln(w + 1), which is greater than one for
= 1.7l8

However, this function causes

to

increase too rapidly, producing values in excess of 2.0 around
the mean, which are not supported by empirical evidence.

The

alternative specification utilized in Cases NH-7 through NH-11
is:

I

=

6v5,

0 < S < 1

♦ (v) = exp(v5) - 1
g(w) = [ln(w + l)]1/6 = v

(4.37)

w(z) = exp[exp[6(/* + za) ]] - l
6v5

=

51n(w(z) +1)

This assumes that relative risk aversion increases at approximately the
same rate in. both subutiity functions U(c,£) and H(f,m). There is no a priori
reason for this to be true, but neither is there any empirical evidence to the
contrary.
One could argue that risk is risk, and aversion to it should be
similar in different contexts. The subutility functions could be parameterized
to allow for differences in Rg.
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Exhibit: 4-9 (a) shows the computational setup for this specifi
cation.

A value of 0.305 for S calibrates the mean reserv

ation wage at r + $300 = $500.

From Equation 4.37,

= $2v6_1

= £2[ln(w + I)]15”1)/6, and since S < 1, this specification
produces a lower growth rate in

that declines with v.

The computed results for this nonhomothetic specification
are shown in Table 4-5 and Exhibits 4-9 through 4-13.

Case

NH-8

same

is

the

basic

elasticity

parameter values as in NH-1.

computation

with

the

The elasticity of e at the mean

is +3.0 and e is procyclical up to a LFPR of 77.1%.
of the endogenous elasticity

The value

in Equation 4.36 is +1.56

at the median wage and +1.74 at the mean.

These values are

close to that for Case NH-3 and represent strong relative risk
aversion and procyclicality of A and e.
ation wage functions f in Exhibits

Because the reserv

4-2 (b)

and 4-9 (b)

are

different, the respective density functions of reservation
wages are different even though they are based on the same
underlying distribution of nonlabor income A(v|n,o2).

The

essential difference between these two nonhomothetic represen
tations

is that the first

reservation wage function

is a

strong downward compression of the distribution of nonlabor
income, and the second one is much less so.

Cases NH-9 through NH-12 perform the same sensitivity
tests as in NH-4 through NH-6.

This specification has about
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the same degree of sensitivity to the value of £^.[Md] (compare
Cases NH-9 and NH-4), and to the value of Lu (Case NH-7 and
NH—12) . This version of the model can tolerate a higher Gini
coefficient for wealth (0.74), undoubtedly due to its higher
elasticity of relative risk aversion.

Cases NH-13 and NH-14 test each of the two model specifi
cations for a "worst-case" situation where money is almost
neutral (EMP = .95), the interest-elasticity of M2 is high
(-.25) , and the wealth-elasticity of money demand is relative
ly low (1.05). The result in each case is a small but positive
elasticity of e at the mean, and a reduction of 3-4% on the
upper bound LFPR's.

The parameters most critical to these

results are p, the wealth-elasticity of Rr, and ^j[Md, the
wealth-elasticity of money demand, which has to be greater
than 1 for e to be procyclical at the mean reservation wage.

Finally,
Keynesian"

in

case,

Exhibit
with

4-16 (b),

sticky

NH-15,

prices

I

(^[P]

show
=

a

*10),

"New
low

elasticity of money demand (^[M*1] = -.15), a wealth Gini of
0.74, and endogenous wealth elasticity of money demand37.
The result is a procyclical elasticity of + 2.6 for e at the
mean wage, which remains procyclical up to the LFPR of 77.9%.

To be rigorous here, a low value of 8J,[P] implies sticky prices only in
a dynamic framework. In the static framework of Chapters II and V prices jump
instantaneously, but with a low value of £^[P], not very far.
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The elasticity of A in the vicinity of the mean is about
+1.25.

Thus, New Keynesian price rigidities would enhance

the procyclical results of this model.

In all of these cases,

e is procyclical at the mean

reservation wage of $500 and LFPR of 66%.

In general, the

upper bound LFPR's are in the range of 70 -78%.

Killingsworth

(1983, p. 103) claims that labor-force participation rates for
women are in the 50% - 60% range, and for men are 80% - 90%.
Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) quote participation rates of 77%
for men,
1979

58% for women, and 67% total,B, from BLS data for

This agrees with the figure of 66% for 1991 in the 1992

Economic Report of the President. The upper-bound LFPR's shown
in Table 4-5 indicate that the range of procyclical e includes
all of these figures, and therefore the results are relevant
to the U. S. labor market.

Of course, the elasticity of e

will be small if the equilibrium real wage in the economy is
close to the upper-bound LFPR of 78%.

Thus, it appears that the aggregate labor supply function
developed in this chapter is capable of exhibiting strongly
procyclical elasticity of A and e over a relevant range of
labor-force participation rates, for plausible values of its
parameters.

This

is

conditional

on

the

assumption

that

consumer preferences have increasing relative risk aversion.
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It was established in Chapters I and III that procyclical
elasticity

of

labor supply

at the

equilibrium wage

is

a

sufficient condition for the markdown of the real wage from
labor's marginal product to be countercyclical.

This follows

directly from the markdown relationship:

PF£/W = [1 + 1/e] = e

Thus, the model can serve as one explanation of countercyc
lical

markups,

monpsonistic

i.

e.,

as

countercyclical

labor markets.

markdowns

in

a

It remains to be determined

whether the magnitudes of the elasticities sshown here are
large enough to offset the negative elasticity of an aggregate
labor demand function and cause the equilibrium real wage to
be acyclical or procyclical.

This analysis is carried out in

Chapter V.

In the first set of computations (Cases NH-1 through
NH-7) . both the magnitude of the elasticity of e at the mean
wage and the range of LFPR's for which the elasticity was
positive were sensitive to changes in the monetary elastici
ties £Jj[P],
for wealth.
model

was

parameters.

and

, and the assumed Gini coefficient

In the second set (Cases NH-8 through NH-12) the
more

stable with

respect

to

changes

in

these

A sensitivity test indicated that, if the Gini

coefficient of the distribution of wealth in the workforce
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were higher than 0.74,
positive

it would be difficult to obtain a

e ] above the mean wage without assuming extreme

values for the monetary elasticities.

The benchmark Cases NH-1 (Exhibit 4-2) and NH-8 (Exhibit
4-9 were parameterized conservatively with respect to the
price-elasticity of money supply and the interest-elasticity
of money demand.

If prices are sticky, in the sense that the

short-run elasticity of the price level with respect to money
is less than 0.8, and/or the interest-elasticity of M2 demand
is less than -.15, then this model will predict even stronger
procyclicality of A and e.

The interest-elasticity of the demand for money balances
plays a key role in the model,
monetary policy effectiveness debate.

as it does in the

Low elasticities imply

that exogenous changes in the money supply will have a strong
influence on interest rates and aggregate demand in the short
run.

(The monetarist view is that the influence is too strong

and destabilizing.)

Similarly, in the model of this chapter,

with nonhomothetic preferences the procyclical behavior of
labor supply and its elasticity is driven by the reciprocal of
i low values therefore imply that monetary policy has a
strong influence on aggregate labor supply.
tent with its influence on aggregate demand.

This is consis
Also, to the

extent that the money demand function is unstable due to
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disintermediation or changes in the velocity of money, the
money-elasticity of aggregate labor supply will also be
unstable.

4.6

Conclusions

I have shown in this chapter that,

by abandoning the

representative agent framework and incorporating heterogeneity
of labor as an endogenous characteristic,

it is possible to

construct a model of the aggregate labor market that appears
to be more consistent with some persistent stylized facts of
macroeconomics —

facts which the representative

agent

is

powerless to explain.

The analysis in this chapter has revealed a potential
source of countercyclical markdowns and procyclical elasticity
of aggregate labor supply: (1) nonhomothetic preferences with
increasing relative risk aversion, and (2) an aggregate labor
supply function based on the distribution of financial wealth
and nonlabor income in the workforce, the shift characteris
tics of which are determined by the effects of central bank
open-market operations.

Increasing

relative

risk

aversion

implies

that

the

elasticities of the demand for leisure and the demand for real
money balances increase with income or wealth.

The method of
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aggregation employed in this chapter was distributional: the
entire distribution of heterogeneous characteristics (in this
instance, nonlabor income and risk aversion) was modeled and
formed the structure of an aggregate labor supply function.
That function is a composite

function of

(a)

a Lognormal

distribution of nonlabor income and (b) a reservation wage
function relating individual reservation wages to nonlabor
income. The cyclical properties of this aggregate labor supply
function were then investigated.

The Lognormal aggregate labor supply function developed
in this chapter exhibited procyclical elasticity at laborforce participation rates of up to 78% for plausible values of
its

parameters.

This

result

holds

only

for

nonhomothetic

preferences with increasing relative risk aversion.

This

property, together with the assumption of monopsony power in
the labor market, makes this aggregate labor supply model a
viable candidate for explaining countercyclical markdowns,
which requires only that e be procyclical.

Whether the elasticity properties of this labor supply
function can also serve to explain acyclical or procyclical
real wages is a more complicated question.
the question of whether the magnitudes of

First, there is
e] are large

enough to offset the negative elasticity of the aggregate
marginal product of labor curve in the standard monopsony
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labor market model (See Equation (3.15) in section 3.5.2 and
the conclusions of that section, in Chapter III) . This raises
the empirical question of what the elasticity of the aggregate
marginal product of labor is, and how to characterize aggre
gate

labor demand

in a monopsony model38.

Finally,

the

behavior of the labor supply function drived in this chapter
depends

on

nonhomogeneous

relative

demands

for

financial

assets and money, which may have other macroeconomic implica
tions.
a

Therefore, this question

general

Chapter II,

equilibrium

framework

needs to be investigated in
similar

to

the model

of

That is the objective of Chapter V.

What can be claimed for this model is that it implies
that, with increasing relative risk aversion in monopsonistic
labor markets, real wages will be less countercyclical than
they would be in a representative agent model of labor supply.
As discussed in Chapter I, aggregate real wages have been at
most mildly procyclical, and then only at certain times and
under certain

conditions.

An acyclical

consistent with the empirical record.

real

wage

is also

What is encouraging is

that the computed magnitudes of £^[e]

at the mean in the

calibrated version of this model are in the range of +3 to

38Hecall, from Chapter III, that a monopsonist does not have a demand
schedule that ie Independent of the elasticity of supply.
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+5 for reasonable ranges of the parameters, and e is strongly
procyclical at the observed labor-force participation rate of
66 %.

In contrast with the representative agent labor market of
Chapter II, the wealth effects in labor supply in this chapter
are distributed, and depend on the particular functional forms
used to represent nonhomothetic preferences and the distribu
tion of wealth in the workforce.

The results obtained here

are specific to the Lognormal distribution;

they cannot be

obtained, for example, with the Pareto distribution.

However,

the research literature indicates that the Lognormal may be
the best choice in this context.

If the representative agent

framework is abandoned, then distributions of heterogeneous
agent characteristics,

such as wealth,

tastes for work and

leisure, and aversion to risk will matter for macroeconomic
outcomes.

It is important to represent these distributions by

functional forms that have theoretical and empirical justifi
cation.

The

model

developed

in

this

chapter

articulates

a

monetary theory of aggregate labor supply for heterogeneous
workers.

The aggregate labor supply function is directly

related to the size distribution of financial wealth in the
workforce.
supply

With real wealth as a shift variable in the labor

function,

it

is

not

surprising

that
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monetary policy actions will have an affect on labor supply.
That was established back in Chapter II.

What is new in this

chapter is that the distributive wealth effects of a Lognormal
distribution

cause

the

elasticity

of

labor

supply

strongly procyclical over a relevant range of
participation rates.

to

be

labor-force

In addition to reducing per capita real

wealth, an increase in money reduces the inequality of the
size distribution of wealth, which increases the elasticity of
aggregate labor supply in the vicinity of the mean reservation
wage.

In this model the inequality of the distribution of

financial

wealth

matters

for

labor

market

outcomes,

and

incidentally, for monetary policy effectiveness.

The willingness of risk-averse agents to adjust their
portfolio balances in response to changes in expected returns
on

financial assets

is an

important question

in monetary

theory, since it helps to determine the interest-elasticity of
the money demand function.

And so it is also in this aggre

gate labor supply function, where the non-neutrality of openmarket operations,

the portfolio balance decision,

and the

elasticity of the Keynesian liquidity preference function play
major roles in determining the cyclical properties of the
aggregate

labor supply function.

The critical

assumption

here, however, is that consumers have increasing relative risk
aversion with respect to the leisure-labor decision and the
portfolio balance decision,

from which it follows that the
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income-elasticity of leisure demand and the wealth-elasticity
of money demand are both significantly greater than unity.
Without that assumption, the model has no important implica
tions for the cyclicality of markdowns and real wages.

These monetary ideas are not without controversy, and the
model presented here is subject to some of the same disagree
ments

and

criticisms

that

have

been

monetary policy effectiveness debate.
historical

perspective

the

aggregate

associated

with

the

Nevertheless, from an
labor

supply

model

presented in this chapter may be viewed as a somewhat belated
followup of Keynes' attempt to construct a monetary theory of
production.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

EXHIBIT 4-1(a)
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EXHIBIT 4-2(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE I
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3.071
2.849
2.605
2.336
2.042
1.719
1.366
0.98
0-559
0.099
-0.401
-0.945
-1.536
-2.176
-1868
-3.616
-4.42
-5.285
-6.212

4
3.J
3

2.3
2

EA(i)
1J
o
1

/

0.3

0/
-0.5

-I200 300

400

300

600

700

800 900 1000 110(1200

"U)r t

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY*
li= 5.347

Median = 253.347

a = 300

cr2 =0.713
p =0.424

Mean = 500
6 =0.019

p2 = 2.60l*l0S

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.15

EQM = 1.2

L =0.45
y = 1.02

ERA =0.184

3.3

0.3
-0.5
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 11011200
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EXHIBIT 4 -3 (b )

W

cnorm(z)w(z) x
*

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE I I

EA(z) He(z)
4

0.00135 200.373
0.00187 200.412
0.00256 200.456
0.00347 200.505
0.00466 200.56
0.00621 200.622
0.0082 200.693
0.01072 200.773
0.0139 200.865
0.01786 200.97
0.02275 201.092
0.02872 201.232
0.03593 201396
0.04457 201.588
0.0548 201.814
0.06681 202.082
0.08076 202.404
0.0968 202.792
0.11507 203.264
0.13567 203.846
0.15866 204.569
0.18406 205.478
0.21186 206.638
0.24196 208.136
0.27425 210.103
0.30854 212.726
0.34458 216.289
0.38209 221.225
0.42074 228.209
0.46017 238.324
0.5
253.347
0.53983 276.281
0.57926 312.355
0.61791 370.977
0.65542 469.677
0.69146 642393
0.72575 957.602
0.75804 1559.787
0.78814 2768.969
0.81594 5332.314
0.84134 11096.932
0.86433 24921.912
0.88493 60483.124
0.9032 159206.05
0.91924 457019.452
0.93319 1.441-106

0
-8.94
-14.562
•17.918
■19.721
-20.458
-20.466
-19.978
-19.159
-18.122
-16.949
-15.699
-14.413
-13.121
-11.845
-10.601
-9.401
-8.252
-7.161
-6.131
-5.166
-4.267
-3.435
-2.67
-1.973
-1.342
-0.776
-0.274
0.166
0.546
0.869
1.137
1.354
1.522
1.645
1.727
1.771
1.782
1.763
1.719
1.653
1.571
1.475
1.369
1.257
1.143

-33.703
-22.163
-14.031
-8.258
-4.129
-1.156
0.995
2.56
3.701
4.534
5.139
5.576
5.885
6.097
6.235
6.312
6.342
6.332
6.288
6.214
6.113
5.987
5.837
5.663
5.465
5.242
4.992
4.716
4.409
4.071
3.699
3.29
2.842
2.351
1.813
1.225
0.584
-0.115
-0.877
-1.704
-2.601
-3.572
-4.621
-5.753
-6.969
-8.274

3J
3
2.3
2
EA(z )

0

IJ
1
0.5 /

/

0
-0.3

-I

200 300 400 500 600 700

800 900 1000 110(1200

M-ELAST1CITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
p =5.347
2

a =0.713
p =0.424
EMP =0.8

Median =253.347 a =300
Mean =500
8=0.019
ERM =-0.15

p2 =2.601-105
EQM = 1.4

L =0.45
y = 1.02
ERA =0.265

i
Et(z) \
0
V

200 300 400 300 600 700 800 900 1000 11011200
K i) t t

M - ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITY
0.08
0.06
Uz)0.04
0.02

0

200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1!0<1200

DENSITY OF RESERVATION WAGES

znorm2A~mcd

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LFPR

cnorm(z] w (z ) -c x
0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0548
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0-13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0.5
0.53983
0.57926
0.61791
0.65542
0.69146
0.72575
0.75804
0.78814
0.81594
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

211

W
EA(z)

0
-14.894
-24.282
-29.906
-32.951
-34.225
-34.285
-33.521
-32.201
-30.517
-28.605
-26.56
-24.453
-22.333
-20.236
-18.188
-16.209
-14.313
-12.508
-10.803
-9.202
-7.708
-6.323
-5.046
-3.879
-2.819
-1.866
-1.016
-0.266
0.385
0.943
1.412
1.796
2.101
2.331
2.494
2.594
2.639
2.634
2.587
2.503
2.39
2.254
1.592-105 2.101
1.937
4.57-I0S
1.766
1.441-10

200.373
200.412
200.456
200.505
200.56
200.622
200.693
200.773
200.865
200.97
201.092
201.232
201.396
201.588
201.814
202.082
202.404
202.792
203.264
203.846
204.569
205.478
206.638
208.136
210.103
212.726
216.289
221.225
228.209
238.324
253.347
276.281
312.355
370.977
469.677
642.393
957.602
1559.787
2768.969
5332.314
11096.932
24921.912
60483.124

EXHIBIT4 -4 (b )

Ee(z)
-56.107
-36.961
-23.467
-13.885
-7.03
-2.093
1.484
4.088
5.989
7.379
8.394
9.128
9.652
10.016
10.256
10.398
10.461
10.46
10.403
10.298
10.15
9.961
9.733
9.468
9.163
8.819
8.434
8.005
7.53
7.004
6.425
5.788
5.088
4.32
3.479
2.559
1.553
0.456
-0.739
-2.039
-3.45
-4.98
-6.633
-8.417
-10.337
-12.398

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE I I I

4
J.3
3

13
2

EA(2)
IJ
0
I

/
/

0.3

1

0
-0.3
-I

200 300 400 300 600 700 SOU 900 1000 111X1200
u (z ) T- i

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
|i= 5 .3 4 7
p =0.424

Median =253.347 a =300
8 =0.019

a2 =0.713

Mean = 500

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.15

L=0.45

p2 =2.60l-105
EOM = l.8

y = 1.02
ERA =0.427

\
\

&(*)
0

V

200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 11011200

M - ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITY
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EXHIBIT 4 • 5 (b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE IV

cncxm(z)w(z) -<t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200.373
0.00187 200.412
0.00256 200.456
0.00347 200JOS
0.00466 200.56
0.00621 200.622
0.0082 200.693
0.01072 200.773
0.0139 200.865
0.01786 200.97
0.02275 201.092
0.02872 201.232
0.03593 201.396
0.04457 201.588
0.0548 201.814
0.06681 202.082
0.08076 202.404
0.0968 202.792
0.11507 203.264
0.13567 203.846
0.15866 204J69
0.18406 205.478
0.21186 206.638
0.24196 208.136
0.27425 210.103
0.30854 212.726
0.34458 216.289
0.38209 221.225
0.42074 228.209
0.46017 238.324
0.5
253J47
0.53983 276.281
0.57926 312.355
0.61791 370.977
0.65542 469.677
0.69146 642.393
0.72575 957.602
0.75804 1559.787
0.78814 2768.969
0.81594 5332.314
0.84134 11096.932
0.86433 24921.912
0.88493 60483.124
0.9032 159206.05
0.91924 457019.452
0.93319 1.441-106

14.65897
0
-3.87888 -9J8413
-6.30069 -6.01011
-7.728 -3.47434
-8.4748 -1.66283
-8.75585 -0.36083
-8.71915 0.57967
-8.46746 1.26143
-8.07264 1.7563
-7J8528 2.11489
-7.04123 2J7303
-6.46608 2.55632
-5.87816 2.68309
-5.29068 2.76654
•4.71317 2.81621
■4.15254 2.83901
-3.61378 2.83993
-3.10046 2.82253
■2.61512 2.78936
-2.1595 2.74216
-1.73475 2.68208
•1.34155 2.6098
-0.98023 2.52564
-0.6508 2.42962
■0.35303 2.32151
-0.08648 2.20086
0.14948 2.06706
0.35564 1.91929
0.53297 1.75661
0.68256 1.57792
0.80563 1.38199
0.90357 1.16744
0.97784 0.93281
1.03006 0.67647
1.06193 0.39674
1.07526 0.09179
1.07192 -0.24024
1.05385 -0.6013
1.02305 -0.99337
0.9815 -1.41844
0.93119 -1.87852
0.87408 -2.37555
0.81205 -19114
0.74688 -3.48787
0.68023 -4.1066
0.61358 -4.7691

2.5

EA(z)
0

-0.5
200 100

-100

500

600

700

800

9u0

tOOO

(I0<[200

»U) r t

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
p =5.34721

2
a =0.71315
p =0.424
EMP =0.8

Median =253.34675 a =300
Mean = 500
5=0.01902

L =0.44958

P2 = 2 .6 0 1 -1 0 S y = 1.02

ERM =-0.25 EQM = 1.I

ERA =0.21134

Et(i)
0
0.5
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400
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11011200
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W

cnocm(z)w(z) » x
0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0548
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0.13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0J
0.53983
0.57926
0.61791
0.65542
0.69146
0.72575
0.75804
0.78814
0.81594
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

0
-7.451
-12.132
-14.921
-16.413
-17.016
-17.011
-16.593
-15.898
-15.023
-14.035
-12.983
-11.902
-10.818
-9.747
-8.705
-7.699
-6.737
-5.824
-4.963
-4.157
-3.406
-2.713
-2.076
-1.497
-0.973
-0.504
-0.089
0.274
0.586
0.85
1.069
1.243
1.377
1.474
1.535
1.566
1.568
1.545
1.502
1.441
1.366
1.28
1.186
1.592-105
1.088
4.57-105
0.987
1.44 M O6

200.373
200.412
200.456
200.505
200.56
200.622
200.693
200.773
200.865
200.97
201.092
201.232
201.396
201.588
201.814
202.082
202.404
202.792
203.264
203.846
204.569
205.478
206.638
208.136
210.103
212.726
216.289
221.225
228.209
238.324
253.347
276.281
312.355
370.977
469.677
642.393
957.602
1559.787
2768.969
5332.314
11096.932
24921.912
60483.124

EXHIBIT4 -6 (b ) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE V

EA(z) Ee(z)
-28.102
-18.463
-11.672
-6.851
-3.403
-0.922
0.873
2.178
3.129
3.822
4.326
4.688
4.943
5.118
5.229
5.291
5.312
5.299
5.259
5.193
5.104
4.994
4.863
4.712
4.54
4.347
4.132
3.893
3.629
3.338
3.018
2.666
2.281
1.858
1.396
0.892
0.341
-0.258
-0.911
-1.62
-2.388
-3.22
-4.118
-5.087
-6.127
-7.243

4

3J
3
2.5

HA(z)

0

2

IJ

1
OJ

0
-OJ

-I

200 300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

110(1200

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
p =5.347

Median =253.347

a2 =0.713

Mean = 500

p =0.424

5 =0.019

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.05

a =300

L = 0 .4 5

|J2 =2.601-I05

EOM = l . l

y = 1.02

ERA =0.075

4

\
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W

caora»(z)w(z)

*

x

0.00135 200.373
0.00187 200.412
0.00256 200.456
0.00347 200.505
0.00466 200.56
0.00621 200.622
0.0082 200.693
0.01072 200.773
0.0139 200.865
0.01786 200.97
0.02275 201.092
0.02872 201.232
0.03593 201.396
0.04457 201.588
0.0548 201.814
0.06681 202.082
0.08076 202.404
0.0968 202.792
0.11507 203.264
0.13567 203.846
0.15866 204.569
0.18406 205.478
0.21186 206.638
0.24196 208.136
0.27425 210.103
0.30854 212.726
0.34458 216.289
0.38209 221.225
0.42074 228.209
0.46017 238.324
0J
253.347
0.53983 276.281
0.57926 312.355
0.61791 370.977
0.65542 469.677
0.69146 642.393
0.72575 957.602
0.75804 1559.787
0.78814 2768.969
0.81594 5332.314
0.84134 11096.932
0.86433 24921.912
0.88493 60483.124
0.9032 159206.05
0.91924 457019.452
0.93319 1.44 MO6

EXHIBIT 4-7 (b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VI

EA(z) Ee(z)
0
-16.367
-4J3 -10.694
-7.03 -6.699
-8.62 -3.864
■9.449 -1.84
■9.758 -0.385
9.712 0.666
-9.426 1.427
-8.98 1.979
■8.432 2.379
-7.82 2.667
-7.174 2.871
-6.514 3.011
-5.855 3.103
• 5.207 3.157
-4.579 3.181
-3.975 3.181
-3.4
3.16
-2.857 3.121
-2.347 3.067
-1.872 2.997
-1.433 2.915
-1.03 2.818
-0.662 2.708
- 0.331 2.585
-0.034 2.447
0.228 2.295
0.457 2.126
0.653 1.941
0.818 1.737
0.953 1.514
1.06
1.27
1.141 1.003
1.196 0.712
1.229 0.394
1.241 0.047
1.235 -0.33
1.212 -0.741
1.174 -1.186
1.125 -1.669
1.066 -2.191
1
-2.756
0.928 -3.364
0.8S3 -4.018
0.776 -4.72
0.7 -5.472

4
3J
3
2,5

2
EA(*)
1J
0
1
OJ
0
-0.5

-I

200 300

400

500

£00

700

KOO

900

1000 110(1200

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
p =5.347

Median =253.347

a2 =0.713

Mean =500

p =0.424

8 =0.019

EMP =0.95 ERM =-0.15

a =300

L =0.45

p2 =2.601-103

EQM = 1.1

y = 1.02

ERA =0.143

4
3.5
3
2.5

\
V
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2
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0

1
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\

V
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EXHIBIT 4 -8(b )

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VII

coonn(z)w(z) t EA(z) Ee(z)
*

0.00135 200373
0.00187 200.412
0.00256 200.456
0.00347 200.505
0.00466 20036
0.00621 200.622
0.0082 200.693
0.01072 200.773
0.0139 200.865
0.01786 200.97
0.02275 201.092
0.02872 201.232
0.03593 201.396
0.04457 201388
0.0548 201.814
0.06681 202.082
0.08076 20Z404
0.0968 202.792
0.11507 203364
0.13567 203.846
0.15866 204369
0.18406 205.478
0.21186 206.638
0.24196 208.136
0.27425 210.103
030854 212.726
034458 216.289
038209 221.225
0.42074 228.209
0.46017 238.324
0.S
253.347
033983 276.281
037926 312.355
0.61791 370.977
0.65542 469.677
0.69146 642.393
0.72575 957.602
0.75804 1559.787
0.7S8I4 2768.969
0.81594 5331314
0.84134 11096.932
0.86433 24921.912
0.88493 60483.124
0.9032 159206.05
0.91924 457019.452
0.93319 1.441-106

0
-1814
-4.562
-5384
-6.109
-6.294
-6347
-6.045
-5.74
-5.368
-4.957
4.523
-4.082
-3.643
-3313
-1796
-2.396
-1016
-1.659
-1324
-1.013
-0.726
-0.464
■0.226
-0.012
0.178
0.344
0.488
0.61
0.711
0.792
0.854
0.899
0.927
0.939
0.938
0.925
0.901
0.867
0.826
0.779
0.728
0.673
0.616
0.559
0.502

4

-10.652
-6.937
-4.322
-1468
-1.144
-0.193
0.492
0.988
1347
1.606
1.791
1.921
1009
1066
1097
1108
1103
1084
1053
1012
1.96
1.899
1.829
1.749
1.66
1.561
1.451
1.331
1.198
1.053
0.894
0.721
0.531
0.324
0.099
-0.147
-0.414
-0.704
-1.018
-1.358
-1.727
-2.124
-1552
-3.011
-3.504
-4.032

3J
3
2-5
ea <z )

2
IJ

0

1
OJ
01
-0.5
-I

200 300

-100

500

600

700

KOO

900

1000

11(111200

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
(i=5.347

Median =253.347 a =300

L =0.45

a2 =0.713

Mean = 500

p2 =2.601-l05 y = 1.02

p =0.471

8=0.019

Lq - .74

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.15

EQM = 1.1

ERA =0.143

4
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EXHIBIT 4-9 (a)
znorm?A jn c d

ELASTICITY OF ELASTICITY COMPUTATIONS
LOGNORMAL LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION

LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION CALIBRATION
z = - 3 , - 2 .9 _ 1.5

a =300

P = 510

x .= 200

=

y =
Ott

v •=I

2 2

P2 = a -y

P2 =9.364* I0

It = In (a ) - .5 a2

y = 1.02

Jln(y 2

1- l)

a =0.844

a =0.713
(i = 5.347

L = 2-cnonnj-^ I - 1
W 2/

L =0.45

f l( z ) = z

f2(z) =

p = .424

Calibrate Mean Reservation Wage
For Nonhomothetic Function

(z2 - l)-(l -P)2
2

p a
S =

Nonhomothetic

In(tn(a r 1))

2

Reservation Wage Function

8 =0.305

In (a )
V = exp (vS) - I

5 = 8v5

g (w) - ln(w - I)

w (z) = exp<exp(8-(p r z a ) ) ) - I

MONETARY CALIBRATION
M 2 = 3.439

F = 5.035

EMP = .8

E M A (z) =

Mean = exp[exp[s-(p r ,5-a2) ] ] - I n
M 2 1- F

Median = exp(exp(8-p)) - l r t

E Q M (z) = 5 -In(w (z) r 1)

I -A
A

Median = 366.057

(-E R M r A (E Q M (z ) - 1)) Equation (D5.8)

ERA(z)
ERM
■z
I

K t( z ) =

Mean =500

A =0.594

E R M =-.15
E R A (z) =

A =

f l( z )

I

/
/ z2 ]

cnorm(z)
-3

.

I

X(z) =

EMP

-exp

|(z)2

Jzicaw{z)
LOGNORMAL DENSITY FUNCTION
OF NONLABOR INCOME

K 2(z) =

a C z ) ~ = exp(— ) dz-f
l)
\ 2 I
\cnonn(z)/

EACz) -= K .l(z) r K 2(z)
E e (z) := - E A ( z )

(Equation D5.11)

fl(z)EMP r

Q (z)-E M A (z )

EM A (z)

M - ELASTICITY OF AGGREGATE
LABOR SUPPLY
(Equation D6.11)

a
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LFPR
W
cnonn(z)w(z) -rt EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605
0.00187 210.28
0.00256 211.017
0.00347 211.823
0.00466 212.707
0.00621 213.677
0.0082 214.744
0.01072 215319
0.0139 217316
0.01786 218.651
0.02275 220.241
0.02872 222.006
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.606
0.06681 231.346
0.08076 234.421
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.782
0.13567 246.192
0.15866 251.191
0.18406 256.871
0.21186 263343
0.24196 270.738
0.27425 279309
030854 288.943
0.34458 300.16
0.38209 313.126
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.648
03
366.057
0.53983 389.955
0.57926 418.036
0.61791 451.148
0.65542 490.335
0.69146 536.885
0.72575 592.393
0.75804 658.843
0.78814 738.714
0.81594 835.113
0.84134 951.956
0.86433 1094.196
0.88493 1268.128
0.9032 1481.789
0.91924 1745.493
0.93319 2072.535

0
4.326
0.886 2.259
1.008 1.086
0.692 0.478
0.145 0.227
-0305 0.2
-1.177 0.313
-1.821 0.512
-2.408 0.762
-2.919 1.044
-3.345 1341
-3.684 1.646
-3.934 1.954
-4.098 2.259
-4.18 2.56
-4.183 2.855
-4.113 3.142
-3.976 3.419
-3.778 3.684
-3325 3.936
-3.225 4.172
-2.884 4.39
-2308 4.587
-2.105 4.758
-1.682 4.9
-1.246 5.008
-0.803 5.076
-0.361 5.099
0.075 5.067
0.497 4.974
0.899 4.81
1.277 4.563
1.626 4.222
1.94 3.772
2.216 3.199
2.452 2.486
2.645 1.613
2.793 0.559
2.897 -0.697
2.958 -2.183
2.976 -3.924
2.955 -5.949
2.897 -8.292
2.806 -10.984
2.688 14.062
2346 17.563

EXHIBIT 4 -9 (b )

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VUI

4
3.5
3
2.5
EA(z) 2
—
1.5

0
—

/
/
/
/
/

1
0-5

0
-0.5
-I

200 300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

110C1200

M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
li= 5 .3 4 7

Median =366.057 a =300

a2 =0.713

Mean =500

p =0.424

5=0.305

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.15

L = 0 .4 5

p2 =2.601-10S

y = 1.02

EC2M(z) = 5 -In (w (z)

I)

9

8
7

6
0
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/
/
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4
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|

\
\
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U0<1200
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EXHIBIT * -10(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE IX

W

cnonn(z)w(z) t EA(z) Ee(z)
*■

0.00135 209.605
0.00187 21028
0.00256 211.017
0.00347 211.823
0.00466 212.707
0.00621 213.677
0.0082 214.744
0.01072 215.919
0.0139 217216
0.01786 218.651
0.02275 220241
0.02872 222.006
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.606
0.06681 231.346
0.08076 234.421
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.782
0.13567 246.192
0.15866 251.191
0.18406 256.871
0.21186 263.343
0.24196 270.738
0.27425 279.209
0.30854 288.943
0.34458 300.16
0.38209 313.126
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.648
0.5
366.057
0.53983 389.955
0.57926 418.036
0.61791 451.148
0.65542 490.335
0.69146 536.885
0.72575 592.393
0.75804 658.843
0.78814 738.714
0.81594 835.113
0.84134 951.956
0.86433 1094.196
0.88493 1268.128
0.9032 1481.789
0.91924 1745.493
0.93319 2072.535

0
-1.924
-0.663 -1.591
-1.332 -1.186
-1.956 -0.765
-2.509 -0.355
-2.98 0.032
-3.365 0.39
-3.667 0.72
-3.891 1.023
-4.042 1.301
-4.124 1.559
-4.145 1.797
-4.109 2.019
-4.023 2.227
-3.89 2.421
-3.715 2.604
-3.505 2.774
-3.262 2.933
-2.992 3.079
-2.699 3.213
-2.387 3.334
-2.06 3.44
-1.724 3.528
-1.381 3.598
-1.036 3.647
-0.693 3.671
-0.357 3.666
-0.03 3.63
0.284 3.556
0.581 3.44
0.857 3.275
1.111 3.055
1.34 2.771
1.541 2.416
1.713 1.978
1.855 1.448
1.966 0.813
2.046 0.061
2.095 -0.824
2.115 -1.857
2.107 -3.055
2.073 -4.435
2.016 -6.019
1.939 -7.826
1.844 -9.878
1.736 -12.198

4

13
3
25

2
mz)
1.5
0
—
I

/
//
/
/
1

0.5

0
-OJ
-I

/

200 300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

110(1200

Hz)i-\
M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
p = 5.347

Median =366.057 a =300

L=0.45

a2 =0.713

Mean = 500

y = l.0 2

p =0.424

|32 = 2 .6 0 M 0 5

8 = 0.305

EMP =0.8

ERM =-0.25

EQM(z) - 8 ln (w (z )

1)

4

3.5
\

/

3

/

\

2.5

\

—
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\
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1
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EXHIBIT 4 -11(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE X

W

cnoim(z)w(z) -rt EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605
0.00187 21038
0.00256 211.017
0.00347 211.823
0.00466 212.707
0.00621 213.677
0.0082 214.744
0.01072 215.919
0.0139 217316
0.01786 218.651
0.02275 220341
0.02872 222.006
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.606
0.06681 231.346
0.08076 234.421
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.782
0.13567 246.192
0.15866 251.191
0.18406 256.871
0.21186 263.343
0.24196 270.738
0.27425 279.209
0.30854 288.943
034458 300.16
0.38209 313.126
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.648
0.5
366.057
0.53983 389.955
0.57926 418.036
0.61791 451.148
0.65542 490.335
0.69146 536.885
0.72575 592.393
0.75804 658.843
0.78814 738.714
0.81594 835.113
0.84134 951.956
0.86433 1094.196
0.88493 1268.128
0.9032 1481.789
0.91924 1745.493
0.93319 2072.535

3.26
0
0.597 1.518
0.524 0.575
0.079 0.133
-0.553 0.001
-1.255 0.061
-1.956 0.239
-2.613 0.486
-3.201 0.774
-3.705 1.084
-4.119 1.405
-4.441 1.728
-4.671 2.051
-4.813 2.37
-4.87 2.682
-4.848 2.987
-4.752 3.284
-4.588 3.57
-4.364 3.844
-4.084 4.104
-3.757 4.349
-3.389 4.575
-2.986 4.781
-2.557 4.961
-2.108 5.113
-1.646 5.231
-1.178 5.309
-0.711 5.343
-0.252 5.323
0.194 5.242
0.619 5.09
1.019 4.857
1.388 4.53
1.723 4.095
2.019 3.538
2.273 2.842
2.484 1.987
2.649 0.952
2.769 -0.285
2.844 -1.749
2.876 -3.468
2.867 -5.471
2.821 -7.789
2.741 -10.457
2.632 -13.509
2.499 -16.983

4
3.5

3
2.3

ea(z)

/

2
1.3

0
—

/
/
/
/

I
0.3

0
-0.3
-1

200 300
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/

-too 300 600

700
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900

1000 ItIK1200

«<*)-«
M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
11=5.347

Median =366.057

a2 =0.713

Mean = 500

p =0.424

5 =0.305

EMP =0.5

ERM =-0.15

a =300

p2 =2.601-103

L =0.45

y = 1.02

EQ M (z) = 8 -ln(w (z) * 1)

9
g
7
6

-^

/
/

Et(z) 5
4

0

—

3

1

2

1
0
-1
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\

\
\
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W

cnonn(:w (z)

tE A (z ) Ee(z)

EXHIBIT 4-12 (b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XI

Ew (z)

9

0.00135209.605 0
12.138
0.00187 210.28 2.822 7.07
0.00256211.017 3.933 3.926
0.00347211.823 4.003 2.032
0.00466212.707 3.462 0.955
0.00621213.677 2.587 0.41
0.0082214.744 1.557 0.216
0.01072215.919 0.486 0.251
0.0139217.216 0.553 0.437
0.01786218.651 1.515 0.721
0.02275220.241 2.371 1.069
0.02872222.006 3.107 1.458
0.03593h23.97 3.715 1.872
0.04457(226.16 4.193 2.3
0.0548228.606 4.542 2.734
0.06681231.346 4.767 3.17
0.08076234.421 4.873 3.602
0.0968 237.88 4.868 4.027
0.11507241.782 -4.76 4.44
0.13567246.192 4.559 4.839
0.15866251.191 4.273 5.22
0.18406256.871 3.913 5.578
0.21186263.343 3.488 5.909
0.24196270.738 -3.01 6.207
0.27425279.209 2.489 6.467
0.30854288.943 1.936 6.68
0.34458 300.16 1.361 6.839
0.3820S313.126 0.774 6.935
0.42074 328.16 0.187 6.957
0.46017345.648 0.391 6.892
0.5 1366.057 0.952 6.728
0.53983389.955 1.485 6.448
0.57926418.036 1.983 6.034
0.61791451.148 2.438 5.468
0.65542490.335 2.845 4.725
0.69146536.885 3.198 3.783
0.72575592.393 3.493 2.612
0.75804658.843 3.727 1.182
0.78814738.714 3.9 -0.539
0.81594835.113 4.011 -2.59
0.84134951.956 4.062 -5.01
0.864331094.196 4.057 -7.842
0.884931268.128 3.998 -11.133
0.90321481.789 3.891 -14.932
0.919241745.493 3.743 -19.293
0.9331S2072.535 3.559 -24.27
_____ u______1

2.483
-1.342
-3.093
-3.558
-3.248
-2.493
-1.506
-0.425
0.662
1.699
2.652
3.501
4.235
4.85
5.347
5.728
6
6.168
6.241
6.227
6.133
5.97
5.744
5.466
5.141
4.777
4.38
3.953
3.499
3.018
2.508
1.962
1.371
0.721
-0.007
-0.838
-1.801
-2.932
-4.276
-5.88
-7.8
-10.096
-12.834
-16.084
-19.916
-24.404

EA(z )
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Mean =500

p =0.424

8 =0.305

EMP =0.8
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EXHIBIT 4 -13 (b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XU

W

caonn(w(2)->■xEA(2) Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135209.605 0
3.856 3.789
0.00187 210.28 0.85 2.169 0.396
0.00256211.017 1.098 1.173 0.847
0.00347211.823 0.991 0.618 0.856
0.00466212.707 0.688 0.346 -0.61
0.00621213.677 0.287 0.254 0.228
0.0082214.744 0.148 0.276 9.213
0.010722I5.9I9 0.577 0.371 9.667
0.0139217.216 0.976 0.511 1.103
0.01786218.6S1 1.331 0.679 1.505
0.02275220.241 1.633 0.863
1.86
0.02872222.006 1.879 1.056 2164
0.03593 223.97 2.067 1.253 2.415
0.04457 226.16 2.198 1.451 2613
0.0548228.606 2.274 1.647 2759
0.06681231.346 2.298 1.84
2856
0.08076234.421 2.272 2.028 2906
0.0968 237.88 2.201 2.21
2914
0.11507241.782 2.088 2.384 2.883
0.13567246.192 1.938 2.549 2816
0.15866251.191 1.756 2.703 2.719
0.18406256.871 1.545 2.844 2594
0.21186263.343 1.311 2.971 2.445
0.24196270.738 1.057 3.081 2.276
0.27425279.209 -0.79 3.17
2.09
0.30854>88.943 0.514 3.235
1.89
034458 300.16 0.232 3.273 1.677
03820S313.I26 0.049 3.279 1.454
0.42074 328.16 0.326 3.248
1.22
0.46017345.648 0.595 3.174 9.975
66.057 0.851 3.051 9.718
03
0.53983389.955 1.091 2.871 9.444
0.57926418.036 1.311 2.625 9.148
0.61791451.148 1.509 2.305 0.177
0.65542490.335 1.681 1.9
-0.S4
0.69146536.885 1.827 1.398 0.954
0.72575592.393 1.943 0.787
1.434
0.75804658.843 2.031 0.051
1.997
0.78814738.714 2.089 -0.825 2.664
0.81594835.113 2.118 -1.858 3.458
0.84134951.956 2.119 -3.066 4.406
0.864331094.196 2.094 -4.47 5.537
0.884931268.128 2.044 -6.092 -6.88
0.90321481.789 1.974 -7.953 8.468
0.919241745.493 1.885 -10.079 10.334
0.9331S2072.535 1.781 -12.495 12.512
1
_
11 . . , i

4
3J
3

15
EA(z )

2

—
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—
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Lq = .74
EQ M (z) - 8 -ln (w (z) f 1)
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W

EXHIBIT 4 -14(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XIII

cnonn(z)w(z) *■t

EA(z) Ee(z)

0.00135 200.373
0.00187 200.412
0.00256 200.456
0.00347 200-505
0.00466 200.56
0.00621 200.622
0.0082 200.693
0.01072 200.773
0.0139 200.865
0.01786 200.97
0.02275 201.092
0.02872 201.232
0.03593 201.396
0.04457 201.588
0.0548 201.814
0.06681 202082
0.08076 202404
0.0968 202792
0.11507 203.264
0.13567 203.846
0.15866 204.569
0.18406 205.478
0.21186 206.638
0.24196 208.136
0.27425 210.103
0.30854 212.726
0.34458 216.289
0.38209 221225
0.42074 228.209
0.46017 238.324
0.5
253.347
0-53983 276281
0.57926 312.355
0.61791 370.977
0.65542 469.677
0.69146 642.393
0.72575 957.602
0.75804 1559.787
0.78814 2768.969
0.81594 5332.314
0.84134 11096.932
0.86433 24921.912
0.88493 60483.124
0.9032 1.592-103
0.91924 A <7. tn^
0 93319
1.441-10

0
-12.446
-3288 -8.104
-523 -5.047
-6.522 -2.88
2.3
-7.134 -1.332
-7.349 -0221 Ea(z)
1.5
-7293 0.58
o
-7.056 1.16
-6.698 1.579
-6.262 1.881
-5.78 2.097
-5.273 2.249
-4.757 2.352
200 300
400
500
600
700
*0 0
900
1000 110(1200
-4.243 2.417
-3.739 2.454
M-ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
-3251 2.466
H = 5.347
Median =253.347
a =300
L =0.45
-2.784 2.46
2
o '=0.713 Mean =500
p2 = 2 .6 0 l-l0 5
y = 1.02
-2.34 2.438
-1.921 2.401
p =0.424
8=0.019
I
-123 2.352
EMP =0.95 ERM =-0.25 EO M = 1.05 ERA =0.191
-1.166 2.291
-0.831 2219
4
-0224 2.136
3.5
-0247 2.043
3
0.003 1.938
2.5
0.224 1.821
2
0.419 1.692
Erfz)
0.586 1.551
tJ
0
0.729 1.395
1
0.846 1.224
0.5
0.94
1.037
0
1.012 0.833
-0J
1.063 0.61
-1
1.095 0.367
200 300 400 500 600 700
*0 0
900 1000 110(1200
1.109 0.102
1.107 -0.186
M - ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITY
1.091 -0.5
1.062 -0.841
0.08
1.022 -121
0.06
0.973 -1.61
0.918 -2.043
H z ) 0.04
0.856 -2.509
0.792 -3.012
0.02
0.725 -3.552
0.657 -4.131
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LFPR

W

cnonn(z)w(z) f t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605
0.00187 21038
0.00256 211.017
0.00347 211.823
0.00466 212.707
0.00621 213.677
0.0082 214.744
0.01072 215.919
0.0139 217316
0.01786 218.651
0.02275 220341
0.02872 222.006
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.606
0.06681 231.346
0.08076 234.421
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.782
0.13567 246.192
0.15866 251.191
0.18406 256.871
0.21186 263.343
0.24196 270.738
0.27425 279.209
0.30854 288.943
034458 300.16
038209 313.126
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.648
0.5
366.057
0.53983 389.955
0.57926 418.036
0.61791 451.148
0.65542 490.335
0.69146 536.885
0.72575 592.393
0.75804 658.843
0.78814 738.714
0.81594 835.113
0.84134 951.956
0.86433 1094.196
0.88493 1268.128
0.9032 1481.789
0.91924 1745.493
0.93319 2072.535

-1.391
0
-0.518 -1.22
-1.09 -0.931
-1.65 -0-592
-2.16 -0.242
-2.605 0.101
-2.976 0.427
-3.272 0.733
-3.495 1.017
-3.648 1.281
-3.737 1.527
-3.767 1.756
-3.741 1.971
-3.665 2.172
-3.544 2.36
-3.383 2.537
-3.185 2.703
-2.956 2.857
3
-2.699
-2.419 3.129
-2.121 3.246
-1.808 3.347
-1.484 3.431
-1.155 3.497
-0.823 3.54
-0.493 3.559
-0.169 3.55
0.146 3.508
0.447 3.428
0.732 3.306
0.997 3.135
1.24 2.908
1.458 2.617
1.65 2.254
1.812 1.809
1.944 1.27
2.047 0.626
2.118 -0.136
2.16 -1.03
2.172 -2.074
2.157 -3.282
2.117 -4.675
2.054 -6.27
1.971 -8.09
1.872 -10.155
1.76 -12.489

EXHIBIT 4 -15(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XIV
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LFPR

W

EXHIBIT ♦ -16(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE

XIV

cnonn(z)w(z) -pt EA(z) Ec(z)
4

0.00135 209.605
0.00187 210.28
0.00256 211.017
0.00347 211.823
0.00466 212.707
0.00621 213.677
0.0082 214.744
0.01072 215.919
0.0139 217.216
0.01786 218.651
0.02275 220.241
0.02872 222.006
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.606
0.06681 231.346
0.08076 234.421
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.782
0.13567 246.192
0.15866 251.191
0.18406 256.871
0.21186 263.343
0.24196 270.738
0.27425 279.209
0.30854 288.943
0.34458 300.16
0.38209 313.126
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.648
0.5
366.057
0.53983 389.955
0.57926 418.036
0.61791 451.148
0.65542 490.335
0.69146 536.885
0.72575 592.393
0.75804 658.843
0.78814 738.714
0.81594 835.113
0.84134 951.956
0.86433 1094.196
0.88493 1268.128
0.9032 1481.789
0.91924 1745.493
0.93319 2072.535

0
1.37
0.174 0.441
-0.032 -0.018
-0.441 -0.188
-0.94 -0.182
-1.461 -0.07
-1.964 0.103
-2.424 0.312
-2827 0.538
-3.166 0.774
-3.439 1.011
-3.645 1.247
-3.786 1.48
-3.865 1.709
-3.885 1.932
-3.85 2.149
-3.763 2359
-3.63 2.561
-3.455 2756
-3.242 2.941
-2.997 3.115
-2723 3.277
-2.427 3.424
-2112 3.555
-1.784 3.666
-1.448 3.755
-1.108 3.817
-0.769 3.848
-0.435 3.844
-0.112 3.798
0.197 3.705
0.488 3.556
0.758 3.344
1.003 3.06
1.221 2.692
1.41
2.23
1.568 1.66
1.694 0.968
1.789 0.138
1.852 -0.846
1.885 -2.003
1.889 -3.354
1.867 -4.919
1.82 -6.722
1.754 -8.788
1.67 -11.141
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CHAPTER V
A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL WITH NON-NEUTRAL MONEY,
COUNTERCYCLICAL MARKDOWNS AND ACYCLICAL REAL WAGES.
5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I derive the implications of the labor
supply* model of Chapter IV for the behavior of markups and the
real wage.

This is done in two stages; (1) a partial equilib

rium. analysis, which extends the analysis in Chapter IV to the
real wage, and (2) a general equilibrium analysis, utilizing
the flexible-price model of Chapter II.

Neither approach leads to a satisfactory conclusion. The
partial

equilibrium

method

excludes

feedback

from

other

markets in the determination of the real wage, and the results
are somewhat sensitive to the magnitudes of parameters.

The

comparative static employed in Chapter II captures the inter
market relationships, albeit in a static framework, but yields
ambiguous results for the real wage because it abstracts from
magnitudes.

These

modeling technique,

limitations suggest that
e.

a different

g . , computer simulation,

which can

combine the best features of the two methods, might be a more
useful methodology for analyzing this problem.

225
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5.2

A Partial Ecrui 1

ibrium

Analysis

With the model of Chapter IV in hand,
return to the question originally posed

it is time to

in Chapter I and

elaborated in Chapter III: Is monopsony power in this model
sufficiently countercyclical to cause the real wage to be
acyclical

or

weakly

procyclical?

Equivalently,

is

the

markdown of the real wage in the labor market sufficiently
countercyclical to offset the assumed negative elasticity of
the marginal productivity of labor?

The fundamental relationship is the first-order condi
tion for profit maximization by a monopsonistic firm::

w[l + 1/e]

= we =

Fz

(5.1)

where (e - 1) is the degree of monopsony power and 1/e is the
markdown factor applied to Fz. The amount of the markdown is
w/e.

I will

denote

the

real wage

which

condition as w*, and write as an identity

satisfies

w*e s

f z.

this

This may

be expressed in terms of elasticities with respect to money
as:

^m Cw *]

+ rM [e]

=

^[F*]

from which 2^[w*] can be derived.
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It is straightforward to show that:

(5.3)

The expression for ^ [ e ] as a function of the equilibrium real
wage was derived in Chapter IV, and the function was plotted
for various cases.

Also:

(5.4)

The first term in brackets is the elasticity of the marginal
product of labor with respect to employment,

which is the

reciprocal of x\, the total elasticity of labor demand in a
perfectly competitive labor market when output is variable.
This elasticity has been estimated at the industry level by
several investigators, as reported in Hammermesh (1993, Table
3.2) :

Meese (1980)
Symons and Layard (1984)

-1.73
1.54

Layard and Nickell (1986)

-1.19

Burgess (1988)

-1.85

Nickell and Symons (1990)

-1.92

Average

-1.65
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These estimates are based on quarterly data for manufacturing
industries in the U. S. and Britain.
annual data fell in the range of
by Hammermesh.

Estimates based on

-0.50 to

-0.95, as reported

I will assume the value of -1.0, which is the

theoretical value for a Cobb-Douglas output technology, and is
conservative here.

Thus, in Equation 5.2 the first term in

brackets will be -1.

The second term in brackets is the elasticity of profitmaximizing employment I* with respect to a change in money.
For a given optimum real wage w*, monopsony employment is
determined on

the

labor

supply curve

A(w*,n,o2), so this

elasticity is £^[A], which was also derived and computed in
Chapter IV.

Thus, in terms of functions for which numerical

values can be computed, Equation 5.2 becomes:
(5.5)

* i «tO - -*k [A] -*„[«]

(♦)

(-)

The intuitive interpretation of Equation 5.5 is that a
one-time change in money shifts the labor supply curve and
also changes its elasticity at the equilibrium real wage, in
the same direction as the shift (i. e., procyclically.) In the
monopsony case, this changes both monopsony power and the size
of the markdown in the opposite direction (countercyclically) .
To the extent that the money-elasticity of monopsony power

I
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exceeds the absolute value of the money-elasticity of the
marginal product curve, the real wage will be procyclical.
If the elasticities on the right-hand side of Equation 5.5 are
exactly offsetting, the real wage will be acyclical.

For a

perfectly competitive labor market, £^[e] = 0 , and ^M [w*] has
the negative elasticity of the marginal product curve where it
intersects the labor supply curve.

Equation 5.5 was computed for several of the cases in
chapter

IV.

The

computations

through 5-7 at the end of

are

shown

this chapter.

in

Exhibits

5-1

The results are

summarized in Table 5-1.

Computed values of the

money-elasticity of the equilib

rium real wage are shown in the last column of Table 5-1.
In the homothetic Case H-l, the negative elasticity of e adds
to the negative elasticity of F£ to make the elasticity of the
real wage -1.0, which is more countercyclical that it would be
under perfect competition (-0.7) . This is consistent with the
conclusion in Chapter III that that monopsony with homothetic
preferences would make the real wage more countercyclical.
In Case NH-8, corresponding to the benchmark case of Figure 49 in Chapter IV, the real wage is weakly countercyclical with
an elasticity of -0.44. This is less countercyclical than it
would be for a perfectly competitive labor market.
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Table 5—1. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of
Real Wage Behavior

EXHIBIT/CASE

PARAMETERS _____ COMPUTED ELASTICITIES
EMP ERM
-*kCA]a
- 0.7

-

1.0

+ 1.82

- 2.26

-

0.44

+ 3.4

+ 2.06

- 2.1

-

0.04

-.10

+ 4.5

+ 2.7

- 3.0

-

0.27

.1

-.15

+ 3.9

+ 2.36

- 1.92

+ 0.44

3.2

- 2.7

+ 0.50

+ 2.0

- 1.8

+ 0.20

5-1

H—1

.8

-.15

-

0.5

5-2

NH-8

.8

-.15

+ 3.0

5-3

NH-10

.5

-.15

5-4

NH-11

.8

5-5

NH-15

5-6

Lq

— •70

.3

-.10

+

5-7

Lq

=.74

.3

-.10

+ 3.3

5.5

-

+

0.30

EMP = £^[P], ERM = #r[M] . Lq is Che Gini coefficient: of
the distribution of wealth.
All computed elasticities are valued at the mean reservation wage of
$500, where e - 0.65 and the labor-force participation rate is 66%.
The total elasticity of aggregate labor demand is assumed to be -1.

Although the benchmark case of Chapter

IV had

large

positive elasticities for e and A, the magnitude of ^ [e ] was
not quite large enough to offset an assumed value of -1 for r|.
If the average of -1.65 for estimated values of ti were used,
the elasticity of the real wage would be + 0.45.

Thus, the

elasticity

the value

of w*

in the model

is sensitive

to

assumed for ti.

The implied elasticity of the real wage is also sensitive
to the values assumed for the monetary elasticities.
NH-10,

In Case

reducing EMP from 0.8 in the benchmark case to 0.5
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makes the real wage acyclical at an elasticity of -.04.

This

corresponds to a weaker short-run effect of money on the price
level (i. e., sticky prices1.) and a stronger effect on real
labor supply, employment and output.

Case NH-11 shows the

effect of assuming a lower interest-elasticity of money demand
(— .10).

The

real

wage

is

less

countercyclical

than

the

benchmark case.

Case NH-15, with EMP = 0.1, corresponds to a very sticky
price

level

in the

short-run,

which

makes

the

real

wage

moderately procyclical at an elasticity of +0.44. This is not
surprising, since sticky prices with flexible nominal wages
can produce a strongly procyclical real wage in a perfectly
competitive labor market (Romer, 1996) . However, that case is
a model of imperfect competition in the goods market, in which
the

effective

labor demand

curve

is

vertical

and

shifts

against an inelastic labor supply curve. In the present model,
sticky prices would augment the procyclical elasticity of a
shifting labor supply curve. As pointed out in Chapter I, one
of the criticisms of the New Keynesian imperfect competition
models is that they tend to predict strongly procyclical real
wages.

There is an indication here that incorporating sticky

prices in this model would result in a real wage that is only

1Again, sticky prices imply sluggish adjustment in a dynamic setting. Some
degree of price or wage stickiness may be necessary to justify a strong and per
sistent money-output connection. The static flexible-price model of Chapter II
may be deficient in this respect.
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weakly procyclical, which is more consistent with the stylized
facts.

Exhibits 5-6 and 5-7 show that combinations of moderately
lower values for EMP and ERM than the benchmark case can gen
erate a weakly procyclical real wage, for Gini coefficients of
wealth of 0.70 and 0.74.

The conclusion from the foregoing analysis is this model
is capable of exhibiting a real wage that is weakly counter
cyclical, acyclical or weakly procyclical, with the outcome
being parameter-dependent.

In the particular calibration of

of the model shown here, the cyclicality of the real wage was
somewhat sensitive to the assumed values
elasticities ^j[P] and
labor demand,

of the monetary

£*r[M], and the elasticity of aggregate

These elasticities are not precisely known,

and may vary over time.

This conclusion is qualified by the fact that it is based
on

a

partial

equilibrium

framework,

where

any

possible

influences on the real wage from the goods and money markets
have been excluded.

That issue is addressed in the next

section.
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5 -3

A

static General

E q u ilib r iu m

F r -a m e w n r lc

In this section the aggregate labor supply function of
Chapter IV is incorporated into the flexible-price static
general equilibrium model of Chapter II, and the implications
for the behavior of the real wage under monopsony are investi
gated.

The method of comparative statics is employed; this

involves

re-specifying and signing the excess demand func

tions of the model, and deriving comparative static deriva
tives, as was done in

Chapter II.

Appendix B to Chapter II

will be referenced in order to minimize duplication here.

5.3.1

Excess Demand Functions

The revised excess demand functions of the model are:

EDG = cd (z,fl) + id(r,y) + g - y8(w) = 0
EDM * yPrYn1+P - M/P = 0,

(3 > 0, y < 0,

0 < p < 1

(5.6)

EDL = fd (ew) - A(w,/x,a2) = 0

where ya (w) is output, z is disposable income, n is wealth, y
is total income, r is the

interest rate, w = W/P, M

money stock and P is the

price level, all as

is the

defined in

Chapter II. The definition of household wealth in this chapter
includes the present value of transfer payments T/rP, (e. g . ,
unemployment compensation, Social Security, unearned income
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credits and welfare assistance) which establishes a minimum
floor on nonlabor income and corresponding wealth. Thus:
n =

M + K B + T + IT
P
rP
r

0<k< 0

(5 .7 )

Monopsony power is incorporated in the labor market by
specifying the labor demand function as £d (ew) , where
e = (1 +■ 1/e).

This follows directly from the inverse of the

first-order condition for profit maximization, Equation 5.1.
Aggregate labor supply

is the Lognormal distribution

developed in Chapter IV.

form

The dimensionality of flows in the

model is per capita per week, so that A is the proportion of
the labor force that is willing to work a 40-hour week at the
real wage w. I have also defined a more specific aggregate
money demand function with wealth elasticity 1+p, which is
consistent with the specification of increasing relative risk
aversion in Chapter IV2.

5.3.2 Partial Derivatives

Equilibrium profits in the monopsony case are:
ir* = ys (£d (ew),k) - w£d (ew) = ?r*(ew).

Increasing relative risk aversion could also be specified in the goods
market. This would effect the results obtained here only if imperfect competition
were also assumed in the goods market, in which case the elasticity of demand
would be a function of the level of income or wealth.
Since I have assumed
perfect competition in the goods market in order to focus on the labor market,
I employ a standard Keynesian consumption function here. Imperfect competition
with IRRA in both goods and labor markets would be an interesting extension.
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Differentiating

it*

with respect to P, W and r , with subscripts

denoting partial derivatives, I obtain:

(5.8)

(5.9)

*
(5.10)
(-) (+)
Here I have used the fact that in monopsony,
the amount of the markdown.

[y*8 - w] = w/e,

The signs of these three partial

derivatives follow from the fact that £ewd < 0 and ep, ew and
er have the opposite signs of ep < 0, ew < 0 and er < 0, which
are known from the analysis in Chapter IV3
e - Pep is not obvious,

The sign of

but this expression was evaluated

numerically for Case NH-8 and found to be unconditionally
positive, with a value of +5 at the mean reservation wage.
Thus, the effect of an increase in the price
increase the conditional demand for labor.

level

is to

The only diff-

3These signs hold over a relevant range of reservation wages, which
for the benchmark Case NH-8 of Chapter IV, includes wages up to $694 per week
at a labor-force participation rate of 77%.
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erence from Chapter II thus far is that for the monopsonistic
labor market nr* < 0, whereas in the perfectly competitive
labor market of Chapter II, nr* = 0.

These signs enable the partial derivatives of 12, which
contains w/r,to be determined.
0

1 fW . kB + T Wld 1
W w.dT
_
1.n .
- d p * ~ r ? ~ - -rFl -^p2-il^\e - Pep\ > 0 (5.11)

The sign here follows from the sign of

ttp*

and the reasoning

in Chapter II that the real wage bill w£d is much greater than
nonlabor income fromequities, bonds and transferpayments.
Clw =

r

<0

(5.12)

< 0

(5 • 1 3,

All of the psurtial derivatives of a have the same sign as in
Chapter II.

With these facts established, it is possible to sign the
partial derivatives of the excess demand functions and examine
the 3 x 3 matrix of partial derivatives, A, of Chapter II and
Appendix B.

Since the excess demand functions for the goods

market are the same as in Chapter II, there will no change
there, and:
EDGp < 0 ,

EDGr < 0, and E D ^ > 0.
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Inspection of the money demand function reveals that
®yd = Pyp-1B

>0,

via* -

(i+pjn^c > o ,

m^ =

yr^D

<0,

P>o,

B > o.

o < p < l,

y < 0,

c > o

D>0.

These are the same signs as in Chapter II, so the signs of the
partial derivatives of EDM are also unchanged.

EDMp > 0,

EDMj. < 0,

EDM„ < 0.

However, conditions in the labor market are different.

EDL =

£d(ew) - A(w,H,o2)

The sign here appears to be ambiguous, but evaluating the
expression numerically for the benchmark case NH-8 (Exhibit
4—9 in Chapter IV) revealed that EDLp is positive up to an
equilibrium real wage of $600, or a labor-force participation
rate of 73%.
EDLr

vr+T > 300

(5.15)

Here again, the sign appears to be ambiguous, but a numerical
evaluation for case NH-8 of Chapter IV revealed that EDLr is
negative for a real wage above $300.
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(5.16)

Thus, for the benchmark case NH-8, the partial deriva
tives of EDL have the same sign as

in Chapter

IX for an

equilibrium real wage in the range of $300 to $600 per week
(Labor-force participation rates of 34% to 73% in the model.)
Since none of the elements of the A matrix change sign over
that range, most of the comparative static results of Chapter
II also hold over that range, including the stability condi
tions and, more importantly, the signs of
(5.17)

5.3.3 Comparative Static Derivatives

The derivative of primary interest here is dw/dM,

Lpi

dM

dW
P dM
1

W dP
P dM

(5.18)

To derive the sign of this it is necessary to expand
dP/dM and dW/dM and recombine them in the above expression, as
was done in Chapter II.

I will do this for the benchmark case

NH-8 in Chapter IV, and the case of no Ricardian equivalence,
i. e.

k

= l.
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For k = 1, we have from Appendix B to Chapter II:
(5.19)

^

= j ^ j E D G p - E D L r - EDLp-EDG^

Substituting the partial derivatives for each component:

W

‘ pflr{[-(1-C * ' ir ,4 - ^ ] * CaC,n4 <!» [ ,lrer]-Ar]
^

C+-)

c-)

~ [ ^ [ £ew[e “ •
Pep]~*] +

p A m][CQ^*’+ ^rjl

(5.20

Similarly, for dP/dM we have:
jp
m

r O’)

Cr>

(r)

O')

= p]i\\.EDGr 'EDLw - EDLr 'EDGw\
C-)

(5.2D

which upon substitution becomes:

m

" pJXf {Conr

][«e»[e‘' *

^ ] [ ' (1 ' c *

i

+ c n°v]} ( 5 - 22)

Upon subtracting W/P times Equation 5-22 from Equation 5-20,
several terms cancel, and after some reduction I obtain4:

A

The trick here is to collect terms on EDLp and EDGp and recognize
Qp + W ^ as a common factor.
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dw
~5m .

-

1

{ ^ r [ ^ [*-tw[-"ew ~ ep]] p 2 1A!
(r)
+ c„ [«P +

(5.23)

where:
C+). <=)

H

EDGr = cQnr + ir < 0

r ® i c+)
EDLr = l%w[wer\ - Ar < 0
The sign of dw/dM is ambiguous.

This is disappointing, but

not surprising because even in the partial equilibrium setup
the

sign of

magnitudes.

the

elasticity

of

the

real wage

depends

on

In Chapter II, the real wage was unambiguously

countercyclical; here, it is ambiguous, which allows for the
possibility

that

it

could

be

acyclical

or

procyclical,

depending on magnitudes.

In Equation 5.23, the effect on dw/dM of er in EDLr is
positive, and is channeled through a wealth effect on consump
tion, cQd[flp + wfl^, which is diminished by the increase in P
and W.

The effects of ew and ep on dw/dM are negative, and

are channeled through the interest-rate effect on demand,
(cQdnr + ird).

The real wage is more likely to be acyclical

or weakly procyclical if the interest-elasticity of monopsony
power is large relative to the interest-elasticity of demand.
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The general equilibrium approach reveals

interactions

between the goods market and the labor market in the determi
nation of the real wage, which could not be taken into account
in

the

partial

equilibrium

through the interest rate.

analysis.

The

connection

A one-time increase

is

in money

raises the price level and the nominal wage, and lowers the
interest rate.

This causes a decline in wealth, which has a

negative effect on consumption and a positive effect on labor
supply.
supply

With monopsony,
are

linked via

effective labor demand and labor

the

elasticity of

labor

supply

in

marginal cost, ew. The new equilibrium in the labor market is
determined by the M-elasticity of ew as the labor supply curve
shifts out.

With homothetic preferences er *= 0, and

w and

e = [1 + 1/e] are functions of W and P only. Equation 5.23
shows that in this case dw/dM < 0, and in fact, due to the
presence of the term

[-we,, - ep] it is more negative than

under perfect competition.

With increasing relative risk

aversion, however, er is positive over a relevant range of w,
and this brings the positive term cnd [np + wf^] *EDLr into play.
The net effect on dw/dM will depend on relative magnitudes of
the two terms in Equation 5.23.

The method of comparative statics is less revealing when
the signs of total derivatives depend on magnitudes, as is the
case here.
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5.4 Conclusions

A Keynesian model with monopsony power
market,

wealth

effects

in

all

markets,

in the

and

labor

increasing

relative risk aversion in consumer preferences, will have a
causal

connection

between

countercyclical markdowns.

money

and

output

and

exhibit

The behavior of the real wage will

be weakly countercyclical, acyclical, or weakly procyclical,
depending on the strength of the wealth effect in the labor
market,

and the values of monetary elasticities which are

parameters of the model.

These results are broadly consistent

with the stylized facts introduced in Chapter I.

The results are somewhat sensitive to values assumed for
the interest-elasticity and wealth-elasticity of the money
demand function,

and the short-run elasticity of the price

level with respect to innovations in money.

They are also

conditional upon assumed Gini coefficients of 0.45 for the
distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce, and 0.70 for
the distribution of financial wealth in the workforce, values
which have been crudely estimated here.

The model presented in this thesis has not been tested
empirically.

Rejection of any of the following hypotheses

could be considered a rejection of the model as constructed
and described here:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

(a)

In the aggregate, firms have significant market power to

set wages in their industries.

(b)

The

wealth-elasticity

of

the

demand

for

real

money

balances among members of the labor force is greater than
unity.

Alternatively, the wealth-elasticity of the demand for

earning assets (stocks and bonds) is less than unity.

(c)

The Gini coefficient for the distribution of financial

wealth in the workforce is less than 0.80.

(d)

The Gini coefficient for the distribution of nonlabor

income in the workforce is greater than 0.4 and less than 0.60

(e)

The distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce

follows a Lognormal distribution.

(d)

The distribution of financial wealth in the workforce

follows a Lognormal distribution.

(e)

The distribution of nonlabor income (or financial wealth)

in the workforce becomes more unequal during contractions and
less unequal during expansions of the business cycle.
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A final note on the methodology employed in this thesis:
When representative agent aggregation

is not valid,

the

distributions of heterogeneous agent characteristics matter
for the behavior of aggregates.

The method of aggregation

must then incorporate information about those distributions in
the form of sufficient statistics.

In the model presented

here, the sufficient statistics were: The parameters of the
Lognormal distribution of nonlabor income; the wealth elastic
ity of the demand for money; and the wealth-elasticity of the
demand for leisure.

Statistical estimates of these parameters

have seldom, if ever, been made.

One impediment to more

widespread modeling of heterogeneity in economics may be that
we lack the empirical knowledge to do it well.

On the other

hand, econometricians usually try to measure things that their
colleagues regard as

important.

The

research program on

heterogeneous agents is in the early stage of its life-cycle,
and promises to reveal more about what we really need to know
about heterogeneity and the distributions of agent character
istics .

The method of comparative statics which served well in
Chapter II was not very revealing in this chapter.

This is

not a very powerful way to evaluate a model in which the
magnitudes of elasticities of second order are important.

A

computer simulation or Computable General Equilibrium model
might be more useful in future research of this nature.

1
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LFPR
W
cnorm(z)w(z) ♦ t EA(z) Hs (z) Ew (z)
0.00135 216.673
0.00187 218.142
0.00256 219.74
0.00347 221.48
0.00466 223373
0.00621 225.432
0.0082 227.673
0.01072 230.111
0.0139 232.765
0.01786 235.652
0.02275 238.793
0.02872 242.212
0.03593 245.931
0.04457 249.979
0.0548 254.382
0.06681 259.174
0.08076 264.389
0.0968 270.062
0.11507 276.236
0.13567 282.954
0.15866 290.263
0.18406 298.217
0.21186 306.871
0.24196 316.288
0.27425 326.535
0.30854 337.685
0.34458 349.817
0.38209 363.019
0.42074 377.383
0.46017 393.014
410.021
0.5
0.53983 428.528
0.57926 448.665
0.61791 470.576
0.65542 494.418
0.69146 520.361
0.72575 548.59
0.7S804 579J07
0.78814 612.73
0.81594 649.098
0.84134 688.671
0.86433 731.731
0.88493 778.585
0.9032 829.568
0.91924 885.043
0.93319 945.406

0

-2.622
-1.634
-0.94
-0.451
-0.104
0.142
0.317
0.441
0.527
0.586
0.625
0.648
0.659
0.661
0.656
0.644
0.627
0.605
0.578
0.548
0.513
0.475
0.432
0.386
0.335
0.279

- 0.68
-1.079
-1.287
-1.367
-1.36
-1.295
-1.192
-1.066
-0.926
-0.779
-0.631
-0.484
-0.342
-0.205
-0.077
0.044
0.156
0.258
0.351
0.434
0.507
0.571
0.626
0.671
0.707
0.735 0318
0.754 0.152
0.765 0.08
0.769 0.002
0.766 -0.083
0.756 -0.174
0.74 -0.274
0.719 -0.382
0.693 -0.498
0.663 -0.625
0.63 -0.761
0.594 -0.908
0.555 -1.067
0.515 -1.238
0.475 -1.422
0.434 -1.619
0.393 -1.831
0.354 -2.056
0.315 -2.297
0.279 -2.554

-0.536
0.338
0.877
1.188
1.343
1.392
1.369
1.299
1.197
1.075
0.943
0.805
0.667
0.531
0.398
0.272
0.152
0.04
-0.065
-0.162
-0.251
-0.332
-0.406
-0.473
-0.534
-0.589
-0.638
-0.684
-0.727
-0.768
-0.808
-0.849
-0.892
-0.94
-0.993
-1.053
-1.123
-1.204
-1.299
-1.409
-1.535
-1.681
-1.846
-2.033
-2.241
-2.472

HOMOTHET1C CASE

EXHIBIT S-1
0.1

—
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EXHIBIT 5-2 (a)
znorm7AA jncd

ELASTICITY OF ELASTICITY COMPUTATIONS
LOGNORMAL LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION

LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION CALIBRATION
z = -3 .-1 9 - 1.3

a .=300

v =I

0 = 510

at = a 22
02
y

t = 200

r =

02 =9.364* 104

It = ln(a) - .5-cr2

Jtn(r 2 r l)

art

y = l.02

a =0.844

a =0.713
H = 5.347

L = 2-cnonn|-^r] - I

W21

L =0.45

p = .424

n(z) =z

£2(z) = (z2 - l)2Cl2-P )2
p a

Calibrate Mean Reservation Wage
For Nonhomothetic Function

Nonhomothetic Reservation Wage Function

5 =5v*

>|/ = exp(vS) - I g(.w) = ln(w - I)
w (z) = exp(exp(5(p r z -o ))) - 1

MONETARY CALIBRATION
M 2 = 3.439

F = 5.035 A =

Mean = 500

A =0.594

EMP = .8
ERM =-.13
ERA(z) =

EM A(z)

Mean = exp[exp[s-(|t r ,5-<j2) ] ] - I r t
M2 r F

Median = exp(exp(8 -p )) - I r t

EQM(z) .= 5-In(w(z) r I)

A

Median =366.057

^-(-E R M r A (E Q M ( z ) - l » Equation (D5.8)

ERA(z)

X(z) =•

rz
K I(z ) =

-exp

■[(«)’

^2-itaw(z)

ERM

LOGNORMAL DENSITY FUNCTION

1

EMP

cnonn(z)

•

OF NONLABOR INCOME

'2

-3
w (z)
e(z) = X(z)~
cnorm(z)

rz
K2(z) =

G(z).

»

*(__!_)
V2 I \cnoim(z)/

EMA(z)

w - ELASTICITY OF
AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY

-3
EA(z) •= K l(z ) r K2(z)
Ee(z) := -EA(z)

fl(z )

(Equation D5.11)

M-ELASTICITY OF
AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY

-EMP r C (z ) EM A (z) (Equation D6.11)

M - ELASTICITY OF THE ELASTICITY OF
AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY

Ew(z) = Ee(2) - EA(z)
e(z) r I

MONEY - ELASTICITY OF
THE REAL WAGE
znorm7AAjncd
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EXHIBIT 5-2(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VUi

W

cnonn(z)w(z) t tEA(z) Ee(z)

Ew(z)

0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0548
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0.13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0.5
0.53983
0.57926
0.61791
0.65542
0.69146
0.72575
0.75804
0.78814
0.81S94
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

0.885
-0.413
-0.775
-0.588
-0.094
0.551 £
1.251 o
1.945
2.597
3.185
3.697
4.128
4.477
4.744
4.933
5.049
5.096
5.08
5.007
4.882
4.712
4.502
4.259
3.987
3.691
3.376
3.044
2.697
2.338
1.964
1.574
1.162
0.72
0.24
-0.295
-0.901
- 1.6
-2.417
-3.383
-4.533
-5.903
-7.537
-9.478
-11.775
-14.476
-17.631

209.605 0
4.326
210.28 0.886 2.259
211.017 1.008 1.086
211.823 0.692 0.478
212.707 0.145 0.227
213.677 0.505 0.2
214.744 1.177 0.313
215.919 1.821 0.512
217.216 2.408 0.762
218.651 2.919 1.044
220.241 3.345 1.341
222.006 3.684 1.646
223.97 3.934 1.954
226.16 4.098 2.259
228.606 -4.18 2.56
231.346 4.183 2.855
234.421 4.113 3.142
237.88 3.976 3.419
241.782 3.778 3.684
246.192 3.525 3.936
251.191 3.225 4.172
256.871 2.884 4.39
263.343 2.508 4.587
270.738 2.105 4.758
279.209 1.682 4.9
288.943 1.246 5.008
300.16 0.803 5.076
313.126 0.361 5.099
328.16 0.075 5.067
345.648 0.497 4.974
366.057 0.899 4.81
389.955 1.277 4.563
418.036 1.626 4.222
451.148 1.94 3.772
490.335 2.216 3.199
536.885 2.452 2.486
592.393 2.645 1.613
658.843 2.793 0.559
738.714 2.897 -0.697
835.113 2.958 -2.183
951.956 2.976 -3.924
1094.196 2.955 -5.949
1268.128 2.897 -8.292
1481.789 2.806 -10.984
1745.493 2.688 -14.062
2072.535 2.546 -17.563
1

2

\
\

1.6
1.2

0.8

\

0.4
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•10

\
\
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EXHIBIT 5-3

W

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE X

cnonn(z)w(z) x EA(z) Es(z) Ew(z)
+

0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0S48
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0.13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0J
0.53983
0.57926
0.61791
0.65542
0.69146
0.72S75
0.75804
0.78814
0.81594
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

209.605
210.28
211.017
211.823
212.707
213.677
214.744
215.919
217.216
218.651
220.241
222.006
223.97
226.16
228.606
231.346
234.421
237.88
241.782
246.192
251.191
256.871
263.343
270.738
279.209
288.943
300.16
313.126
328.16
345.648
366.057
389.955
418.036
451.148
490.335
536.885
592.393
658.843
738.714
835.113
951.956
1094.196
1268.128
1481.789
1745.493
2072.535

0

0.597
0.524
0.079
-0.553
-1.255
-1.956
-2.613
-3.201
-3.705
-4.119
-4.441
-4.671
-4.813
-4.87
-4.848
-4.752
-4.588
-4.364
-4.084
-3.757
-3.389
-2.986
-2.557
-2.108
-1.646
-1.178
-0.711
-0.252
0.194
0.619
1.019
1.388
1.723
2.019
2.273
2.484
2.649
2.769
2.844
2.876
2.867
2.821
2.741
2.632
2.499

3.26
1.518
0.575
0.133
0.001

0.061
0.239
0.486
0.774
1.084
1.405
1.728
2.051
2.37
2.682
2.987
3.284
3.57
3.844
4.104
4.349
4.575
4.781
4.961
5.113
5.231
5.309
5.343
5.323
5.242
5.09
4.857
4.53
4.095
3.538
2.842
1.987
0.952
-0.285
-1.749
-3.468
-5.471
-7.789
-10.457
-13.509
-16.983

_L

0.667
0.279
-0.4
-0.05
0.553
1.269
2.012

2.731
3.393
3.982
4.488
4.907
5.24
5.49
5.659
5.754
5.779
5.741
5.646
5.499
5.307
5.076
4.811
4.519
4.204
3.871
3.522
3.16
2.786
2.4
1.998
1.577
1.129
0.643
0.106
-0.5
1.197
2.009
2.967
4.106
5.463
-7.08
9.003
11.279
13.956
17.085
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EXHIBIT 5 -4

W

cnorm(z)w(z) tEA(z}£e(z) Ew(z)

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XI

*

O.OOI3S 209.6
0.00187 210.28
0.00256 211.02
0.00347 211.82
0.00466 212.71
0.00621 213.68
0.0082 214.74
0.01072 215.92
0.0139 217.22
0.01786 218.65
0.02275 220.24
0.02872 2 22 .0 !
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.61
0.06681 231.35
0.08076 234.42
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.78
0.13567 246.19
0.15866 251.19
0.18406 256.87
0.21186 263.34
0.24196 270.74
0.27425 279.21
0.30854 288.94
0.34458 300.16
0.38209 313.13
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.65
0.5
366.06
0.53983 389.96
0.57926 418.04
0.61791 451.15
0.65542 490.33
0.69146 536.88
0.72575 592.39
0.75804 658.84
0.78814 738.71
0.81594 835.11
0.84134 951.96
0.86433 1094.2
0.88493 1268.13
0.9032 1481.79
0.91924 1745.49
0 93319 2072.53

0

12.14
7.07
3.93
2.03
0.95
0.41

2.82
3.93
4
3.46
2.59
1.56 0.22
0.49 0.25
-0.55 0.44
-1.51 0.72
-2.37 1.07
-3.11 1.46
-3.72 1.87
-4.19 2.3
-4.54 2.73
-4.77 3.17
-4.87 3.6
-4.87 4.03
-4.76 4.44
-4.56 4.84
-4.27 5.22
-3.91 5.58
-3.49 5.91
-3.01 6.21
-2.49 6.47
-1.94 6.68
-1.36 6.84
-0.77 6.94
-0.19 6.96
0.39 6.89
0.95 6.73
1.48 6.45
1.98 6.03
2.44 5.47
2.84 4.73
3.2 3.78
3.49 2.61
3.73 1.18
3.9 -0.54
4.01 -2.59
4.06 -5.01
4.06 -7.84
4 -11.13
3.89 -14.93
3.74 -19.29
3.56 -24.27

2.48
-1.34
-3.09
-3.56
-3.25
-2.49
-1.5 1
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EXHIBIT 5 -5

W

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XV

cnonn(z)w(z) <-xEA(z]Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0548
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0.13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0.5
0.53983
0.57926
0.617S1
0.65542
0.69146
0.72575
0.75804
0.78814
0.81594
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

209.6
210.28
211.02

211.82
212.71
213.68
214.74
215.92
217.22
218.65
220.24
222.01

223.97
226.16
228.61
231.35
234.42
237.88
241.78
246.19
251.19
256.87
263.34
270.74
279.21
288.94
300.16
313.13
328.16
345.65
366.06
389.96
418.04
451.15
490.33
536.88
592.39
658.84
738.71
835.11
951.96
1094.2
1268.13
1481.79
1745.49
2072J3

1.84
0.53
- 0.12 - 0.11
-0.74 -0.33
-1.48 -0.3
-2.25 - 0.12
-2.99 0.14
-3.67 0.45
-4.26 0.79
-4.75 1.14
-5.15 1.49
-5.45 1.84
-5.65 2.18
-5.77 2.52
-5.79 2.84
-5.73 3.16
-5.6 3.47
-5.41 3.77
-5.14 4.06
-4.83 4.33
-4.47 4.58
-4.06 4.82
-3.62 5.04
-3.16 5.23
- 2.68 5.4
-2.18 5.53
- 1.68 5.62
-1.18 5.67
-0.69 5.66
- 0.21 5.6
0.25 5.46
0.67 5.25
1.07 4.94
1.43 4.53
1.76 3.99
2.04 3.32
2.27 2.49
2.46 1.48
2.6 0.27
2.69 -1.17
2.74 - 2.86
2.75 -4.83
2.72 -7.12
2.65 -9.75
2.56 -12.77
2.44 -16.21
0

0.21

0.38
- 0.1

1.2

0.1

0.67
1.41
2.23
3.03
3.78
4.45
5.04
5.54
5.95
6.26
6.48
6.63
6.69
6.69
6.62
6.5
6J2

0.8
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EXHIBIT 5 -6

W

cnonn(z)w(z) tEA(z) Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135
0.00187
0.00256
0.00347
0.00466
0.00621
0.0082
0.01072
0.0139
0.01786
0.02275
0.02872
0.03593
0.04457
0.0548
0.06681
0.08076
0.0968
0.11507
0.13567
0.15866
0.18406
0.21186
0.24196
0.27425
0.30854
0.34458
0.38209
0.42074
0.46017
0.5
0.53983
0.57926
0.61791
0.65542
0.69146
0.72575
0.75804
0.78814
0.81594
0.84134
0.86433
0.88493
0.9032
0.91924
0.93319

209.6
210.28
211.02

211.82
212.71
213.68
214.74
215.92
217.22
218.65
220.24
222.01

223.97
226.16
228.61
231.35
234.42
237.88
241.78
246.19
251.19
256.87
263.34
270.74
279.21
288.94
300.16
313.13
328.16
345.65
366.06
389.96
418.04
451.15
490.33
536.88
592.39
658.84
738.71
835.11
951.96
1094.2
1268.13
1481.79
1745.49
2072.53

0

2.34
3.13
2.98
2.3
1.34
0.26
-0.83
- 1.88
-2.83
-3.66
-4.37
-4.94
-5.38
-5.69
-5.88
-5.94
-5.89
-5.74
-5.49
-5.16
-4.75
-4.29
-3.76
-3.2
- 2.6
-1.99
-1.36
-0.73
- 0.11
0.48
1.05
1.59
2.08
2.52
2.9
3.22
3.49
3.69
3.82
3.9
3.91
3.87
3.78
3.65
3.48

10.36
5.84
3.08
1.46
0.58
0.18
0.09
0.21

0.46
0.79
1.17
1.59
2.03
2.48
2.94
3.39
3.84
4.28
4.71
5.12
5.51
5.89
6.23
6.55
6.82
7.05
7.23
7.34
7.38
7.34

12
6.94
6.55
6.01

5.29
4.38
3.24
1.84
0.15
-1.87
-4.25
-7.04
-10.3
-14.05
-18.37
-23.3

\

2
1

2.12

1.6

- 1.12
1.2
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EXHIBIT 5 -7

W

NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XVII

cnarm(z)w(z) + tEA(z)Ee(z) Ew (z)
0.00135 209.6
0.00187 210.28
0.00256 211.02
0.00347 211.82
0.00466 212.71
0.00621 213.68
0.0082 214.74
0.01072 215.92
0.0139 217.22
0.01786 218.65
0.02275 220.24
0.02872 222.01
0.03593 223.97
0.04457 226.16
0.0548 228.61
0.06681 231.35
0.08076 234.42
0.0968 237.88
0.11507 241.78
0.13567 246.19
0.15866 251.19
0.18406 256.87
0.21186 263.34
0.24196 270.74
0.27425 279.21
0.30854 288.94
0.34458 300.16
0.38209 313.13
0.42074 328.16
0.46017 345.65
0.5
366.06
0.53983 389.96
0.57926 418.04
0.61791 451.15
0.65542 490.33
0.69146 536.88
0.72575 592.39
0.75804 658.84
0.78814 738.71
0.81594 835.11
0.84134 951.96
0.86433 1094.2
0.88493 1268.13
0.9032 1481.79
0.91924 1745.49
0.93319 2072.53

0
7.42
1.69 4.22
2.29 2.26
2.23 1.1
1.79 0.47
1.15 0.17
0.42 0.09
-0.32 0.15
-1.03 0.31
- 1.68 0.53
-126 0.78
-2.75 1.06
-3.15 1.36
-3.45 1.66
-3.67 1.97
-3.81 2.28
-3.86 2.58
-3.83 188
-3.74 3.17
-3.58 3.45
-3.36 3.71
-3.09 3.97
-2.78 4.2
-2.43 4.41
-2.05 4.6
-1.65 4.75
-1.24 4.87
-0.82 4.94
-0.4 4.97
0.02 4.93
0.42 4.83
0.8 4.65
1.16 4.38
1.49 4
1.78 3.51
2.04 2.88
2.25 109
2.43 1.13
2.56 -0.03
2.65 -1.41
2.69 -3.05
2.7 -4.97
167 -7.2
2.61 -9.77
2.51 -12.73
2.39 -16.11

1.52
-0.81
-1.81
-1.99
-1.69
- 1.11
-0.4
0.36

1.6
1.2

0.8

0.4
-16

EKz)
0

-0.4

1.11

1.82
146
3.03
3.52
3.93
4.25
4.5
4.66
4.76
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLS
NOTE: Partial derivatives are generally denoted by subscripts
A

Jacobian matrix of excess demand functions (Chapters II
and V)

[A[ determinant of A (Chapters II and V; Appendix B)
A
proportion of aggregate wealth held in bonds and equities
(Chapter IV and Appendix D)
proportion of wealth that an individual worker prefers to
hold in bonds and equities.
a

Mean reservation wage; mean of the Lognormal distribution

B

quantity of government bonds held by the private sector;
each paying annual interest of $1 in perpetuity.
variance of the Lognormal distribution

cd

consumption flow demand

6

calibration parameter; elasticity of $

EDX

excess demand function for market X; X = G, M, L

e » e£w

teal wage-elasticity of aggregate labor supply

E

-

[l + 1/e]"1 = l/e

e

=

[1 + l/e]

rx [y]

elasticity operator; elasticity of y with respect to x.

fdstock demand for real asset holdings
fsstock supply of real assets
*(w) cumulative distribution function for reservation wages
9

(z) standardized Normal density function

g(w) inverse reservation wage function = f-1(v) = v
y

coefficient of variation of the Lognormal distribution
254
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li

fixed hours in a work week (40)

H(f, m)

subutility function for stock holdings of real money
balances and risky financial assets

t|

elasticity of demand (labor demand in Chapters IV & V)

tl£

elasticity of demand for leisure (Chapter III and IV)

id

investment flow demand = K d

k

fraction of government bond holdings perceived as net
financial wealth by households.

K

fixed stock of physical capital
demand for labor services

Is

supply of labor services

A(*) Lognormal cumulative distribution function
1( *) Lognormal probability density function
L

Lorenz (Gini) coefficient of concentration.

M

nominal outside money stock

m -

M
P

TtLd = (‘p)rf

stock demand for real money balances

It

log median of A

e

reservation wage

a

Total wealth; financial and transfer wealth.

P

aggregate price level for goods

*■

flow of real profits on capital
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f(v) reservation wage function
r

interest rate on earning assets
Measure of absolute risk aversion = U"/U'

Rr

Measure of relative risk aversion = e u " / u '

p

wealth-elasticity of relative risk aversion, R:

a2

dispersion parameter for A; variance of log w

T

transfer payments to households

ra

base tax rate on income (exogenous)
p

r

endogenous tax rate on income (Chapter II)

minimum reservation wage (Chapter IV & V)
U(c,£) subutility function for consumption and leisure
v

real nonlabor income = V/P

W

nominal aggregate wage rate

v-

£
p

C

elasticity of tjr(v)

y

aggregate real income

y®

aggregate real output (supply)

z =
=

y - r, disposable real income (Chapter II)
(In w - fi)/o (Chapter IV and V)

0 =

i: ratio of bonds to outside money

p
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APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER II
B.l

Differentiation of Excess Demand Functions
(All symbols are defined in Appendix A)

The excess demand functions of the model are:
EDG = c d(z, Q)+ i d(r, y) +g - y s(w) = 0
EDM = m d{ y 3(w) ,z , Q) -m a = 0
EDL = id (w) -la (w, Q) = 0
where household real disposable income is z = y s{w) +
B , and w =W— .
and x — x o +p —
p
Household real wealth is

Q = -^ +
+ —
P
rP
i

, OiKil

Firm Profits are it* - y s(ld(.w) , k) - wtd(w) =x*(w) .
With subscripts denoting partial derivatives:

Then Q F = Q

257
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I also make the standard behavioral assumptions that
0 < c / + i / < l , Cq > 0 ; 0 <nty<l, itird<0, ntQ>0; «d<0,

0, «q<0

Differentiating the model:

CO
EDGP = -

c-)

/

v

°-)

(l-c/-i/)y/ ("71 I + C« Q * < 0

dCJ>
C_>d
EDGZ = cQd Q r + ir
^

<0

. fc-> i

EDGff = - ( l - c f - i y ) y £

<--)
+ Co Q „

>0

To sign EDGp and EDGy, assume (l -cf-iy) > 0 andthat direct
effects of P and W are greater than the
indirecteffectsvia
Q.
Then EDGp < 0 , EDGy > 0 .
EDMP = m/ y / •I— ^ I+

£Z?Afr = /nr + h i q Q

■,
EEM*. = m / y /
<--)

/

fl<■+7 3 - >0
<0

z

t+).to
+ tnQ Q „
„ \ C-)

M «
£DLr = -{q Q j

<0

Cr)

M

C-)

EDLIir= ^ ( ^ - « e ) -«q Q „
EDGXo = -c/,
.EDG_ = +1,

<0

<0

EDMto = EDLXo = 0
EDMa = E D L = 0

EDGH =±c,f.

BDe» ' " ^ C°‘,;

EDMx =(m<?-l)±,

;

BDLh * - ± Y s

EDLB . - - 2 Y %
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The model in total differential form is
c->
c->
<-+■>
EDGr
EDGp
22DG„
0-)
CO
c->
EDMr
EDMV
A-dv= EDMp
CO
Cr)
00
EDLp
EDLZ
£2?L„

Adv

=

Gdu, where:

dP
dr
dW
(Bl)

c a

1
“P Q

- 1r d

-1

Gdu = 0

—

—

rP

co
CQd

X ffd

(1 - m Qd)

-rP e-'s

0

rP

B.2

C*o
dg
dM
dB

Stability Analysis

Assume that the trajectories of the endogenous vari
ables P, r , W in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point
P * , r * t W* cure governed by:
P = k^EDG (P, r. W)
i - k^EDMiP, r, W)
W= k2EDL (P, r, W)
where k1r k2, k 3 > 0 are arbitrary constants. Linearizing the
system (Al) in the neighborhood, I obtain:
CO
CO
, CO
kxEDGp
k1EDGr
k^EDGff
k 1 a12
iai3
*ian
CO
CO
CO
, w
k2 a22
P = kzEDMp k2EDMr k2EDM„
* 2 3 23
2a 21
W
CO
CO
, C
-)
k2EDLp
k3EDLr
kjEDLff
ic3a3i
ka*
3 33
3 a 32
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the system to be
stable in the neighborhood of (P*, r*, W*) are: (RouthHurwicz)
1.

2.

tr fl < 0 which is satisfied
f* <0
ail ai2
^22
frj CO

IPI12

*1 *3

C-)

CO

CO

'll *13
^*3
1: ^3

a 22

a 23

a 32

a 33

IPI1 3

*2 *3

<--)

> 0 for all 1^, k2,k

Gr)

IP I23
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where |P12|>0 is satisfied by signs already assumed.
|/Si2 [ - (EDGP-EDMZ- EDMP‘EDGZ ) > 0 implies

-^1 Iy*-ym <
CO

£+)
(E D G p E D L ff-E D L p ' EDG„) >0.

fpx3f> 0 if
We are free to impose
this condition on magnitudes, and it implies
dW ,
s dW 1
4P Ir*~ym
ap I*"-**
t+)
CO
|P23|>0 if (EDMr E D L ff-E D L Z ' EDMV) >0.
an magnitudes implies
dW ,
N
dr 1,d-<'
co
3 *

IPl <0

,

<0

Imposing this condition

dW
dr
e)

Cr>

<0

CO

CO

CO

CO

CO

&•)

IP I= kj^k^ [(£DGp •EDMZ•EDLW)+ (EDLp'EDGr'EDM„) + (EDMp'EDLr'EDG„\ 1
A
B
C
.
,

,

.

to

c=0

c+)

CO

C->

CO

CO

C-)

Cr\

-klk2k2[(EDLp'EDMT'EDGtf)+(EDMp'EDGz'EDL„) + (EDGp-EDLz'EDMU)]
D

£

F

The signs B>0, D<0 and F<0 pose a potential problem.
Stab
ility requires that the contributions of these terms to j P|
be offset by other terms. B and E have EDGr in common.
B-E < 0 iff:
CO

CO

CO

to

EDGZ[EDLp ‘EDMff - EDL„ •EDMP] < 0
CO

or

CO

EDLp

EDMp

EDL m

EDMw

CO

co

°r
G-)

<*■)

C and F have ED Lr in common, and C -F < 0 iff:
to

(*)

0)

C-)

EDLr [ EDMp* EDGy -

C-)

EDGP*EDMy]

< 0

which implies
dWi
CO

.
?

dW|
’tfp\yd-y‘
<*)

Finally, A and D have EDMr in common, and it follows from
the previous stability requirement |B13| > 0 that A -D < 0.
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Alternatively, it follows from |*231 > 0 that A-F < 0, and
if B-E <0 it must also hold for stability that C-D < 0, or:
£*)
«
c->
c+)
c-)
EDG„[EDMp'EDLr - EDLp-EDMr] < 0
EDMP
^ EDLP
EDM'
EDL.
C-> r

C-} r

°r

"h !
> "il
«
ft)
In addition, it easy to show that

-^ply<*.y' < 0

ionally. With these sign conditions,
Routh-Hurwicz condition is met.

uncondit

|*|< 0 and the third

To summarize the stability conditions:
cu

» < - f l.«. < - f I
< -f U..
(A
Cf)
(t)
In W-P space (dr=0) the slope of the money market equilib
rium locus is greater than the slope of the goods market
locus, which in turn is greater than the slope of the labor
market locus. All three slopes are positive.
(See Figure B-l(a))
dw,

dw,
~dr d~t*

L~)

c-'k

In W-r space (dP=0) the slope of the labor market equilib
rium locus is greater than the slope of the money market
equilibrium locus. Both slopes are negative.
(See Figure B-l(b)). It is also true that:
dW,

- dW |
c-)

but it is not an imposed stability condition.

(iii)

<

C+)
C+>
In r-P space (dW=0) the slope of the labor market equilib
rium locus is less than the slope of the money market locus.
Both slopes are positive. (See Figure B-l(c)). The following
also holds but is not an imposed stability condition:
dr i
~ dP

^

dr ,
< ~[p \H<lf

(*)
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W

Figure B-l.

Equilibrium Locii for the three markets:
Goods, Honey and Labor
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These three conditions, along with the conventional
assumption that 0 < (c/ + iy) < 1 and EDGp < 0, EDGy > 0, are
sufficient for stability of the linearized system (Al) .
B.3 Comparative Static Analysis of Ooen-Market Operations
A one-time purchase of bonds for outside money is
specified by: dM = - ,

dt0 = d g = 0.

Applying Cramer's Rule

to (Al) and using the co-factor expansion of the determinant
along the substituted column vector, I obtain:

-

(a)
[EDMr•EDLW-EDLr•EDM„] +

caf(1-K)

(A2)

- Ir i /
*

d

vi

(l-K ))

ri -

i

-p Cq (!-K)

<--■>

c**

^

00

[ EDGz 'E D Lw-E D L z ‘EDG tr]

<--)

C->

&)

[EDGr 'EDMff-EDMZ •EDG„ ]

Stability condition (i) guarantees that (a) > 0, and so
> 0 unconditionally. It is evident that
dM
minimum when k — l, a maximum when k — 0.
dr
"

dM

is a

1 \ rl d
®
13
TU t Cq (1'k) [B0
Sfi>--E“v--E^Di..-E^CW*] *
(A3)
r 1 /
\1
^ ^(r)
^
+ -^ (i-J B fd -K ))
[ EDGp 'E D L U- EDLP •EDGW]

(d)
ri _
-

Cq ( ! - X )

i

m

&■)

w

/

[ EDGP'EDMff-EDMp 'EDG„] V
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Stability condition (i) guarantees that (b) > 0, (c) > 0,
and also implies (d) < 0 , so it appears that the sign of
—

CtM

might depend on the value of k.

For

k

=1,

uM

<

0.

Expansion of (A3) and cancellation of terms produces the
result that for 0 _lic.il:

%

■

<0

dW _ 1 ^
- -± cQd (1-k)
dM ~ "|a[ j
cr)

o)

c-)

[EDMP•EDLr- EDLP•EDMr ] +
(£)
C-)

-

(1-K>)

<r)

0)

C-)

[EDGp‘EDLZ- EDLP ‘EDGZ] +
(flO

+

r1 *

l

c~>

c~>

&)

c-->

/

[EDGp 'EDMX- EDMp 'EDGZ ] >

^
CA4)
(e) < 0 from stability condition (iii) and this results in a
dW

negative contribution to — . Terms (f) and (g) are unamdM
biguously > 0 and make a positive contribution to -§r- •
dM
If k
1 , only (f) has an effect on
and
>0 .
dM
dM
For k -1 ,
>0 .
dM
-

Expanding (A4) and cancelling terms produces the
result:
=

] [- ca( 8 , ■'V <1 -K))- i ^ l 1 '"’o' <1-*>
1

C~)

-«o[Qr-»-in/(l-K) ]EDGp
«

+

(r)

Q-)
(1-K) EDMpt

> 0,

OiKil
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B.A

Non-Neutralit.v Results

Real Wage
d P vft

dx , n

dw ^ n

Q ( p) _ _1
dM

Expanding

dM

and

d(— \

dM

, it can be shown that, if

<~)

<--)

because Q p +
Q = - Ji f
p p if
p[ p
—

rP

k

=

P dM
1,

6-1

1 < o.

J

The real wage declines, i.e.,

-^ <
By subtracting
W P
dM
W dP
from —
within each corresponding co-factor expansion,

it can be proven that —d'

J L <o0

provided that - ^ | ydmy, s

for 0 < Ki 1 unambiguously,

L«.m* i. e.,

the wealth

effect in the money market is not less than the wealth
effect in the goods market.
Real Wealth
Frtr. „ _ ,

to
dQ_Q

C-) & 6-) ^
d P . Q dr q dW ,n

HQ
is not obvious even for k = 1, but by
dM
expanding the derivatives and collecting terms one obtains

The sign of

-=p-

the result that Q i
P 4 r + Q r - x < 0 , which makes
dM
dM
for the case k - 1:

dM

<0

and,

HQ
The sign of — ^ depends only
dM
on the basic behavioral assumptions i / < 0 , { £ < 0 , { * > 0 and
the stability conditions which guarantee that |A| < 0 .
Since Q P + - | Q „ = - - | [ ^ + ^ L
p
p
w
p [p
rP
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Finally ,

*

s

.

Expanding this expression, collecting and cancelling terms,
X find that
> 0
(?)

labor supply increases due to the wealth effect, even though
—

has declined. Since the labor market always clears in

this model, id=ts and the new equilibrium is at a higher
level of employment and output. A causal connection between
money and output is established via a wealth effect on labor
supply.
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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

Cl. Monopsonistic Labor Markets in Search Equilibrium

The search theory of

labor markets differs

from the

static supply-demand model in two fundamental ways:

(1) an

emphasis on matching workers to job vacancies, implying that
the relevant labor supply to a firm is the number of workers
rather than worker-hours, with individual labor supply assumed
to be fixed; (2) the assumption that firms set wages (or make
wage offers)

which workers

either take or reject1.

This

literature also deals with markets which are in a state of
adjustment in which disequilibrium trading takes place.
(1958)

pointed out that,

Arrow

in the absence of an auctioneer,

price-setting necessarily defaults to agents and price-setting
is the de facto exercise of market power.

Thus,

dynamic

monopsony power is implicit in most disequilibrium search
models of the labor market.
The

sources

of

monopsony

power

in these

models

are

typically asymmetric information and unequal trading costs.
Participants in the labor force have imperfect information
about the existence and location of job vacancies and/or the

1Howitt and McAfee [1987] and Howitt [1988] describe search models in which
wages are determined by bargaining between workers and firms. The equilibrium
solution of the bilateral monopoly is indeterminate unless an arbitrary surplussharing rule is introduced (McDonald and Solow [1981]. The monopsony model
investigated, here could be generalized by introducing a sharing rule that is
endogenous and procyclical with respect to labor's share.

267
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distribution of wage offers by firms.

Trading opportunities

can

a

be

improved

through

search,

at

cost

of

household

resources, including time and foregone wages.
The existence of a marginal cost-benefit tradeoff

in

search models implies an optimum search or stopping rule.
Prospective hires are imperfectly informed and will turn down
wage offers that cure too low relative to their expectations.
Individual firms seeking to expand employment find that they
cam. increase the rate of new hires by raising their wage
offers, i. e., in these models, firms have dynamic monopsony
power

over

the

flow

adjustment process.

of

net

hires

during the

Thus, firms are able to

employment

regulate the

flow of new hires and quits, and consequently the level of
equilibrium employment, by raising or lowering their nominal
wage offers.

The supply-side response is determined by the

wage-elasticity of labor supply, in or out of equilibrium.
In Mortensen's (1970) seminal model, the long-run labor
supply curve is perfectly elastic, but the equilibrium real
wage is less than the marginal product of labor by the cost to
the firm of financing the marginal cost of hiring one more
worker.

Thus Mortensen's model retains a markdown in equilib

rium, but one that is smaller than in the static monopsony
case2.

2

In a timeless static model, financing the marginal labor cost is out of
the question so it must be included in current expenditure flow, i. e., the
incremental higher wage is paid to all employed workers in the absence of wage
discrimination.
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Diamond [1971] showed in a consumer random search model
that if profit-maximizing sellers fully exploit their informa
tional advantage against consumers, the optimum price for all
sellers in equilibrium is the static monopoly price.

Although

this model deals with monopoly power, the equilibrium result
can be

carried over to the

case of pure monopsony

by

a

symmetrical construction in which firms as buyers of labor
services have more information or lower trading costs than
workers.
Baily [1975] showed that the stationary solution to the
intertemporal optimization problem of the representative firm
with dynamic monopsony power is similar to the static monopso
ny equilibrium, with a markdown W/ed where W is the stationary
wage and ed is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply to
the firm3.

In fact,

countercyclical monopsony power

is

implicit in Baily's model, although Baily did not point out
this feature.

The operative assumptions of Baily's model are:

(a) the firm is a price-taker in both the goods and capital
markets ; (b) the firm can increase its flow supply of labor
services by raising its relative wage offer according to a
recruiting function (dL®/dt)/L8 = g(W) , g' > 0; (c) there are
decreasing returns to successive wage increases in recruiting
labor, i. e. g" < 0; and (d) firms maximize profits.

3This result was- confirmed by Pissarides [1976, Chap. 4, p. 56].
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Baily derives the optimum dynamic wage-setting path as:
PF* =

W[1 + 1/ed]

(Cl.l)

Here PF^ is the marginal revenue product of labor, W is the
money wage, ed = Wg'/(r-g) is the dynamic elasticity of labor
supply, g is the recruiting function and r is the intertemp
oral discount rate.
is W/ed

Along the adjustment path the markdown

and the corresponding measure of dynamic monopsony

power is l/ed.
In Baily's model, monopsony power varies with employment
due to the properties of the recruiting function g(W) .

since

the value of g is positive in expansions, negative in contrac
tions and zero in steady-state employment,

countercyclical

monopsony power is possible in Baily's model,
state output and employment,

with steady-

g = 0, and the elasticity of

labor supply in steady-state equilibrium is:4
€ss

It is

*

W*g'(W*)/r

(Cl.2 )

straightforward to show

in Baily's model

that

&(ed) r the elasticity of ed with respect to the wage, will be
positive

along the optimum adjustment path from one steady-

state equilibrium to another, if and only if:
^wCg'] =

|Wg"/g'|

<

(1 + ed)

(Cl.3)

This result holds also at the equilibrium wage W* where
g(W*) = 0 . Thus, a second-order constraint on the recruiting
function g(W), restricting the rate of diminishing returns, is
4

Baily*8 steady-state solution to (Cl.l) is identical to that of Mortenson,
with the implicit steady-state elasticity of labor supply equal to W*g'(W*)/r,
where K is the steady-state wage.
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required to ensure procyclical elasticity of labor supply in
equilibrium5. The

important conclusion from Baily's paper is

that monopsony power, or a wage markdown, is retained in longrun equilibrium and monopsony power in equilibrium can be
procyclical.
Another

approach

to

making

market

power

endogenous

exploits externalities from trading in thin and thick markets.
Diamond [1982a], Pissarides [1976, 1988] and Andolfatto [1996]
developed search equilibrium models in which the returns from
trade depend on the volume of trading, e. g, the number of job
vacancies or the number of workers searching.

The market

coordinating mechanism is search and trading by agents in lieu
of an auctioneer.

The steady-state equilibrium

level

of

employment is supported by an underlying search process.
These models can have multiple equilibria as a conse
quence of increasing returns in the search technology,

and

typically

are

have

Keynesian

equilibrium models.

features

even

though

they

The labor market is modeled as a bilater

al monopoly, with bargaining power over wages shared between
firms and workers in inverse proportion to their relative
trading costs.

Monopsony would be the case where workers have

significantly higher trading costs than firms; monopsony power
would be cyclical if the cost ratio depended on the labor

5These results were derived by the author from Baily*8 steady-state
equations. They are mentioned here because similar relationships will be found
in the heterogeneous reservation wage model presented in Chapter IV.
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force participation rate.

This potential source of cyclical

monopsony power is not utilized in this thesis.

C2. Elasticity of Labor Supply in the Standard Monopsony Model

The individual labor supply function is derived from the
solution to the consumers' consumption-leisure choice prob
lem6 s
Max

U(c, £)

subject to Pc + W£ < Y =
c > 0,

0 < £ < T,

V + WT

(C2.1)

V > 0

where U is a quasi-concave utility function, c is the quantity
of a composite consumption good with price index P,

£ is

leisure time with nominal wage price W, and Y is the sum of
the individual's endowments of nominal nonlabor income V and
the value of total time T in the period.
solution to (C2.1)

The

interior

yields Marshallian demand functions for

consumption and leisure as functions of prices and income:
C d = Cd (W, P, V)

(C2.2)

£d = £d(W, P, V)
Because the budget constraint in (C2.1) is linear and continu
ous , these demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in
W r P and V.

Euler's Theorem applied to leisure demand gives:

6Thls basic exposition follows Killingsworth (1983)
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(C2.3)

The homogeneity property

also

implies

that

only

relative

prices matter, and using the product price P as numeraire we
may express the demand for leisure in real terms as:
£d = £d (w, 1, v)

=

where w = W/P and v = V/P.

£d (w, v)

(C2.4)

Without loss of generality, I will

set T = 1 and interpret £d as the fraction of time spent in
nonmarket activities each period.

Individual labor supply is

then the mathematical complement to leisure demand:
(C2.5)

£s(w, v) = 1 - £d (w, v)

With the behavioral assumptions made thus far and the
functional

form of

U(c,£)

unspecified,

the

partial derivatives of the demand equations
ambiguous.
consumption

If we
and

assume,
leisure

as
are

is

signs
in

commonly done,

normal

goods

and

of

all

(C2.2)

are

that
are

both
gross

substitutes, then

acd/a v > o, a£d/a v > o, acd/aw > o,

and e£d/a p > o.

If we make the additional assumption, also commonly done, that
substitution effects dominate income effects in both consump
tion and leisure, then it follows from the Slutsky equation
that

a *d/aw < o, a*d/a p > o, acd/aw > o,

and acd/a p < o.

These additional assumptions imply a negative sign for the
wage-elasticity of leisure demand:
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Since labor supply is the mathematical complement of leisure
demand,

its

corresponding

first

partial

derivatives

have

opposite signs from leisure demand and its wage-elasticity is
unambiguously positive: e£w > 0.
Without making

additional

specifications,

the

second

partial derivatives of the demand functions are ambiguous.
Ordinarily this

is

of

little concern

in the

analysis

of

consumer demand and labor supply, but in the present instance
we are interested in the direction of endogenous change in
€jgw r which is a second order effect.

If, however, we make

the additional (and crucial) assumption of homothetic prefer
ences, then the signs of all second partial derivatives can be
determined.
First, a homothetic utility function U(c,£)

implies a

linear income expansion path and Engel curves that are rays
through the origin, i. e.,

the income elasticities of leisure

demand and consumption are unity.
of substitution Ujg/Uc = W/P

Second, the marginal rate

is constant along any

income

expansion path; this in turn implies that the point elastici
ties of the demand functions of
respect to changes in income alone.

(C2.2) are invariant with
Thus, shifts in consump

tion and leisure demand due to changes in real income alone,
with relative price W/P constant, will be iso-elastic, i. e.,
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3(nv)/5v

“

3(i\g)/dv

=

8(nc)/dv = 0

This, however, will not be the case for labor supply,
mathematical complement of leisure demand.

the

From (C2.5), the

elasticity of labor supply is related to the elasticity of
leisure demand as follows:

€Zw - [--- — jrijg > 0

(C2.7)

(l-£d)

Partial differentiation of (C2.7) with respect to v gives the
result:

de = - -ld . 5*le _
*\z
TTv
(l-£d)
(1-ld)

dld
~5V
(1 -ld)

> Q

(C2.8)

The positive sign follows from the homotheticity property
which makes dr\/dv = 0, the assumption that r\z < 0, and that
leisure is a normal good.

This result can also be obtained by

differentiating eZw directly7:

7The homotheticity assumption enables all second partial derivatives of the
demand equations to be signed. Euler's and Young's theorems and the
property of unit income elasticity can be used to derive for labor supply:
32£s/aw2 < 0 , dz2s/dvz a

0, 32£s/3v3w > 0

These signs, along with those of the first partials, can be used to obtain the
result in (C2.9). The corresponding first partials of £d have the exact opposite
signs.
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Ps

d2l3

di3 dla

dwdv

ZE 1ZE 1 > o

(C2.9)

(€S)2

The positive sign is determined by the fact that 5£s/5v < 0
and 82£8/3vdw > 0 .
The economic
individual

with

interpretation of de/dv
high

nonlabor

income

> 0 is that an

occupies

a

higher

indifference curve and therefore has higher absolute demands
for both consumption and leisure.

With homothetic preferenc

es, the wage-elasticity of leisure demand is constant along
any income expansion path, but the wage-elasticity of labor
supply increases with income because the total available time
T in the period is fixed and the desired ratio of leisure time
to work time increases with income.
In Equation (C2.7), r\2 is constant but the ratio
ld/ (l - £d) increases with v, resulting in e2w increasing with
v.

Since v is the only shift variable in £a(w,v) and dla/dv

< 0, a decrease in v is associated with an outward shift of
the labor supply function and an increase in employment and
output. Thus, in the standard setup with homothetic prefer
ences,

e2v is always countercyclical, implying that monopsony

power will be procyclical and the real wage will be counter
cyclical in the standard monopsony model.
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APPENDIX D TO CHAPTER IV

Dl.

The Reservation Wage Function

The properties of the reservation wage function

(v) are

inherent in the utility function and the budget and hours con
straints of the consumer's problem.

Since

assumed to differ only in their endowments,
same reservation wage function.

consumers

are

they share the

The function V in Equation

(4.2)) is continuous and twice differentiable in (v, o») due to
the standard assumptions about U0 = U(v, 1) and Ui = U(v -t- &>h,
1-h) .

Also,

note

that

dV/do> =

^ 0.

Thus

the

implicit function theorem applies, and the implicit function
for

the

reservation

wage

a

=

Differentiating Equation (4.2)

^(v)

can

be

investigated.

(and dropping the terms with

arguments h and 1-h which are constants) yields the result:
(Dl.l)
and solving (Dl.l) for da/dv:

dv

~

h [ W J"

1

> 0

(D1.2)

The inequality in (D1.2) follows from the fact that U0
and Uj are strictly concave and

(v + ah)

> v for a > 0.
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Equation (D1.2) also follows from the fact that U„ and U, are
concave and therefore have decreasing absolute risk aversion
(Hall, Lippman & McCall [1979],

Ch. 7).

It has been long

established in the labor market search literature that if the
individual

utility

function

has

decreasing

absolute

risk

aversion (DARA), the reservation wage increases monotonically
with nonlabor income v or wealth 0 (Danforth, 1979)1.
The derivable

properties of if are functions of the first

and second partial derivatives of U0 and ty.

The elasticity

of ^ is:
dU0
> 0

Since ifr is monotonic,

it has an inverse function if'' = g(u)

with elasticity ^,[g(«) ] = l/£.
(4.6)

(Dl.3)

It is evident from Equation

in Chapter IV that elu and £ will be inversely related.

If d£/dv > 0, then de/dv

< 0 and a decline in v, which is

necessary for the

supply

increase

labor

curve to

shift

out,

will

which will then be procyclical.

In a context of job search with uncertainty, a utility function with
DARA implies a declining absolute risk premium for the choice of an
uncertain income stream from job search as nonlabor income or wealth
increases. Although uncertainty and search dynamics are not being modeled
here, the relative risk aversion, or concavity, of U(c,£) plays a role in

determining de&j/dv; see below.
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The first derivative of the elasticity £ is:

(Dl.4)

from which it can be seen that the sign of \p" is pivotal to
the sign of £*.

Differentiating Equation (D1.2) yields:
dU' r d2U° , _

dU<> r 3 2 u 1 ,

"3FL' 3 ^ ' J

“5c" Tv^c*

=

(Dl.5)

and since
dzUQ
dvdc

dZUo

- a"
- °°

< n
<o

and
d2U,
dvdc
then (D1.5) can be written:

(Dl.6)

Equation (D1.6) can be rearranged to yield the following rela
tionship :
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(f

) ^ (C7i)

"

Rk(Uo)

< > 0

=

r

(D 1 .7 )

U S

1

where R* (U) = -U"/U' is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk

aversion.

The

sign

of

Equation

(D1.7)

depends

on

cardinal utility measure and is ambiguous without specifica
tion of a functional form for U(c, I) .
For a general concave utility function with decreasing
relative risk aversion (DARA), the most that can be said about
0(v) is that it is positive and monotonically increasing with
v.

For the class of homothetic utility functions it is easy

to show that

—

arbitrary constant,

t/v,
and

f — 1, ^(v) = kv where
0"

=

0;

in

that

verified from Equation (D1.4) that £' = 0 .

case

k

is an

it can

be

Thus, the assump

tion of homothetic preferences implies a linear reservation
wage function \j/ with constant elasticity £ everywhere.
Inspection of Equations (D1.4) and (D1.7) reveals that
utility

functions

that

are

more

concave

functions will have \pu > 0 and £ 1 > 0 ,

than

homothetic

with opposite signs

prevailing for utility functions that are less concave.

If

0, then the elasticity of 0(v) will be changing with v,
and will have an effect on e*H via £J,[g] that will be due only
to nonhomothetic preferences.
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D 2 . Non-homothetic Preferences and Relative Risk Aversion

A closely related measure of concavity is the relative
risk aversion Rr (U) = U"v/U'= vR*. which is also the elasticity
of the marginal utility of income. In terms of relative risk
aversion. Equation D1.7 becomes:
*(*o)
v

r

(D2.1)

For a homothetic utility function Rr is constant for all
values of c and I, i.e., the elasticity of marginal utility is
constant everywhere.

In the special case of log utility,

R* = 1 and it can be shown by substitution in Equation (D2.1)
that

- 0, and also from Equations (D1.3) and (D1.4) that

£ = 1 and therefore £' = 0 .

This corresponds to the reserv

ation wage function fa in Figure 4-2, which is representative
of all homothetic utility functions.

Thus, the assumption of

homothetic preferences rules out any dynamic effect of £, the
elasticity

of

the

reservation

elasticity of labor supply.

wage

function,

on

e,

the

This result is consistent with

the conclusions of Chapter III.
If the utility function is not homothetic, then Rr will
be either increasing or decreasing with v, and from Equations
(02.1) and (01.4) ,
or negative.

and £' will be correspondingly positive

In either case, the change in £(v) will have a
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corresponding effect on e£w. Thus, the operative implications
of

nonhomothetic

preferences

for

the

elasticity

of

the

reservation wage function can be reduced to the assumption of
whether R r is increasing or decreasing with income in the
worker population2.

D3. Relative Risk Aversion and Procyclical cJu

Arrow

(1970)

showed that a utility

function must be

bounded from above and from below in order for lotteries to be
consistently ranked according to their Expected Utility, and
for a bounded utility function:3

lim Rr (U(x )) < 1
X -* 0
Equation

(D3.1)

and

implies

lim Rr (U(x )) > 1
X

that

•

only

(D3.1)

00

two

possibilities

are

consistent with the Expected Utility Theorem: constant or
increasing Rr.

The constant case is homotheticity with

f" = 0 which has already been considered.

If utility is

assumed to be nonhomothetic with increasing Rr, then it is
evident from Equations D2.1 and D1.4 that tjr" > 0 and

>0.

2

Preferences could be heterogeneous across workers, or all workers
could have identical nonhomothetic preferences. The relevant heteroge
neous property which determines the sign of
is relative, or proportion
al., risk aversion.
3A bounded utility function precludes an infinite utility measure
far arbitrarily large lottery payoffs, which would invalidate the Expected
Utility Theorem. See Arrow (1970).
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Since g' [g(o>) ] = l/£r it then follows from Equation (4.6) in
Chapter IV that de/dv < 0f and a decline in v which causes the
labor supply curve to shift out will also be accompanied by an
increase

in

the

elasticity

of

labor

supply.

This

corresponds to reservation wage function fa with £'
Figure 4-2.

case

> 0 in

Arrow points out that increasing Rr is consistent

with empirical findings that the wealth elasticity of the
demand for money balances is at least unity.

Thus, one possible source of procyclical elasticity of
labor supply would be nonhomothetic preferences with increas
ing relative risk aversion (IRRA) .
risk

premium

decreases

component

more

than

of

the

With increasing R*, the

reservation

proportionally

with

wage

nonlabor

function
income,

causing the elasticity of aggregate labor supply to increase
as the labor supply curve shifts out.
The remaining possibility, decreasing relative risk
aversion,

corresponding to reservation wage function fa i-n

Figure 4-2, can be eliminated on the basis of (D3.1), and the
empirical estimates that the wealth-elasticity of the demand
for money balances is not less than unity.

D4. Conditions on Preferences for Procyclical e»H

By differentiating the expressions for RA and R*, it is
straightforward to show a that a utility function U(x) which
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has decreasing R* and increasing R* must: satisfy the double
inequality:

(D4.1)

or, in elasticity terms:
0 < [rx[C7"] - rx[t7']] <

i

(D4.2)

The set of utility functions {U(x)> which satisfy (D4.1) and
(04.2)

will have monotonically increasing reservation wage

functions with elasticities that increase with nonlabor income
v r creating a procyclical influence on the elasticity of labor
supply in Equation

(D4.6)4.

An example of such a utility

function, due to Pratt (1964), is:

U(x) - -expf-p*1(x + 0)p],

0 < p < l,

0 >0

(D4.3)

For the case 0 = 0, RA = [ x p + (l-p)]x‘1 which is decreasing in
Rr = [3CP + (1-p) ] which is increasing in x, with nearly
constant elasticity p when x is large.

Sfith increasing R r , the income-elasticity of the demand for leisure
(and consumption) increases with income; thus the income-elasticity of
labor supply, the complement of leisure demand, decreases with income, and
conversely.
Thus with increasing R r , a decline in nonlabor income
increases the elasticity of labor supply.
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5. Shift of the Aggregate Labor Supply Function

The Lognormal labor supply function is:

(D5.1)

Partial differentiation under the integral sign:
W
-ijzX(wjdw <0

because £z^(z)dz=0

(D5.2)

W
A„z = —ij.|[z2 - l]X(hr)dw

(D5.3)

= 2^I[Z2'1]^(Z)dZ { < o \ z i o

(DS-4)

Here I employ the transformation z =

(In w

- n)/a which

enables the substitution of the standardized normal density
<p(z) for X(w) . This convention will be maintained throughout.
An increase in P due to an open-market purchase reduces
ft but not a2. (See Section 4.4.2)
operation necessarily reduces
wealth held in the risky asset
through

the

nonhomogeneous

A,

However,

an open-market

the proportion

(bonds)

portfolio

of total

and this reduces o2
adjustment

process

described in Section 4.4.3 and Appendix Section 07 below.
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It also follows from the portfolio balance relationship that
S U * 2] > 0, so a decline in r reduces A and thereby a2.
Thus P f directly through dp/dP, and r, indirectly through
(da2/dA) (dA/dr) ,

will shift and compress the aggregate labor

supply curve.
The partial elasticities £p[A] and

[A] of A are derived

below.

(D5.5)

The price-elasticity of A is:

z
An

increase in P

increases aggregate labor

(05.6)

supply

at all

reservation wages.
The interest-elasticity works through A and a2:

z
jlz2-l]<p(z)dz
(DS.7)
N ( Z |0,1)
For the Pratt IRRA utility function in Equation D 4 .3, the
elasticity ^[o2] was found previously to be +2 (l-p)2/p2or2.
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*r[A] is the interest-elasticity of A in the portfolio
balance relationship, and is related to the interest-elastici
ty and wealth-elasticity of the money demand function, as will
be shown in the following development.
dA r _ r F? + Or(Fo-A)
~5r ~A Ali

(D5.8)

where F*1 and M*1 represent the demand for risky financial assets
and money balances, respectively. Here I maintain consistency
with the specifications of money and asset demand in Chapter
II, Section 2.1, i. e . , M*1 = Md(y,r, Q) and
F*1 = Fd(y,r,Q,..), so that there are wealth effects in both
demand functions.

Note that changes in r can affect A in two

ways: a substitution effect Frd, and a wealth effect
Qr(Ffld - A) .

The following identities also apply:

A O = F d, F d =-M?,

F£=l-/f2,

= -(±~A) , J^r = -A

Substituting these identities and rearranging terms results in
the following expression for

[A]:

= ( ^ ) [ ~ ^ CWd]+A

Thus

£*r[A]

can

be

expressed

r0[Md] -1

exclusively

> 0

in

(D5.9)

terms

interest- and wealth-elasticities of money demand.

of

the

£v[A] can

be evaluated numerically for given values of A and these two
elasticities. Note,
thetic, ^q CM*] =

however,

that if preferences are homo-

- 1, i. e.,asset demand elasticities
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are constant with respect to scale.

In that case, there is no

wealth effect on A, and:
=

grr[A]

M d]

(D5.10)

the magnitude of which is considerably less than one.
The macro variables P and r are affected by changes in
the stock of money.

In the model of Chapter II, it was found

that dP/dM > 0 and dr/dM < o unambiguously, and that an openmarket purchase of bonds was non-neutral.
labor supply function A

If the aggregate

were to be imbedded in that model,

it would have a total money-elasticity as follows:

I'z<p(z)dz
][dP M

,1) J[dMP

(D5.il)

(z2-l)<p(z)dz
. (1-P)2[I
N(Z10,1)

\BA r 1 dr M
/3F a JwdM r.

This expression can be evaluated numerically for given values
of p r <r, and the elasticities on the right-hand side.
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D6.

Endogenous Change in Labor Su p p Iv Elasticity

The real-wage elasticity ofaggregate labor supply is:

e =

= e(

(D6.1)

which shows that the elasticity of A is equivalent to its
relative density.

The partial derivative of e with respect to

one of its parameters x is:
d (Xw)
de _
ix "

dA
dx c lx
— a— ' e ~ r

(D6.2)

For x = ftz

z<p(z)dz
(06.3)

I
z -

de

N( z |0,1)

For x = o2:
d(Xw)
do2
(D6.4)
dA
d^
T ~

W(Z|0,1)
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I

[zz-l]<p(z)dz

de = e \
(zz - 1) da2
2a2!

(D 6 .5 )

N(z\o,l)

The sign of the right-hand side will depend on the value of z,
and the expression will have to be evaluated numerically.
The change in elasticity due to an increase in P at a
given wage is through ft only:
3e

3e / - 1 \

J P ~ Jjx\ P I
(D6.6)
z<p{z)dz

e -z + i
N ( z |0,1)
~oP

A

reduction

in fi due to an

unambiguously.

increase

<0

in P will

reduce

e

There is no effect on the dispersion parameter

a2 from P.
The price-elasticity of e is, from (06.6)

Z(p{z) dz
I
S’
pCe] = a{~Z+ tf(z|0,l) } < 0

(D6.7)

Upon comparing Equations (D6.7) and (D5.6), it is evident
that:
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2>[e] =-«'P[ A ] - £
Since

(D6.8)

[A] > 0, an increase in the price level alone

will increase e only at large negative values of z , well below
the median [i.

There is, however, another channel through a2.

The elasticity of the distribution will be increased in a
region about the log median if the kurtosis of the density
function X(w)
ters.

is decreased by a change in the shift parame

The kurtosis of the Lognormal density function is an

increasing function of o2 only5.

Thus, a decline in the log

variance a2 will increase the relative density of X(w) in the
vicinity of fi, which will increase elasticity there.
variance and skewness of X(w)

(The

will also decrease with

a

decline in o2.)

From Equation (D6.5):

I1

[z2-l]p(z)dz

Km

= -i (**-!>

NTzT0,i)

^ 2 T dA r
2(1 —
-p)
7 ?
1 dir A

(D6.9)

and comparing this with Equation D5.7, it is evident that:

5The kurtosis yz *
+ 15“2 +• 16) where “2 = exp(a2) — 1.
A decline in o2 reduces the kurtosis of the Lognormal density function.
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^ r [6] = - g r [ A j + (1-^ ) 2 (z2- l ) g r CA3

Finally, the total money-elasticity of e, with respect to
a one-time open-market purchase,

is derived from Equations

(06.7) and (D6.9) as:

.1

z<p(z)dz

z

+•

__

N(z 10,1) *»[*]
(D6.10)

X . 10,1)

I* ™ !* ™

Like Equation (D5.ll), this expression can be evaluated for
given values of the elasticities on the right-hand side.
Comparing Equation (D6.10) with Equation (D5.ll) reveals
that:
«HCe] =-^ m C A ] - f|^[P]]
* _ s.

[A]

^ _ (l-p ) z( z z~ l )
£z—
W^)—

(D6.ll)

For a non-neutral open-market operation the elasticity
&m (PI is positive and less than one, most likely greater than
0.5.

is the elasticity of proportional demand for

risky assets in Tobin's portfolio balance model of Keynesian
liquidity preference (Tobin, 1958). (See Chapter IV, Section
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liquidity preference (Tobin, 1958). (See Chapter IV, Section
4-4 and Figure 4-5) .

This elasticity will be determined by

the particular utility function assumed to represent prefer
ences,

but

can

be

calculated

from

Equation

(D5.9)

given

empirical estimates of the interest-elasticity and wealthelasticity of money demand, and A, the share of risky assets
in financial wealth.

The third elasticity,

just the reciprocal of

(dr/dM) (M/r) is

.

Given plausible values for these three
Equations

(D5.ll)

numerically
standard

for

Normal

and

calibrated
density

function N(z|0,l),
aversion.

D7-

(D6.10)

or

(D6.ll)

parameters

function

<p(z)

elasticities,

can be evaluated

of

A(w|n,a2) ,

and

the

distribution

and p, the elasticity of relative risk

This is done in Chapter IV, Section 5.

onfc-iimim Portfolio Balancing with Increasing R r

This section follows the analysis and relies upon
proofs in Arrow (1970) and Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) . It is
included to provide a more rigorous support of the discussion
in Section 4.4.3.
An individual with an endowment of wealth nQ at the
beginning of a time period can hold it in either earning
assets f which provide an uncertain periodic return R, or in
riskless money balances m which provide no return. The return
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R = r + r/re -1
Here, 1/r is the current price of the risky asset and l/re is
the

expected price

at

the

end of

the

period.

Individual

preferences for wealth and its components m and f are de
scribed by a concave utility

function H(Q) .

It will be

assumed here that H(Q) has decreasing absolute risk aversion
[d/3G(H"/H')

<

0]

[3/3Q(HwG/H') > 0].

and

increasing

Thus,

relative

risk

aversion

individuals are risk-averse and

prefer to diversify between f and m.
Since wealth at the end of the period is uncertain, the
individual desires to choose a portfolio allocation between f
and m that will maximize his/her expected utility from wealth
at the end of the period.

The consumer's problem in the asset

market is:
Max ECHCQ,)]
a

= E[H(l-a)0o + a(l+R)G0)] = E[H(0o(l + aR)) ]

0 < a < 1
Where the expectation E

is with respect

to

the uncertain

return R. The only decision variable is a, and the constraint
f

+• m

=

0o is

incorporated

in the

substitution

for

.

Differentiating E[H] twice with respect to a gives the firstand second-order conditions for a maximum:
F.O.C.

E[H'(G0(l + aR)R0o]

S.O.C.

E[H"(0o(l + aR)R2G2]

=

0
<0
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The second order condition is satisfied by the concavity of H.
The first order condition equates marginal utilities of f and
m

at the

optimum;

this occurs when the marginal rate of

substitution between f and m equals their price ratio, which
is

(1 + R ) .

The standard setup with

indifference curves

tangent to budget lines is shown in Figure 4-5 (a) and (b) in
Section 4.4.3.
The first-order condition gives the optimum a* as an
implicit function of no and R, and we may write a* = a(H,r) .
(With static, regressive expectations, re = r = R) .

Implicit

differentiation of a* with respect to r in the first-order
condition gives:
da- = _ E[H"
dr

> Q

(D7>1)

E[Hn [r2n2]

The denominator of D7.1 is the negative second-order condi
tion.

Arrow (1970; Appendix [4]) proved that the numerator is

positive if H has decreasing absolute risk aversion

(RA) ,

which has been assumed here. It follows that £*r[a*] > 0, and
a reduction in r reduces a*, the optimum portfolio share of
the risky asset.
Implicit differentiation of a* with respect to nQ gives:

da*
dfl0 =

E{Hn [ m 0 + a*r 2n 2] ]
?
E[H,fr2nl]

(D7-2>

The denominator of D7.2 is the negative second-order condi
tion,

and Arrow

(op.

cit.,

Appendix

[5])

proved that the
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numerator

is

negative

if H

has

increasing

relative

risk

aversion (Rr) (which has also been assumed) , and zero if H has
constant relative risk aversion, i. e., if H is homothetic.
It follows that if H is homothetic,

a* is independent of

wealth and is the same for all wealth-holders, and since
dza*/drdQ = 0 , portfolio share adjustments to changes in r will
be homogeneous over wealth-holders.

But with increasing Rr,

2^[a*] < 0, and the optimum portfolio share a* will decline
with am increase in 0 at a constant interest rate r.
be shown that increasing

Rr

implies that d2a*/dQ3r >

0 .

It can
so that

the marginal rate of substitution between f and m increases
with wealth.

Thus,

portfolio adjustments

in response

to

changes in r will not be homogeneous over wealth-holders.
In response to an open market operation, which reduces Q
and r,

bond-holders

with

increasing Rr will

reduce

their

portfolio shares allocated to bonds proportionally to their
wealth.

Since wealthier bond-holders hold a lower percentage

of their wealth

in bonds

to begin with,

their

portfolio

rebalancing actions will reduce their bond income v more than
proportionally.
than

Relative nonlabor incomes will decline more

proportionally,

compressing

the

dispersion

distribution.
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Applying the elasticity operator ?Q to v = ra*ft, remem
bering that a* = a(ft,r), yields the relationship:
= { ^ [ ^ ] [ l + ^ r [ a * ] ] } + { ^ [ n ] [ l + ^ Q[ a * ] ] } < 0

(D 7.3 )

The first term on the right is the substitution effect of a
change in r due to a change in aggregate M, and is always
negative.

The second term is the wealth effect of a change in

aggregate M.
the

wealth

If preferences are homothetic,
effect

is

only

the

effect

of

[a*] = 0 and
a

proportional

reduction in earning assets, which is also negative on v, but
homogeneous over bond-holders.
aversion,

With increasing relative risk

[a*] will be negative but greater than -1; the net

wealth effect on v will still be negative, but not as large,
because a reduction in ft will increase a* somewhat.
not apparent

from this

equation

is that,

with

What is

increasing

relative risk aversion, the substitution effect will be much
greater at higher values of ft and v due to the increasing
concavity of the utility function, i. e. 2^[a*(ft,r)]

is an

increasing function of ft, and a* and v will decline more than
proportionally, i. e., d2a*/dndr > 0. This causes the wealth
expansion path to have a decreasing slope, as shown in Figure
4-5(b), Section 4.4.3
Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) , following Arrow (1970) and
Pratt (1964), proved the following:
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(1) The absolute value of risky asset holdings increases
(decreases) with wealth if absolute risk aversion
decreases (increases) with wealth.
i. e., 2o[f] > 0 if and only if H has decreasing RA
(2) The fraction of risky asset holdings increases
(decreases) with wealth if relative risk aversion
decreases (increases) with wealth.
i. e., £fc[a*] < 0 if and only if H has increasing

Rr.

As pointed out earlier in Sections D2 through D4 of this
Appendix,

a utility function with increasing relative risk

aversion

is

nonhomothetic

in

a

systematic

way

that

has

important implications for both the consumption-leisure and
portfolio balance choices.
With increasing Rr , ^[a*] > 0 and ^[a*] < 0, A reduction
in r, the (expected) rate of return on bonds,

induced by an

open-market operation will lower the reward/risk ratio for all
bond-holders,

but wealthier ones with higher relative risk

aversion will reduce their bond allocations proportionally to
their wealth.

Since these wealthier investors hold a lower

percentage of bonds in their portfolios,

their actions will

result in a reduction in v{ = ra,-Q{ that is more than propor
tional to the value of v,- prior to the open-market operation.
This

will

compress

the

distribution

of

v,

reducing

the

variance of its logarithm, a2. The loss of bond income, which
will be proportionally larger for wealthier workers, can be
interpreted as a risk premium paid to reduce risk, one which
increases with wealth.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES
Abraham, K. and Haltiwanger, J. (1995) . Real wages and the
business cycle, J. Econ. Lit., 33., (Sept) 1215-1265
Ackley, G. (1961) , Macroeconomic theory, Chap. 1, MacMillan &
Co., New York
Aiyagari, s . R. and Gertler, M. (1 9 8 5 ) , The backing of
government bonds and monetarism, Journal of Monetary
Economics,16,19-44
Aitchison, J. and Brown, J.A.C. (1963) The Lognormal distribu
tion, Cambridge University Press.
______ , (1954) On criteria for descriptions of income
distribution, Metroeconomica, 6, 88-107
Akerlof, G. (1982) Labor contracts as partial gift exchange.
Qtly. Jr. Econ., November, 543-69
Akerlof, G. and Yellen, J. (1985) A Near-rational model of the
business cycle with wage and price intertia. Qrtly. Jr.
Econ., Suppl. 100:823-38
Akerlof, G. and Yellen, J. (1986) , Efficiency wage models of
the labor market, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Anderson, L. and Jordan, J. (1980) , Monetary and fiscal
actions: A test of their relative importance in economic
stabilization, Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
November 1980, 11-23.
Andolfatto, D. (1996), Business cycles and labor-market
search, Am. Econ. Rev., 86, 1, March, 112-132
Applebaum, E. (1979) The labor market, In A guide to PostKeynesian Economics, A. Eichner, (ed.) M. E. Sharpe,
New York,
Arrow, K. J . , (1958) Toward a theory of price adjustment. In
The allocation of economic resources. P. Baran et al,
(Eds.) Stanford Univ. Press.
___________ , (1970) Essays in the theory of risk-bearing,
Markham Publishing Co., Chicago.
Atkinson, A. B. (1983) The Economics of inequality,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, England
299

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

300
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R. (1985) Collusion over the
business cycle, NBER Working Paper No. 5056, NBER,
Cambridge, MA.
Baily, M. N., (1974)
Wages and employment under uncertain
demand. Rev. Econ. Stat., January 37-50.
___________ , (1975) Dynamic monopsony and structural change,
Am. Econ. Rev. 65, 2, June, 338-349
Ball, L. and Romer, D. (1990)
neutrality of money. Rev.
203; reprinted in Mankiw,
Keynesian economics, Vol.

Real rigidities and the non
Econ. Studies, 57 April 183G. and Romer, D. (eds.) New
I, MIT Press, 1992

Barro, R. (1974)
Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? J. Pol.
Econ., 82, 6 1095-1117.
________ , (1976)
Reply to Feldstein and Buchanan
Econ., 84, 2, 343-49.

J.

Pol.

_____ ,(1977) Unanticipated money growth and unemployment
in the United States. Am. Econ. Rev., 67, March 101-115
Barro, R. and Grossman, H. (1971) A general disequilibrium
model of income and employment. Am. Econ. Rev., 61, 1
March 82-93
______
, (1976), Money, employment and
inflation, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, England
Barsky, R. , Salon, G . , and Parker, J . (1994). Measuring the
cyclicality of real wages: How important is composition
bias? Qtly. Jr. Econ., 109, 1, February 1-26
Baxter, J. and King, R. (1993) Fiscal policy in
equilibrium. Am. Econ. Rev., 83, June, 315-334

general

Ben-Porath, Y. (1973).
Labor-force participation rates and
the supply of labor, Jr. Pol. Econ., 81, 697-704.
Bergstrand, J.H., Cosimano, T. F., Houck, J.W., and Sheehan,
R.G. (Eds.) (1994). The changing distribution of income
in an open U.S. economy, North Holland, New York.
Bemanke, B. S., (1986), Alternative explanations of the
money-income correlation, Carnegie-Rochester Conference
on Public Policy, Brunner, K., & Meltzer, A. (Eds.)
Autumn, 49-100.
Beroanke, B. and Blinder, A. (1988) Credit, money and aggre
gate demand, Am. Econ. Rev., 78, May, 435-57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301
Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1995) Inside the black box: The
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. Jr. Econ.
Persp., 9, (4) Fall, 27-48
Bernheim, B. D. (1987) Ricardian equivalence: An evaluation
of theory and evidence, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1987;
MIT Press,
Bils, M., (1985) , Real wages over the business cycle: evidence
from panel data. J . Pol Econ., August 666-689
_______
, (1987) The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and
Price. Am Econ. Rev., 77, 5, December.
_________ ,(1989) Pricing in a customer market. Qtly .Jr.Econ.
November, 699-718
Blanchard, 0.,(1986).
Comment on Efficiency wage theories:
A partial evaluation, L.F. Katz, NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, 1986, 288-9
____________ , (1990). Why does money affect output? A survey,
Chap 15 in Handbook of monetary economics, Vol I I . , B. M.
Friedman & F.H. Hahn (eds.), Elsevier Science.
Blanchard, 0. and Fischer, W. (1979) . Lectures on macroecon
omics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Blanchard, o. and Kiyotaki, N. (1987) Monopolistic competition
and the effects of aggregate demand. Am Econ. Rev., 77,4
September.
Blinder, A.S. (1974) . Toward an economic theory of income
distribution, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Boal, W. M. and Ransom, M. R . , (1997) Monopsony in the labor
market, Jr. Econ. Lit, 35, l, March, 86-112
Borch, K. (1969) A Note on uncertainty and indifference
curves, Rev. Econ. Studies, 36, 1-4
Branson, w. (1989). Macroeconomic theory and policy,
3rd. ed., Harper Collins.
Brunner, K. and Meltzer, A. (1993) Money and the economy:
Issues in monetary analysis. Cambridge Univ. Press.
Buchanan, J.M. (1976)
Barro on the Ricardian equivalence
theorem, Jr. Pol. Econ., 84, 2, 337-42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

302
Buiter, Willem H. (1991) Debt neutrality, redistribution and
consumer heterogeneity: A survey and some extensions,
Chap. 4 in Money, macroeconomics and economic policy:.
Essays in honor of James Tobin, W. C. Brainard,
W. D. Nordhaus and H. W. Watts, (eds.), HIT Press.
Burgess, S. (1988) Employment adjustment in UK manufuacturing.
Econ. Journal, 98, 81-103
Cagan, P. (1989) Monetarism, in Handbook of Monetary Economics
B. Friedman and F. Hahn (eds.) North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Canzoneri, M. (1977) The returns to labor and the cyclical
behavior of real wages: the Canadian case. Rev. of Econ
& Stat., January.
Champernowne, D. G. (1973), The distribution of income between
persons, Cambridge University Press.
Chatterji, C. and Sparks, R. (1991) Real wages, productivity,
and the cycle: An efficiency wage model. Jr. Macroecon.,
13, (3), Summer. 495-510.
Chick, V. (1983) Macroeconomics after Keynes, Chap 7,
132-158 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Christiano, L. J. and Eichenbaum, M. (1992) , Current real
business-cycle theories and aggregate
labor-market
fluctuations, Am. Econ. Rev., 82, 3, 430-450
Clower, R. W. (1985) . The Keynesian counter-revolution: A
theoretical re-appraisal, in The theory of interest
rates, Hahn, R. and Brechling, H. (eds.)
MacMillan &
Co., London
Cohen, D. (1985), Inflation, wealth and interest rates in
an
intertemporal optimizing model, Jr. of Mon. Econ., 16,
73-85.
Coleman, Thomas S. (1984). Essays on aggregate labor market
business cycle fluctuations, unpublished Ph.D. Disserta
tion, University of Chicago, 1984.
Cook, T. & Hahn, T. (1989), The effect of changes in the
Federal funds rate on market interest rates in the
1970's J. Mon. Econ., 2 4 , November, 331-351.
Cross, G.(ed.) (1988) Worktime and industrialization,
Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia.
Cross, G . (1989) A guest for time, Univ. of California
Press, Berkely, CA.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

303
Danforth, J. P. (1979) . On the role of consumption and
decreasing absolute risk aversion in the theory of job
search, in Lippman, S.A. and McCall, J.J. (Eds.) Studies
in the Economics of Search, North-Holland, 109-131.
Dankert, C., Mann, F., & Northrup, H.
Harper & Row, New York.

(1965) Hours of work,

Dantbine, J, Donaldson, J. B. and Smith, L. (1987), On the
super-neutrality of money in a stochastic dynamic
macroeconomic model, Jr. of Mon. Econ.,20,475-499.
Davidson, P. (1994) Post Keynesian Macroeconomic Theory,
Edward Elgar, Vermont
Deaton, A. (1992)
Understanding
Press, Oxford Univ. Press.

consumption,

Clarendon

Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980) Economics and consumer
behavior, Chap. 11, 283-290. Cambridge Univ. Press.
Diamond, P. (1971)
A model of price adjustment, Jr. Econ.
Theory, 3, June, 156-68
Diamond, P. (1982a) Aggregate demand management in search
equilibrium, Jr. Pol. Econ., 90, October, 881-894
Diamond, P. (1982b) A search-equilibrium approach to the
microfoundations of macroeconomics, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Diamond, P., and Stiglitz, J. (1974) Increases in risk and in
risk aversion, Jr. of Econ. Theory, 8, 337-360
Diaz-Gimenez, J . , Quadrini, V. and Rios-Rull, J. (1997).
Dimensions of inequality: Facts on the U. S.
distribution of earnings, income and wealth, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Spring, 3-21.
Dornbusch, R. & Fischer, S. (1978) Microeconomics, McGrawHill, New York
Dunlop, J. T. (1938)
The Movement of real and money wage
rates, Econ. Journal, 48, 191, September 413-34
Ehrenberg, R. G. (1971)
Heterogeneous labor, the internal
labor market, and the dynamics of the employment-hours
decision. Jr. of Econ. Theory, 3, 85-104
Ehrenberg, R. & Smith, R. (1991) Modern labor economics,
Fourth Ed., Harper-Collins.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

304
Eichenbaum, M . , and Single-ton, K. (1986) Do equilibrium real
business cycle theories explain postwar business cycles?
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol 1, 91-134, S. Fischer,
(ed.) MIT Press.
Eichenbaum, M . , Hansen, L. and Singleton, K. (1988) A timeseries analysis of representative agent models of
consumption and leisure choice under uncertainty.
Qt ly. Jr. Econ. 103, (1) February, 51-78.
Eichner, A. S. (1973)
A theory of the determination of the
markup under oligopoly. Econ. Journal, 83, 22, 1184-1200
______________ _,(1979)
(Ed.) A guide to Post Keynesian Economics, M. E. Sharpe, New York
____________ , (1985). Toward a new economy: essays in PostKeynesian and institutionalist theory. M.E.Sharpe, NY
,(1991)
The macrodynamics of advanced market
economies. M. E. Sharpe, NY
Feldstein, M. S. (1969) Mean-Variance analysis in the theory
of liquidity preference and portfolio selection,
Rev. Econ. Studies, 36, 5-12.
_______________ , (1976) Perceived wealth in bonds and Social
Security: A comment, Jr. Pol. Econ., 84, 2, 331-36.
Feige, E. & Pearce, D. (1976) . The substitutability of money
and near-monies: A survey of the time-series evidence,
J. Econ. Lit., 15, 439-69.
Fischer, S. (1972) Assets, contingent commodities, and the
Slutsky equation, Econometrica, March.
_____ ______, (1977) Long-term contracts, rational expectations, and the optimal money supply rule. Jr. Pol. Econ.
85, February 163-190.
___________ , (1979) , Capital accumulation on the transition
path in a monetary optimizing model, Econometrica,47,
No. 6 1433-1439,
____________,(1988), Recent developments
Econ. Journal, 98, June, 294-330.

in macroeconomics,

Fisher, F. (1969) The existence of aggregate
functions. Econometrica, 37, 4 October.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

production

305
Friedman, B. M. (1995)
Does monetary policy affect real
economic activity? Why do we still ask this question?
NBER Working Paper, No. 5212, August
Friedman, J. W. (1977) Oligopoly and the theory of games,
North Holland, Amsterdam.
Friedman, M. W. (1953) . Choice, chance, and the personal
distribution of income, Jr. Pol. Econ., 61, 273-209.
______________ , (1979) . The demand for money: some theoreti
cal and empirical results, J. Pol. Econ. 67, 327-51.
Friedman, M. and Schwarz, A. (1963) A monetary history of the
United States: 1867-1960. Princeton Univ. Press
Gali,

J. (1996)
Technology, employment, and the business
cycle: Do technology shocks explain aggregate fluctua
tions? NBER Working Paper, No. 5721, NBER, Cambridge.

Geweke, J. (1986) The superneutrality of money in the United
States: An interpretation of the evidence. Econometrica,
54, 1-22.
Gibrat, R. (1957) On economic inequalities, International
Economic Papers, 7, 53-70, (Translated from French)
Goldfeld, S. M. (1973) The demand for money revisited,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, #3, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
_____ ________ , (1976) The case of the missing money. Brookings papers on economic activity. No. 3 The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D. C.
Gramlich, E., & Kalchbrenner, J. (1970) A constrained
estimation approach to the demand for liquid
assets,
Special Studies Paper No. 3, Division of
Research & Statistics, Federal Reserve Board, Washington,
D. C.
Guasch, J. and Weiss, A. (1980) Adverse selection by markets
and the advantage of being late. Qtly Jr. Econ., 94,
453-466
Haberler, G. (1952)
The Pigou Effect once more , Jr. Pol.
Econ., 60 June 240-252
Hafer, R. & Hein, S. (1979)
Evidence on the temporal
stability of the demand for money relation in the
United States", Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis
Reviev, Dec. 61 (12), 3-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

306
Hall,

J . , Lippman, S., and McCall, J. (1979).
Expec-ted
utility maximizing job search, Ch. 7 in Lippman and
McCall (eds.) Studies in the Economics of Job Search,
North-Holland

Hall, R. E, (1980) Labor supply and aggregate fluctuations,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
No. 12, 1980, 7-33. North-Holland, Amsterdam
________
, (1986) Market structure and macroeconomic fluctuations. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1986, 2 ,
285-32, Brookings Institution. Washington D. C. Reprinted
as
Chap. 15 in N. 6. Mankiw and D. Romer (eds.) New
Keynesian Economics, Vol. 1, 387-424, The MIT Press, 1991
___________,(1988) The relation between price and marginal
cost in U.S. industry, Jr. Pol. Econ., 9 6 , 5, 921-947.
____________ ,(1991), Labor demand, labor supply, and employ
ment volatility, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 17-47, MIT
Press.
Hall, R. E, and Taylor, J.,(1986) Macroeconomics, Norton & Co.
Hamburger, M. (1966), The demand for money by households,
money substitutes and monetary policy, J. Pol Econ.,
1966, 7 4 , 4, 600-623.
____________ , (1977) . Behavior of the money stock: Is there
a Puzzle? J. Mon. Econ., July, 3 (3), 265-88.
Hammermesh, D.
Press.

(1993).

Labor demand,

Princeton University

Hansen, G. 0. (1985).
Indivisible labor and the business
cycle, Jr. Mon. Econ., 1 6 , 309-527.
Hansen, G. D. and Wright, R. (1992) The labor market in Real
Business Cycle theory. Qtly Rev., Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, 2 - 1 2 .
Hart, 0. D. (1975), Some negative results on the existence of
comparative statics results in portfolio theory,
Rev. Econ. Studies, 4 2 . , 615-21.
Heckman, J. (1984). Comments on the Ashenfelter and Kydland
papers. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, #21, 209-224, North-Holland.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

307
Heckman, J. and Sedlacek, G. (1985) Heterogeneity, aggrega
tion, and market wage functions: An empirical model of
self-selection in the labor market. J . Pol. Econ., 93,
6, December, 1077-1125
Hicks, J. (1937)
April 1937.

Mr. Keynes and the classics. Econometrica,

Hinrichs, K., Roche, W. & Sirianni, C.,(1991) Working time
in transition. Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia
Hoehn, J. G. , (1982)
Monetary aggregates as indicators of
general economic activity, Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas , November, 1-11.
Howitt, P. (1988) Business cycles with costly
recruiting. Qtly. Jr. Econ., 147-165

search and

Howitt, P, and McAfee, R. (1987), Costly search and recruit
ing, Intl. Econ. Rev., 28, 1, 89-107
Judd, J. and Scadding, J. (1982). The search for a stable
money demand function: A survey of the post-1973 litera
ture, J. Econ. Lit., 20, (Sept.) 993-1023.
Kalecki, M. (1938) . The determinants of the distribution of
national income, Econometrica, 6, 97-112.
Keane, M. Moffitt, R. and Runkle, D. (1988) Real wages over
the business cycle: Estimating the impact of heterogene
ity with micro data. J. Pol. Econ. 96, 1232-1265
Keynes, J. M. (1936)
The general theory of employment,
interest and money. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, NY
Keynes, J.M.
output,

(1939)
Relative movements of real wages and
Econ. Journal, 49, (1939), 34-51.

Killingsworth, M.R.
ersity Press.

(1983).

Labor supply, Cambridge Univ

Kirman, A. P. (1992)
Whom or what does the representative
agent represent? Jr. Econ. Persp. 6, 117-36
Knieser T, & Goldsmith, A. (1987) A survey of alternative
models of the aggregate labor market, J. of Econ. Lit.,
25 (Sept.) 1241-1280,
King, R. and Plosser, C. (1984), Money, credit and prices in
a real business cycle, Am. Econ. Rev., 74,
363-380.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

308
King, R., Plosser, C. and Rebelo, s. (1988) Production, growth
and business cycles II: New directions. Jr. M on. Econ.,
2 1 , 309-341.
Kuh,

E. (1966) , Unemployment, Production Functions,
Effective Demand, Jr. Pol. Econ., June, 238-49.

and

Kydland, F. E. (1984)
Labor force heterogeneity and the
business cycle. Camegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, Vol. 20. Autumn.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1982) Time to build and
aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 52, 1 3 4 5 - 7 0
__________________________________ , (1990), Business cycles:
real facts and the monetary myth,
Quarterly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Spring 1990.
Laidler, D. (1977),
The demand for money: theories and
evidence., 2nd Ed., T. Y. Crowell, NY.
__________ , (1980) , The demand for money in the United States
- yet again, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, No. 12, 219-271. North-Holland.
Lang, K. and Leonard, J. (eds.) (1987) Unemployment and the
structure of labor markets, Chap. 1, Basil Blackwell,
Cambridge, MA
Layard, R. and Nickell, S. (1980)
Economica, 5 3 , 3. 121-69

Unemployment in Britain.

Langenfelt, G. (1974) The historic origin of the eight hour
day, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT
Latane1, H. (1960).
Income velocity and interest rates: A
pragmatic approach, Rev. Econ. & Stat., 4 2 , 445-49.
Lee, T. H. (1967) Alternative interest rates and the demand
for money, Am. Econ. Rev., December, 5 7 (5) 1168-81.
Leeper, Eric M. (1991), Equilibria under 'active' and
'passive' monetary and fiscal policies, Jr. Mon.
Econ. 2 7 , 129-147.
Leijonhufvud, A. (1968) On Keynesian economics and the
economics of Keynes, Oxford Univ. Press, London.
_____ _________ , (1981) Information and coordination: Essays
in macroeconomic theory. Oxford Univ. Press. London.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

309
Leraer, A. (1934), The concept of monopoly and the measure
ment of monopoly power, Rev. Econ. Studies, 1, June,
157- 175.
Levbel, A. (1989)
Exact aggregation and a representative
consumer. Econometrica, 57, 701-06
Lilien, D. M. and Hall, R. E., (1986) Cyclical fluctuations
in the labor market, Chap. 17 in Handbook of Labor
Economics. Vol. II, pp. 1001-1033.
Ashenfelter, 0. et
al, (Eds.) Elsevier Science, NY.
Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D. (1988) The insider-outsider theory
of employment and unemployment, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Lippman, s.A. and McCall, J. J. (1976), The economics of job
search: a survey. Economic Inquiry, 14, June 155-189;
Sept 347-367.
Lipsey, R.E. and Tice, H.S. (1989) .
The measurement of
saving, investment and wealth, in Studies in income and
wealth. Vol. 52, NBER, University of Chicago Press.
Litterman, R. B. and Weiss, L. (1985) , Money, real interest
rates and output: A reinterpretation of postwar US Data.
Econometrica, January, 53:1; 129-156.
Long, J. and Plosser, C. (1983) Real business cycles.
Jr. Pol. Econ., 91, February 39-69
Lucas, R. E., Jr. (1980), Two illustrations of the quantity
theory of money, Am. Econ. Rev., 70, 1005-1014.
Lydall,
H.(1973).
Press, Oxford.

The Structure of Earnings,

Clarendon

Mankiw, G. (1985) Small menu costs and large business cycles:
A macroeconomic model of monopoly. Qrtly. Jr. Econ., 100,
May, 529-539
Mankiw,
G. (1989) Real business cycles:A New Keynesian
perspective. J. Econ. Persp. 3, 3, Summer, 79-89
Mankiw, N.G. and Romer, D. (1991)
New Keynesian Economics,
Vol 1 & Vol 2, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Mankiw, G. Rotemberg, J. and Summers, L. (1985) Intertemporal
substitution in economics. Qrtly. Jr. Econ. February.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

310
Marini, Giancarlo, and van der Ploeg, Frederick (1988),
Monetary and fiscal policy in an optimising model
with capital accumulation and finite lives, Econ.
Journal, 9 8 772-786.
Markowitz, H. M. . (1987), Mean-Variance Analysis in portfolio
choice and capital markets, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA.
Martel, R. J. (1996)
Heterogeneity, aggregation, and a
meaningful macroeconomics., Chap. 8 in Beyond microfound
ations, D. Colander (ed). Cambridge Univ. Press.
Mather, J. (1987) In search of cyclical wage differentials.
NBER Conference paper, unpublished. National Bureau of
Economic Research.
McCallum, B. T. (1988)
Real business cycle models.
Working Paper, No. 2480, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
McCallum, B. T., (1989),
Monetary economics:
policy. MacMillan Publishing Co,. New York.

NBER

theory and

McDonald, I. and Solow, R. (1981),
Wage bargaining and
employment. Am. Econ. Rev., 7 1 , December, 896-980.
Meese, R. (1980) Dynamic factor demand schedules for labor and
capital under rational expectations. Jr. Econometrics,14,
141-58.
Meltzer, A. H. (1963) , The demand for money: the evidence
from the time series, J. Pol. Econ., 7 1 ,
219-46.
Metzler, L. A., (1951) Wealth, saving and the rate of inter
est. J. Pol. Econ., 5 9 , April, 93-116
Mishkin, F. (1983), Does anticipated aggregate demand policy
matter?,
Chapter 6 in A Rational approach to macro
economics, F. Mishkin, NBER/University of Chicago Press.
Modigliani, F. & Sutch, R. (1966),
Innovations in interest
rate policy, Am. Econ. Rev., May, 1966.
Hortensen, D. T., (1970), A theory of wage and employment
dynamics, in Microeconomic foundations of employment
and inflation theory, Phelps, E. (Ed.) Norton Press.
Mundell, R. (1963), Inflation and real interest,
Econ.. 290-283.

Jr. Pol.

Nickell, S. and Symons, J. (1990) . The real wage-employment
relationship in the United States. Jr. Labor Econ. 8,
1 -1 5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

311
O*Driscoll, G. (1977) The Ricardian nonequivalence theorem.
Jr. Pol. Econ.,85, 11.
Okon, A. M. (1981) , Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic
Anetlysis, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Oven, J. D. (1989) Reduced working hours: cure for unemploy
ment or economic burden? John Hopkins Univ. Press.
Patinkin, D. (1965)
New York.

Money, Interest and Prices. Harper & Row,

Pencavel, J. (1986)
Labor Supply of Hen: A Survey, Chap 1
in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol I, P. 83, Ashenfelter. 0. et al, (Eds.), Elsevier Science.
Pestieau P., and Possen U.M. (1979) A model of wealth
distribution. Econometrica, 47, 3 (May) 761-774.
Phelps, E. S. (1968) , Money wage dynamics and labor market
equilibrium. Jr. Pol. Econ., 76, (4) Part 2, August
678-711.
___________ , (Ed.) (1970) Microeconomic Foundations of Employ
ment and Inflation Theory, Norton, 1970,
____________ ,(1972) Money, wealth and labor supply, Jr. Econ.
Theory., 5, 1, August.
____________ , (1990)
Seven schools
Oxford Univ. Press, London

of

economic

thought,

Philips, L. and Pippenger, J. (1976). Preferred habitat vs.
efficient market: A test of alternative hypotheses,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 1966.
Pigou, A. C. (1937), Real and money wage rates in relation to
unemployment, Econ.
Journal,, June 405-422.
Pigou, A.C. (1943)
The classical stationary state,
Journal, 53, Dec. 342-351

Econ.

Pissarides, C.A. (1976) Labor market adjustment,
Cambridge Univ. Press, London.
_______________ , (1985), Short-run equilibrium dynamics of
unemployment, vacancies and real wages, Am. Econ.
Rev., 75, Sept. 676-690.
______________ , (1988) , The search equilibrium approach to
fluctuations in employment, Am. Econ. Assoc. Papers &
Proc.,l,May, 363-368.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

312
Ploeg, Frederick van der, and Alogoskoufis, G. S. (1994)
Money and endogenous growth, Jr. of Mon., Cr. and
Banking, 26, No. 4, 771-791.
Prais, S. and Houthakker, H. (1971)
The analysis of family
budgets, Cambridge University Press. London.
Pratt, J. W. (1964)
Risk aversion in the small and in the
large, Econometrica, 32, No. 1-2, Jan-April 1964
Prescott, E. C. (1986) Theory ahead of business cycle
measurement. Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
10, (4), Fall 28-30.
Projector, D.S. and Bretz, J. (1975). Measurement of
transfer income in the Current Population Survey,
Smith J.D. (1975), Chapter 12, pp. 377-447.

in

Radner, D. and Vaughn, D.R. (1987) Wealth, income and the
economic status of households. Chap. 5 in International
comparisons of the distribution of household wealth,
E.N.Wolff (Ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford University.
Rees, A. (1973) The economics of work and play. Chap. 11
Harper & Row, NY
Reynolds, L. (1970) Some aspects of labor supply, in Perspec
tives on wage determination, C. McConnell, ed. McGrawHill, NY
Robinson, J. (1932), The economics of imperfect competition
MacMillan, London.
Rogerson, R. (1988).
Indivisible labor, lotteries
equilibrium, Jr. Mon, Economics, 21, 3-16.

and

Rogerson, R. (1984) . Topics in the theory of labor markets,
unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota.
Rogerson, R. and Wright, R. (1988) Involuntary unemployment
in economies with efficient risk-sharing, J. Mon. Econ.
22, 501-515
Romer, D. (1996).

Advanced macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill, NY

Romer, C. and Romer, D . , (1989), Does monetary policy matter?
A new test in the spirit of Friedman and Schwarz, NBER
Macroeconomic Annual 1989, 121-170, MIt Press.
Rosen, S. (1985) Implicit Contracts: A survey, Jr. Econ.Lit
23, Sept. 1144-1175.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

313
Rotemberg, J. J. (1987), The New Keynesian microeconomic
foundations, NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1987, 69-114.
MIT Press.
Rotemberg, J. J. and Saloner, G. (1986) , A supergame-theoret
ic model of price wars during booms, Am. Econ. Rev., 76,
3, June 390-407.
Rotemberg, J. J. and Woodford, M. (1991), Markups and the
business cycle, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1991. MIT
Press. 63-129.
Rothschild, M., (1971)
Increasing risk II:
consequences, Jr. Econ. Theory, 3: 66-84.

its

economic

_____ ________ , (1973),
Models of market organization with
imperfect competition: A survey, Jr. Pol.Econ.81,
1283-1308.
Rothschild, M. & Stiglitz, J. (1970) Increasing risk I:
A definition, Jr. Econ. Theory, 2:, 225-243.
Sargan, J. D. (1957) The Distribution of Wealth, Econo
metrica, 25, 568-90
Sargent, T. (1987) Macroeconomic theory, second Ed. Chap.l,
p. 8 Academic Press, London.
Sargent, T. and Wallace, N. (1974). The elasticity of
substitution and cyclical behavior of productivity, wages
and labor's share. Am. Econ. Rev., 64, May 257-263
Selden, R. T. (1956). Monetary velocity in the United
States, in Friedman, M. W. & Schwarz, A. (eds.) Studies
in the quantity theory of money, Univ. of Chicago Press,
1956, 170-257.
Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J. (1984) Equilibrium unemployment
as a discipline device. Am. Econ. Rev., 74, June 433-444
Reprinted in New Keynesian Macroeconomics, Vol.l, Mankiw,
G, and Romer, D. (eds.) MIT Press
Shapiro, M. D. (1994) Federal Reserve policy: cause and
effect. Chap. 9 in Monetary policy, N.G. Mankiw, (ed.)
Univ. of Chicago Press. Chicago.
Sherman, R. & Willett, T. (1972) The standardized work week
and the allocation of time, Kyklos, 25, 65-82.
Sidrauski, M. (1967), Rational choice and patterns of growth
in a monetary economy, Am. Econ. Rev, Proceedings, 57
534-44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

314
Sims, C. (1972), Money, income and causality, A m . Econ. Rev.
September, 62,4, 540-542.
________ , (1980), Comparisons of interwar and postwar business
cycles: monetarism reconsidered, Am. Econ. Rev., 70, 2
May, 250-257.
________ ,(1992) Interpreting the macroeconomic time series
facts. Europ. E con. Rev 36m June, 975-1011
Slottje, D.J. (1989) . The structure of earnings and the meas
urement of income inequality in the U.S., North-Holland,
New York.
Smith, J. D. (1975). The personal distribution of income and
wealth, Studies in Income & Wealth, No. 39, NBER,
Columbia University Press.
Smith, J. D. (1980) . Modeling the distribution and intergenerational transmission of wealth, Studies in income
and wealth. Vol. 46, NBER, University of Chicago Press.
Solon, G. and Barsky, R.
cycle,

(1989) Real wages over the business

Solow, R. (1957) Technical change and the aggregate product
ion function. Rev. Econ. Studies, 39, 312-320. August.
________ , (1979) Another possible source of wage stickiness.
Jr. of Macroecon., 1, Winter, 79-82
________ ,. (1990) The labor market as a social institution.
Basil Blackwell,Cambridge, MA
Steindl, J. (1972) The distribution of wealth after a model
of Wold and Whittle, Rev. Econ. Stud., 39, (July) 263-8
Stiglitz, J. (1969) The effects of wealth, income and capital
gains taxation on risk taking, Qrtly. Jr. of Econ., 83,
263-283
Stock, J. and Watson, M. (1987) , Interpreting the evidence on
money-income causality, NBER Working Paper No.2228.
Stockman, A.C. (1983)
Aggregation bias and the cyclical
behavior of real wages. Unpublished working paper.
University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
___________
,(1986),
Sector disturbances, government
policies, and industrial production in seven European
countries. Working Paper No. 41 (University of Rochester,
Rochester, N Y .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

315
Symons, J. and Layard, R. (1984). Neoclassical demand for
labor functions for six major economies. Econ. Journal.
94, 788-99
Tarshis, L. (1939) Changes in Real and Money Wages, Econ. Jr
49, March, 150-154..
Taylor, J. (1979) Staggered price setting in a macro model.
Am. Econ.Rev. 2, May 108-113
Tiegen, R. L. (1964), Demand and supply functions for money
in the United States: some strutural estimates,
Econometrica, 32, 4, (Oct.) 497-509.
Tobin, J. (1958)
Liquidity preference as behavior toward
Risk, Rev. Econ. Stud., 25, (Feb) 65-86.
________ , (1965), Money and economic growth,
Econometrica,33, 4, 671-684
________ , (1970) Post hoc, ergo proper hoc. Qtly. Jr. Econ.,
84, 310-317
Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1987) , Monetary growth, inflation, and
economic activity in a dynamic macro model, Intl. Econ.
Rev., 28, No. 3, 707-730.
Vaughn, R. (1988)
Distributional aspects of the life cycle
theory of saving, Chap. 8 in Kessler, D. & Masson, A . ,
(eds.) Modeling the accumulation and distribution of
wealth, Clarendon Press, Oxford Univ., London
Vaughn, R., (1979) Class behavior and the distribution of
wealth, Rev Econ. Stud., 46, 447-65.
Wang, Ping and Yip, Chong K. (1992) , Alternative approaches
to money and growth, Jr. Mon., Cr. & Banking, 24, No 4,
553-562.
Weicher, J. c. (1997) . Wealth and its distribution, 19831992: secular growth, cyclical stability.
Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of S. Louis, 79, 1, Jan/FFeb., 3-23
Weiss, A. (1980) Job Queues and layoffs in labor markets with
flexible wages. Jr. Po..Econ., 88 (3), 526-38.
________ , (1990) Efficiency wages: models of unemployment,
layoffs and dispersion. Princeton Univer. Press, Prince
ton, NJ
Wold, H. & Whittle, P. (1957)
A model explaining the Pareto
distribution of wealth, Econometrica, 25, 591-95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

316
Wolff, E. N. (1980) Estimates of the 1969 size distribution of
household wealth in the United States from a synthetic
data base. Chap. 6 in Modeling the distribution and
intergenerational tremsmission of wealth, J. D. Smith
(ed), NBER Studies in income and wealth No. 46. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
___________ , (1981).
The accumulation of household wealth
over the life cycle, Rev. of Inc. and Wealth, Vol. 27.
__________ , 1987) The effects of pensions and social
security on the distribution of wealth in the U. S.,
Chap. 9 in E. N. Wolf, (ed), International Comparisons of
the Distributon of Household Wealth,208-247,, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
___________ , (1992) Changing inequality of wealth, Am. Econ.
Rev, Papers and Proc., 82, 2, 552-58
___________ , (1994) Trends in household wealth in the U. S.,
1962-1983 and 1983-1989, Rev. of Inc. and Wealth,
40, 2, June, 143-174.
_____ _____ , (1995) Top heavy: A study of the increasing
inequality of wealth in America, Twentieth Century Fund
Report, 1995, Twentieth Century Fund Press, New York.
___________ , (1998) Recent trends in the size distribution of
household wealth, J. Econ. Persp, 12, 3, Summer,131-150.
Wolff, E. N., and Marley, M. (1989) Long-term trends in U. S.
wealth inequality: Methodological issues and results, in
R. Lipsey and H. Tice, (eds) , The Measurement of Saving,
Investment and Wealth, Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 52, NBER, University of Chicago Press, 765-839
Woodford, M. (1995) Price level determinacy without control
of a monetary aggregate. Carnegie-Rochester Conference on
Public Policy, Nov. 1994 (rev. Jan 1995; mimeo)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (Q A -3 )

✓

/

150mm

IIVL4GE.Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester. NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

<5>

